Technology-forcing through environmental regulation

This paper analyzes the demand characteristics of innovation in pollution abatement and the interaction between a regulator and a polluter under a technology-forcing policy. Important demand-driven determinants of innovation in pollution control are examined, such as uncertainties surrounding unexplored technologies, the length of the compliance period and the maximum abatement costs the regulator is willing to accept. We derive the formal condition that the regulator balances the marginal utility of emissions reduction against the marginal disutilities of a longer compliance time and the increased uncertainty about the feasibility of a more stringent standard.     

Deposit insurance and bank regulation in a monetary economy: a general equilibrium exposition

Summary. It is commonly argued that poorly designed banking system safety nets are largely to blame for the frequency and severity of modern banking crises. For example, underpriced deposit insurance and/or low reserve requirements are often viewed as factors that encourage risk-taking by banks. In this paper, we study the effects of three policy variables: deposit insurance premia, reserve requirements and the way in which the costs of bank bailouts are financed. We show that when deposit insurance premia are low, the monetization of bank bailout costs may not be more inflationary than financing these costs out of general revenue. This is because, while monetizing the costs increases the inflation tax rate, higher levels of general taxation reduce savings, deposits, bank reserves, and the inflation tax base. Increasing the inflation tax rate obviously raises inflation, but so does an erosion of the inflation tax base. We also find that low deposit insurance premia or low reserve requirements may not be associated with a high rate of bank failure.Received: 2 January 2002, Revised: 1 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: D5, E5, G1.B. D. Smith: Sadly, our co-author, colleague and dear friend, Bruce D. Smith, died on July 9, 2002.     

Risk and Capital Structure in the Regulated Firm

This paper studies the role of capital structure in a regulated firm. We show that it affects the prices set by the regulator, the expected price being lower the higher the proportion of debt finance. However, when debt is increased beyond a certain level, the benefit of lower expected prices is offset by their increased variability. We also study the socially preferred capital structure. This is such that consumers carry some risk, in the form of higher prices in adverse economic conditions.     

Pricing access in network competition

We compare various access pricing rules in the two-way access model. We show that the Generalized Efficient Component Pricing Rule (TECPR) leads to a lower equilibrium price than does the Efficient Component Pricing Rule, (ECPR) marginal cost pricing, (MCP) and any non-negative fixed access charges.      

Job Creation and Job Destruction in a Regulated Labor Market: The Case of Austria

We study Austrian job reallocation in the period of 1978 to 1998, using a large administrative dataset where we correct for spurious entries and exits of firms. We find that on average 9 out of 100 randomly selected jobs were created within the last year, and that about 9 out of randomly selected 100 jobs were destroyed within the next year. Hence, the magnitude of Austrian job flows seems to be comparable to other countries, similar to the well-known results of Davis et al. (1996) for the United States. Job reallocation appears to be driven primarily by idiosyncratic shocks. However, job creation increases significantly during cyclical upswings whereas job destruction rises in downturns. We also find substantial persistence of job creation and destruction. The pronounced pattern of job reallocation rates falling with firm size and age continues to hold when we use a set of controls. Finally, we show that – controlling for sector and firm size composition – Austrian job reallocation rates are only half the rates for the U.S. This result is not surprising given the impact of tighter regulation and labor law in Austria.     

Incentive Regulation of Prices When Costs are Sunk

We present a model featuring irreversible investment, economies of scale, uncertain future demand and capital prices, and a regulator who sets the firm’s output price according to the cost structure of a hypothetical replacement firm. We show that a replacement firm has a fundamental cost advantage over the regulated firm: it can better exploit the economies of scale because it has not had to confront the historical uncertainties faced by the regulated firm. We show that setting prices so low that a replacement firm is just willing to participate is insufficient to allow the regulated firm to expect to break even whenever it has to invest. Thus, unless the regulator is willing to incur costly monitoring to ensure the firm invests, revenue must be allowed in excess of that required for a replacement firm to participate. This contrasts with much of the existing literature, which argues that the market value of a regulated firm should equal the cost of replacing its existing assets. We also obtain a closed-form solution for the regulated firm’s output price when this price is set at discrete intervals. In contrast to rate of return regulation, we find that resetting the regulated price more frequently can increase the risk faced by the firm’s owners, and that this is reflected in a higher output price and a higher weighted-average cost of capital.     

Government as a discriminating monopolist in the financial market: the case of China

We show that the many unusual features of China’s financial markets are consistent with a government choosing regulations to maximize a standard type of social welfare function. Under certain conditions, these regulations are equivalent to imposing explicit taxes on business and interest income, yet should be much easier to enforce. The observed implicit tax rates are broadly in line with those observed in other countries. The theory also forecasts, however, that China will face increasing incentives over time to shift to explicit taxes.     

注册会计师行业监管的若干问题研究

针对我国对舞弊的会计师事务所处罚力度明显不够的事实，监管机构应加大处罚力度，在确定合理处罚的基础上选择适当的监管力度，政府监管力度按成本效益原则确定监管费用的最优投入，决定监管机构的规模和大小，并完善相关的机构建设。     

Incomplete regulation, market competition and collusion

Regulators often do not regulate all firms competing in a given sector. Due to product substitutability, unregulated competitors have incentives to bribe regulated firms to have them overstate their costs and produce less, thereby softening competition. The best collusion-proof contract entails distortions both for inefficient and efficient regulated firms (distortion ‘at the top’). But a contract inducing active collusion may do better by allowing the regulator to ‘team up’ with the regulated firm to indirectly tax its competitor. The best such contract is characterized. It is such that the unregulated firm pays the regulated one to have it truthfully reveals its inefficiency. We finally compare those contracts.     

Sustainable resource use,economic development,and public regulation

The role of production technology for sustainable economic growth and resource management in the multispecies renewable resources industries is a neglected issue, particularly in complex tropical ecosystems. Given the still rudimentary understanding of biological interactions among species, even in most temperate ecosystems, the importance of under-standing the technological and economic interactions is heightened for sustainable economic growth and public regulation. This paper evaluates these interactions for the multiproduct gill net fisheries of Peninsular Malaysia. Standard price and quantity controls may have little promise. Gear regulations, a policy of constant escapement, and managing the entire mix of species as a single stock for economic rather than biomass yield appear the most promising management tools given the limited regulatory options.