中国企业家的终极关怀:探索性分析与群体细分

企业家终极关怀是管理哲学命题,它促使企业家不断地追求"终极目标",从而达到全面自由发展的境界。通过对587位中国企业家调查问卷分析,中国企业家的终极关怀包含三个构成维度:利他贡献、成就超我;财富声望、彰显本我;竞争整合、挑战自我。根据企业家终极关怀因子的得分再进行聚类分析,企业家群体分为四类:竞争整合导向型、利他贡献导向型、财富声望导向型、终极关怀淡漠型。将这四类企业家群体与企业类型和企业家类型的变量进行广义对应分析,得到更为确切的企业家细分群体及类型特征:有信仰的企业家更注重利他贡献;国有企业的企业家更容易淡漠终极关怀;中等规模、处于成长期企业的企业家更注重财富声望;高学历企业家更注重竞争整合。     

How do agency problems affect firm value? – Evidence from China

Using newly available data, we examine the effects of the agency conflicts between ultimate controlling shareholders and minority shareholders in China's publicly listed firms between 2004 and 2009. We measure the severity of these agency problems by the excess control rights of the ultimate controlling shareholders. We show that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly lower firm value. We identify two channels through which the excess control rights affect firm value: (1) related-party loan guarantees, and (2) legal violations. We find that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly larger amounts of related-party loan guarantees (scaled by assets) for non-state and private firms, but not for state-owned firms. We find that, for non-state and private firms, the excess controls rights are associated with (1) significantly higher probability that the firm will issue value-destroying related-party loan guarantees and (2) significantly worse stock market reactions to the announcements of related-party loan guarantees. However, these results do not hold for state-owned firms. We also find that higher excess control rights are associated with significantly higher probability, frequency and severity of legal violations for non-state and private firms, but not for state-owned firms.     

Convergent cultural evolution and multilevel selection: Reply to comments on Janet Landa’s ‘The bioeconomics of homogenous middleman groups as adaptive units: Theory and empirical evidence viewed from a group selection framework’

The comments on Janet Landa’s (J Bioecon 10(3):259–278, 2008) target article provide a fascinating snapshot of how multilevel selection theory is perceived across several disciplines. When we focus on the zone of agreement among the commentators, Landa’s article provides an important example of convergent cultural evolution. When we focus on the zone of disagreement, we find a snapshot of the current status of the group selection controversy that goes beyond narrow scientific issues and requires a ‘truth and reconciliation’ process to resolve, as discussed in my series of blogs titled “Truth and Reconciliation for Group Selection” (Wilson , 2009) and briefly summarized here.      

审计师声誉与银行信贷资源配置——基于银行信用借款决策的经验证据

本文以2001至2006年沪深A股上市公司为样本,从银行信用借款决策的视角,研究了审计师声誉对银行信贷资源配置的影响。研究发现,聘请高声誉审计师的上市公司更可能获得银行信用借款(即存在门槛效应)且信用借款的比例更高(即存在约束效应);在区分产权性质后发现,国有控股公司中审计师声誉机制主要体现为约束效应,其原因在于政治关系是一种更可靠的替代机制;非国有控股公司中仅存在审计师声誉机制的门槛效应,主要归因于我国司法体系不健全,银行将寻求其他更可靠的替代机制。研究结果表明审计师声誉是一种有效的资源配置机制,但其有效性受制度环境的制约。     

保险公司控股股东和实际控制人监管的合理性基础与制度设计

监管保险公司控股股东和实际控制人,不仅是防范保险公司控制权被滥用的现实需要,而且有其深刻的制度背景、思想条件和法律基础.在导入保险公司控股股东和实际控制人监管制度时,应遵循维护被保险人利益、区别对待、循序渐进、借鉴国际经验与中国国情相结合的原则,并将之落实在具体内容的构建之中.     

大股东控制、市场化程度与公司现金持有水平

运用2003～2008年我国所有非金融类A股上市公司的样本数据,从大股东控制视角出发,重点关注第一大股东持股比例、实际控制人性质和公司所在地区市场化程度对于公司现金持有水平的共同作用。结果表明,第一大股东持股比例与公司现金持有量水平正相关,实际控制人为国有的比非国有的上市公司的现金持有量高;公司外部治理环境的改善,有助于减轻由第一大股东持股比例以及实际控制人性质对公司现金持有量造成的负面影响。     

终极控制人两权分离、所有权性质与股票流动性

以2003～2009年沪深两市仅发行了A股的上市公司为样本,使用高频交易数据构造相对有效价差和相对报价价差以衡量股票流动性,同时采用价差分解的方法构造逆向选择指标以衡量信息不对称程度,对这一问题进行了考察。研究结果表明:两权分离度越高,则股票流动性越低,信息不对称程度越高;和国有企业相比,这一关系在民营企业中表现得更加的明显。     

终极股东控制与债务期限决策——来自中国上市家族企业的证据

现有研究证实企业普遍存在终极股东,本文利用我国303家上市家族企业2007～2009年面板数据检验了终极股东控制和债务期限结构的关系.研究发现:存在终极控制的上市家族企业,随着终极控制权和现金流权分离程度的增加,更愿意采用负债融资,以获取更多可控制资源,实现其控制权私利,并且我国上市家族企业不倾向于短期债务,而更愿意采用长期债务,来实现其非金钱收益,这是因为短期债务能够减少自由现金流量,并具有外部监督效用,限制了终极控制人获取私利的机会.     

电动汽车所用电控系统性能介绍及设计

本文简要介绍电动汽车所用电机控制器的种类、结构、工作原理、特点和设计。     

编组站站调IDSSG

利用计算机编制编组站站调阶段计划,应首先建立编组站站调智能决策支持系统生成器(IDSSG),根据各编组站的具体情况生成专用的站调智能决策支持系统(IDSS)。结合站调阶段计划的特点,说明编组站站调IDSSG的特性和设计要求,并对系统的构成及各子系统的设计进行论述。