Asymmetric auctions with resale: An experimental study

We study auctions with resale based on Hafalir and Krishna's (2008) [6] model. As predicted, weak bidders bid more with resale than without, so that average auction prices tend to increase. When the equilibrium calls for weak types to bid higher than their values with resale they do, but not nearly as much as the theory predicts. In other treatments outcomes are much closer to the risk neutral Nash model's predictions. Bid distributions for weak and strong types are more similar with resale than without, in line with the theory.     

Menu-dependent preferences and revelation principle

We extend the set of preferences to include menu-dependent preferences and characterize the domain in which the revelation principle holds. A weakening of the well-known contraction consistency is shown to define a subset of this domain. However, we show that minimax-regret preference can be outside the domain.     

Idiosyncratic risk and financial policy

In economies subject to uninsurable idiosyncratic risks, competitive equilibrium allocations are constrained inefficient: reallocations of assets support Pareto superior allocations. This is the case even if the asset market for the allocation of aggregate risks is complete.     

Competitive behavior in market games: Evidence and theory

We explore whether competitive outcomes arise in an experimental implementation of a market game, introduced by Shubik (1973) [21]. Market games obtain Pareto inferior (strict) Nash equilibria, in which some or possibly all markets are closed. We find that subjects do not coordinate on autarkic Nash equilibria, but favor more efficient Nash equilibria in which all markets are open. As the number of subjects participating in the market game increases, the Nash equilibrium they achieve approximates the associated competitive equilibrium of the underlying economy. Motivated by these findings, we provide a theoretical argument for why evolutionary forces can lead to competitive outcomes in market games.     

Ironing without control

I extend Myerson?s [R. Myerson, Optimal auction design, Math. Oper. Res. 6 (1981) 58–73] ironing technique to more general objective functions. The approach is based on a generalized notion of virtual surplus which can be maximized pointwise even when the monotonicity constraint implied by incentive compatibility binds. It is applicable to quasilinear principal-agent models where the standard virtual surplus is weakly concave in the allocation or appropriately separable in the allocation and type. No assumptions on allocation rules are required beyond monotonicity.     

Justifiable preferences

We characterize preferences over acts that can be represented by a utility function and a multiple-prior, such that an act f is preferred to act g if there is a prior under which the expected utility induced by f is higher than that induced by g. These preferences are referred to as justifiable preferences. We further introduce a generalized model of ambiguity that involves a collection of multiple-priors, namely, multiple multiple-priors and incorporate Bewley?s Knightian model in justifiability: f is preferred to g if, according to at least one set of priors, f is unanimously preferred to g.     

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechanisms. We conclude that either the quasilinearity-like assumptions of available sufficiency results cannot be completely dispensed with or some mechanisms that do not satisfy the best element property must be employed. We term the condition “restricted deception-proofness.” It requires that, in environments with identical preferences, the social choice function be immune to all deceptions, making it then stronger than incentive compatibility. In some environments the conditions for (exact or approximate) implementation by mechanisms satisfying the best element property are more restrictive than previously thought.     

FOOD INSECURITY AND INSUFFICIENCY AT LOW LEVELS OF FOOD EXPENDITURES

In this study we investigate the external validity of the food insecurity and insufficiency measures—specifically, how these measures correlate with food expenditures—using the December 2003 Food Security Supplement of the Current Population Survey. We focus on a special segment of the population—households with low incomes and low food expenditures. If reports of food problems are based on a lack of food, reports should be nearly ubiquitous at the bottom of the expenditure distribution. We find, however, that this is not the case. We define and scale food expenditures several different ways and find that the reported incidence of food insecurity never rises above one‐half anywhere along the corresponding expenditure distributions, leading to concerns about the external validity of the measure.     

Forecasting of electricity costs based on an enhanced gray-based learning model: A case study of renewable energy in Taiwan

This work presents a novel gray-based cost efficiency (GCE) model that integrates the gray forecasting model into a two-factor cost efficiency curve model for renewable energy (RE) technologies and identifies the optimal forecasting model for power generation cost of RE technologies. The analytical framework of proposed GCE model improves short-term prediction of power generation cost, and can be applied during the early developmental stages for RE technologies. Empirical analysis is based on wind power data for Taiwan. Time lag of knowledge stock was simulated to represent the actual relationship between R&D expenditures and cost reductions in power generation by knowledge stock. Analytical results demonstrate the GCE model is a useful tool to quantify the influences of cost reductions in power generation. The implications of analytical results are that institutional policy instruments play an important role in RE technologies achieving cost reductions and market adoption. The proposed GCE model can be applied to all high-technology cases, and particularly to RE technologies. The study concludes by outlining the limitations of the proposed GCE model and directions for further research.     

一种新的战略定位方法:ISTP3

定位是营销管理和战略管理的核心,但始终没有一种简洁有效的找出定位的方法。本文首先分析了价值准则定位框架、与众不同的区分四步骤、STP等现存影响较大的定位方法,指出它们的缺陷在于只适用于终端消费产品(服务)、实操性差。随后,在现代营销之父菲利普.科特勒的STP方法的基础上,提出了一种STP升级的定位方法——ISTP3,其较STP的改进主要在于两点:一是对市场细分、目标市场选定和市场定位,都必须区分企业的产品是属于产业链市场的上、中、下游的哪一环节来进行;二是定位包含三个层次,分别是满足购买(基层定位)、满足功能(中层定位)与享受体验(高层定位)。最后,结合几个著名案例对ISTP3运用及其要则进行了示范性介绍。