REGULATION STRATEGIES FOR THE PROVISION OF PATERNALISTIC GOODS

In this study, we analyze the regulation of markets for the provision of services whose costs are subsidized for paternalistic reasons. We model the choice of a benevolent regulator who wants to maximize consumer welfare in a setting where quality cannot be verified and the good provided is fully subsidized. The choice is thus made between two types of providers (profit maximizers and altruistic providers) and two frameworks (monopoly franchise and quality competition). Our analysis shows that in this environment the performance of mixed markets is always dominated by pure forms. Moreover, although making efficient providers compete for the market minimizes cost, the choice of quality competition with altruistic providers may be preferable from a welfare point of view whenever service quality is relevant and the productivity differential is not substantial.     

Corporate Cash Holding in Asia

In this paper, we analyze the determinants of corporate saving in the form of changes in cash holdings for 11 Asian economies using firm‐level data from the Oriana Database for the 2002–2011 period. We find some evidence that cash flow has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings (i.e. that the cash flow sensitivity of cash is positive) and that the positive impact of cash flow on the change in cash holdings is larger and more significant in the case of smaller and presumably more constrained firms than in the case of larger and presumably less constrained firms in both developed and developing economies. Both of these findings corroborate the importance of financial constraints in Asian firms. In addition, we find that the cash flow sensitivity of cash declined after the global financial crisis and that Tobin's q has a positive impact on the change in cash holdings, especially in the case of larger and presumably unconstrained firms.     

Loss-leader pricing and upgrades

A new theory of loss-leader pricing is provided in which firms advertise low (below cost) prices for certain goods to signal that their other unadvertised (substitute) goods are not priced too high. The theory is applied to the pricing of upgrades. The results contrast with most existing loss-leader theories in that firms make a loss on some consumers (who buy the basic version of the good) and a profit on others (who buy the upgrade).     

3S技术在国家重点建设工程项目中的应用——以京沪高铁项目(天津段)为例

3S技术是测量技术发展史的一次重大突破,给测量领域带来了新的生命力,并已推广应用在国家基础建设的各个方面。本文以京沪高铁天津段这样的国家重点建设工程项目为例,介绍了3S技术在该项目从土地规划到建设运营方面的应用。     

Using Personal Car Register for Measuring Economic Inequality in Countries with a Large Share of Shadow Economy: Evidence for Latvia

We suggest using information from the state register of personal cars as an alternative indicator of economic inequality in countries with a large share of shadow economy. We illustrate our approach using the Latvian pool of personal cars. Our main finding is that the extent of household economic inequality in Latvia is much larger than officially assumed. According to Eurostat, the officially published estimate of the Gini coefficient for Latvia is 0.374 for 2009, which is much higher than the Gini coefficient value reported for all the 27 EU member countries (0.304), but significantly lower than 0.48 according to our results.     

Predation and network based price discrimination in Chile

This paper uses a model of strategic interaction among firms –that set discriminatory and nonlinear prices– in addition to public information on prices of the plans marketed by the three major mobile phone companies, to assess the extent to which on-net/off-net price differentials in the plans they offered could represent predatory practices in the mobile telephony market in Chile. The results show that the largest companies offered a few plans with an off-net/on-net price differential larger than what a competitive theoretical model predicts. This larger differential is consistent with the notion of predation defined by Hoernig (2007) as reducing a competitor's profits. Despite the fact that these plans were a small fraction of all the plans mobile phone firms offered, they were recently banned by the antitrust authority because of their potential anticompetitive effects.     

The α-stable processes and their relationship with the exponent of self-similarity: Exchange rates of USA Dollar,Canadian Dollar,Euro and Yen

This research work analyzes the yields of the exchange rate parities of the American dollar, Canadian dollar, Euro, and Yen; estimates the basic statistics and the α-stables; carries out the Kolmogorov–Smirnov, Anderson–Darling, and Lilliefors goodness of fit tests; estimates the self-similar exponents and carries out the t and F tests, ruling out that the series of parities are multifractal. It also estimates the confidence intervals of the exchange rate parities and concludes that the estimated α-stable distributions are more efficient than the Gaussian distribution to quantify the risks of the market, and that the series are self-similar. Through the ? index, we can infer the risk of the events, indicating that the parities are anti-persistent and thus have short-term memory, mean reversion, and a negative correlation with the high risk in the short and medium term. The estimation and validation of the α-stable distributions and the self-similar exponent are important in the evaluation and creation of innovative investment instruments through financial engineering, risk administration, and the evaluation of derived products.     

Interpolating the Lorenz Curve: Methods to Preserve Shape and Remain Consistent with the Concentration Curves for Components

C¹‐class interpolation methods that preserve monotonicity and convexity and are thus suitable for the estimation of the Lorenz curve from grouped data are not widely known. Instead, parametric models are usually applied for such estimation. Parametric models, however, have difficulty in accurately approximating every part of income/expenditure distributions. This paper proposes two types of C¹‐class shape‐preserving interpolation methods. One is a piecewise rational polynomial interpolation (proposed independently by Stineman and Delbourgo) that enables consistent interpolation of the concentration curves for income/expenditure components, attaining approximately the same accuracy as that of the existing methods when applied to decile‐grouped data or to more detailed aggregation. Another is a Hybrid interpolation that employs pieces of curves derived from parametric models on end intervals. Empirical comparisons show that the Hybrid interpolation (with the assistance of parametric models for class‐boundary estimation) outperforms the existing methods even when applied to quintile‐grouped data without class boundaries.     

Waiting for Signaling Quality

When a durable good of uncertain quality is introduced to the market, some consumers strategically delay their buying until the next period, with the hope of learning the unknown quality. I analyze the monopolist's pricing and waiting strategies when consumers have strategic delay incentives. I show when the monopolist offers introductory low prices in pooling equilibria. I also find two types of separating equilibria: one where the high‐type monopolist signals its quality by choosing a different price than the low‐type monopolist in the first period and another where the high‐type monopolist announces the product in the first period and waits to sell only in the second period. Waiting creates a credible cost for signaling; hence, the monopolist uses it as a signaling device.     

Optimal combination of innovation and environmental policies under technology licensing

Under what conditions will a carbon tax encourage environmental innovation? Can a regulator design an optimal environmental policy to reduce emissions and to promote clean technologies? This paper studies optimal environmental policy in the situation where a monopoly innovator develops and licenses clean production technologies to downstream polluting firms. We find that (i) a higher emission tax will encourage innovation when the burden of the tax payment in the polluters' costs and/or the price-elasticity of the demand for polluting goods are small, (ii) the innovation-inducing effects of emission tax are inversely related to the emission-reduction (Pigouvian) effects of the tax, and (iii) the social optimum can be achieved by the mix of tax and subsidy. We also show that if the policy instrument is limited to the tax, the second-best tax rate would lie between the marginal damage and the first-best rate. By performing numerical simulations, we also demonstrate that the optimal mix of the emission tax and R&D subsidy can have “double dividend” benefits.