贸易自由化与竞争政策的国际协调

由于拥有共同的目标——改善市场间或市场内的资源分配,竞争政策与国际贸易自由化之间有着极为密切的联系。从国际贸易自由化与竞争政策的关系入手,指出一国的竞争政策对国际贸易自由化的影响,并在此基础上论述国际经济社会在协调二者关系中所进行的各种制度设计与努力,最后讨论竞争政策国际协调的前景等问题。     

中小企业竞争力问题研究

随着经济的全球化和我国市场经济体制的日趋完善,特别是中国加入WTO后,企业间的竞争日渐激烈,竞争的方式和内容也在发生深刻的变化。没有特色的中小企业在低层次的竞争中更是很难继续生存下去。相对于大企业而言,处于弱势的中小企业必须根据自身特点重新认识自己的比较优势,以此制定合适的竞争战略,从而使中小企业迅速占领市场,赢得用户,提升自身的营销竞争力。     

省域经济竞争力体系模型构造的研究

省域经济竞争力是一个多层次的竞争力体系，其中包括了纵向的省、市、县三级经济竞争力和横向的产业、行业、子行业与产业集群竞争力。每个竞争力都可根据其特点建构出相应的竞争力模型，这些模型从不同角度揭示出省域经济竞争力的内容和规律性，为省域经济竞争力的分析提供了一个相对完整的模型体系。     

农业国际化与我国农产品贸易优势

农业国际化是全球农业生产力水平不断提高的结果,而加入世贸组织极大地促进和推动了我国农业的国际化进程。文章借助世贸组织前后我国农产品国际贸易数据．分别计算我国农产品产业内贸易和产业间贸易的发展指数,实证分析了我国农产品在世贸组织前后竞争优势的演变．并对进一步增强我国农产品竞争优势提出具体的政策建议。     

Competitiveness of Egyptian cotton exports in the international market

Cotton plays a vital role in the Egyptian economy by meeting domestic and export demands,contributing significantly to agriculture,industry,export earnings,and providing a cash income to roughly one million small farmers.This paper examines the competitiveness of Egyptian cotton exports（ECE） in the international market during the period 1990-2006.It mainly aims at investigating the trends in cotton exports over the studied period,analyzing the competitive position of Egyptian cotton by employing several economic and trade indices,and identifying the key factors that influence Egypt＇s cotton exports to the world.The results revealed that the total quantity of ECE has fallen from 196.8 thousand tons in 2003 to 87.2 thousand tons in 2006.It also shows a high degree of geographic concentration of ECE,into India,Italy,the Republic of Korea,and Japan.Together,these markets imported about 50%of ECE during 1990-2006.The competitive advantage of Egyptian cotton would appear dependent on quality not price.Japan,the Republic of Korea and Italy presented the most stable markets for ECE.Linear regression analysis suggests that a one percent increase in the Egypt-to-USA export price ratio leads to a decrease in ECE by about 27.8 thousand tons.Such analysis has also shown a positive and significant effect of the World Trade Organization on ECE.     

基于竞争战略视角的跨国公司R&D机构区位机理研究——以诺基亚为例

目前对跨国公司R&D区位的研究大多站在区域要素供给的角度,探讨影响R&D机构布局的区位因子。实际上,在全球竞争时代,跨国公司R&D机构布局在考虑投资地R&D区位规模的同时,还受到企业内在因素的影响。从竞争战略视角出发,以诺基亚公司为例,研究跨国公司R&D机构的全球区位机理。结果发现,R&D机构的空间布局受到研发网络/战略的总体控制,并受生产单元、竞争对手、合作伙伴等利益相关体的影响,同时与东道国各类要素产生层层耦合。从诺基亚案例分析中得出若干启示,以期为我国城市R&D产业发展提供重要参考。     

组织惯例更新触发因素与影响效应——基于先动型市场导向和可持续竞争优势视角

组织惯例更新是企业进行组织优化和迭代以适应外部动态环境的重要途径,基于组织学习理论和动态能力理论,构建先动型市场导向—组织学习—组织惯例更新—动态能力—可持续竞争优势研究框架,探讨组织惯例更新触发因素与影响效应。通过对191家科技型企业进行问卷调研发现：①先动型市场导向显著正向影响组织惯例更新,组织学习在先动型市场导向与组织惯例更新之间起部分中介作用;②组织惯例更新显著正向影响企业可持续竞争优势,动态能力在组织惯例更新与可持续竞争优势之间发挥完全中介作用。研究结论有助于厘清组织惯例更新触发因素、丰富组织惯例更新结果研究,并对企业建立可持续竞争优势具有一定指导意义。     

The determinants of tendering periods for PPP procurement in the UK: an empirical analysis

The procurement of infrastructure projects via public–private partnerships (PPPs) is rising globally. PPPs are, however, often characterized by lengthy tendering periods, defined as the difference between contract notice and financial close. Tendering periods are important because they account for a significant proportion of overall project delivery time. Slow tendering deters bidders and thus reduces competition for contracts. We source data on 670 PPP projects in the United Kingdom and use a duration analysis model to empirically examine factors that impact tendering period duration. Our results reveal significant sectoral variation with projects in the health and housing sectors taking significantly longer to reach financial close. We also show that, after controlling for other factors, projects with higher capital values and projects that overlap with the timing of general elections are associated with significantly longer tendering periods. We further examine the impact of the competitive dialogue procurement method and find evidence that tendering periods have increased since 2006; the year competitive dialogue was introduced. We do, however, observe a significant reduction in the time between appointment of preferred bidder and financial close post-2006. This suggests that competitive dialogue is effective in reducing the scope for negotiations by preferred bidders holding quasi-monopoly advantages.     

Existence of a competitive equilibrium in a one sector growth model with heterogeneous agents and irreversible investment

Summary. We prove existence of a competitive equilibrium in a version of a Ramsey (one sector) model in which agents are heterogeneous and gross investment is constrained to be non negative. We do so by converting the infinite-dimensional fixed point problem stated in terms of prices and commodities into a finite-dimensional Negishi problem involving individual weights in a social value function. This method allows us to obtain detailed results concerning the properties of competitive equilibria. Because of the simplicity of the techniques utilized our approach is amenable to be adapted by practitioners in analogous problems often studied in macroeconomics. Received: September 13, 2001; revised version: December 9, 2002 RID="*" ID="*" We are grateful to Tapan Mitra for pointing out errors as well as making very valuable suggestions. Thanks are due to Raouf Boucekkine and Jorge Duran for additional helpful discussions. We also thank an anonymous referee for his/her helpful comments. The second author acknowledges the financial support of the Belgian Ministry of Scientific Research (Grant ARC 99/04-235 “Growth and incentive design”) and of the Belgian Federal Goverment (Grant PAI P5/10, “Equilibrium theory and optimization for public policy and industry regulation”). Correspondence to: C. Le Van     

Bargaining, binding contracts, and competitive wages

In a model where many workers bargain with one firm and sign binding contracts, we show existence of a stationary subgame perfect equilibrium. If the production function satisfies decreasing returns, each worker receives a share of his marginal product (treating all other workers as employed) in equilibrium. Thus, wages are competitive. This is in contrast to Stole and Zweibel (1996, Rev. Econ. Stud. 63, 375–410), who assume that contracts are non-binding and find that the payoff of a worker is a weighted average of the inframarginal contributions. Hence, binding contracts imply lower wages than non-binding contracts.