西方现代股利政策理论及实证研究回顾

本文对西方现代公司股利政策方面的理论和实证研究进行了一个综合性的回顾和分析。其中包括主流的股利行为模型、股利的信息内涵、代理成本、追随者效应,也包括国内研究中较少涉及的债务约束、声誉学说、成长机会和交易成本问题,以期对国内相对落后的股利政策研究和随意性较强的股利政策制定带来一定的借鉴意义。     

Are We Better Off if Our Politicians Have More Information?

The model of public policy studied in this paper has heterogeneous citizens/voters and two public goods: one (roads) chosen directly by an elected policy‐maker, and the other (pollution) stochastically dependent on the amount of roads. Both a one‐country and a two‐country version of the model are analyzed; the latter displays externalities across the countries which create incentives for free riding and strategic delegation. The welfare effects of providing the policy‐maker with information about the relationship between roads and pollution are investigated, and it is shown that more information hurts some—sometimes even all—citizens. In particular, the opportunity not to create an institution for information gathering can serve as a commitment device for a country, although with the unfortunate effect of making the overall outcome even worse. Implications for the welfare effects of “informational lobbying” are also discussed.     

Uncertainty in the Austrian Theory of Capital

This paper is based on the traditional Austrian Theory of Capital which deals with expected values of future returns of investments over various periods of time. The longer the time period that elapses between the beginning of a production process and its end, the higher the (expected) productivity must be due to positive time preferences of individuals. This paper focuses on the uncertainty of future returns and on uncertainty preferences, instead. Based on the Hayekian idea of the dispersion of knowledge in society, it will be shown that there is a systematic relationship between the structure of capital and uncertainty. This result will be derived for a production process characterized by complete vertical integration and one which is not completely vertically integrated. The distinction between these two settings is crucial, if one accepts the distinction between an individual and a social period of production and the planning horizon which are introduced in this paper.     

Dynamic Panel Data Evidence on the Trade-Income Relation

This paper revisits the relationship between a country’s openness and its per capita income. Building on Frankel and Romer, it argues that a dynamic econometric specification similar to the ones used in empirical growth studies better fits the theoretical literature and also resolves some otherwise unresolved inconsistencies. The preferred econometric method is Blundell and Bond’s system-GMM estimator, which allows dealing with measurement error, weak instruments, and time-invariant country-specific effects. The findings confirm the existence of a strong effect of trade on income but fail to find evidence for trade as an independent factor of divergence. JEL no. F43, O40     

Managing Strategic Alliances in China （1）-Background and Experience

Creating effective strategic alliance is a useful method for the global expansion of international companies and managing strategic alliances is an important research project to the success of strategic alliances. This paper focuses on the practical problems of strategic alliances in China and explores how to manage such alliances. This research aims to introduce the basic background of strategic alliances, analyzes the primary reason for the current situations of strategic alliances, discusses the advantages and disadvantages of strategic alliances, gives the successful factors managing strategic alliances and discusses what should be done in the future research about strategic alliances？     

Pollution Control in Open Economies: Implications of Within-period Interactions for Dynamic Game Equilibrium

This paper examines a two-country, dynamic game model of pollution control in the presence of economic interactions between countries within a period, as well as the environmental interaction between periods (i.e., a change in the stock of global pollution). These economic interactions emerge because of changes in the terms of trade of polluting goods or the market share of domestic polluting industries. It is shown that if within-period externalities exist, a noncooperative equilibrium may result in a smaller stock of global pollution in the steady state than does international cooperation. Moreover, the properties of equilibrium paths depend on the direction and size of such externalities. In addition, trigger strategy equilibria that achieve the outcome of the collusive solution are examined.     

Whose Capital is It? Putting Owners Back in Control

John Bogle, founder of The Vanguard Group, looks at corporate governance issues. JEL Classification G3     

从博弈论看商务谈判僵局的本质和处理

商务谈判中的僵局是谈判双方都不愿看到但又不得不面对的难题。只有了解了商务谈判僵局产生的本质才能够更好地处理好谈判中的僵局。从博弈论的角度,对商务谈判僵局的本质进行了分析,指出在挖掘共同利益的过程中既可以寻求到瓜分共同利益的有效途径,又可寻找到共同利益与个体利益实现的最佳结合点。     

国有经济结构分析与调整对策

国有经济战略调整是中央提出的国有企业改革和发展的重要目标。在计划经济体制向市场经济体制的转轨过程中，国有经济的分布仍不够合理，国有企业在竞争领域仍然占有很大的比重，在经济结构的优化方面仍然存在着一些不容忽视的问题。因此，对这一问题的深入研究，具有重要意义。     

Goals versus institutions: the development of performance measurement in the Swedish university sector

This paper contrasts goal-directed and institutional approaches to the development of performance measurement (PM) in the Swedish university sector, which has been subject to increasing emphasis on management by objectives since the early 1990s. We adopt a macro perspective, focusing on recent changes in PM related to governmental control of universities and colleges and combine an extensive review of archival data with interviews in our empirical analysis. It is concluded that although the goal-directed model cannot be completely rejected as a heuristic informing recent changes in PM, a process-orientated institutional perspective considerably enriches the analysis by making it less static and more contextually informed. In particular, the latter perspective better explains the evolution of loose couplings between formally stated goals and performance indicators and between different systems for PM by directing attention to the complex interplay between conflicting constituent interests in the evolution of resource and cost allocation practices and quality control procedures. However, our empirical analysis also leads us to reconsider the conceptions of loose coupling as either a “given” feature of institutionalised organizations or an outcome of more pro-active resistance at the micro level prevailing in much earlier work in institutional theory.