The Informational Effect of Corporate Lobbying Against Proposed Accounting Standards

Accounting standard setting has been described as a highly political process. Different interest groups are often quite ready to criticize any proposed accounting standard and lobby the accounting standard setting body. This study explores the possibility that certain information might be revealed through corporate lobbying behavior. A game-theoretic model is formulated to examine the implications of a proposed accounting standard which, if passed, would require the financial statement recording of some previously undisclosed liabilities. In this model, management has incentive to lobby against the standard and prevent the mandatory reporting of the liabilities. Lobbying against the standard, however, may itself reveal to the market information about the liabilities. Results of the equilibrium analysis show that, because of this informational effect, a company may choose not to lobby even though the company may have a high liability and can be adversely affected by the proposed standard. On the other hand, a company may avoid revealing its liability level if it can adopt the "always-lobby" strategy. Furthermore, a company may not have to lobby at all if it can "free-ride" on other companies' lobbying effort. Companies may even be able to enjoy "free-riding" at least some of the time if each company can share the responsibilities and lobby on a probabilistic and what otherwise may seem like a random basis.     

会计准则制定程序的博弈分析——以美国和欧盟为例

近年来,政治行为已经成为会计准则制定过程中的一个重要议题。以美国和欧盟为例,从博弈论角度对会计准则制定过程中的政治过程进行深入分析,发现美国和欧盟的会计准则制定主体——FASB和IASB遵循一个极为相似的程序,但它们却被植入了截然不同的政治环境中。对于一个相似的新会计准则,即使两个会计准则制定主体有着极为相似的偏好,其结果也将迥然不同。     

Lobbying and tax competition in an oligopolistic industry: a reverse home-market effect

This paper studies tax competition between two asymmetrical countries for an oligopolistic industry with many firms. Each government sets its tax rate strategically to maximize the weighted sum of residents’ welfare and political contributions by owners of firms. It is shown that if the governments care deeply about contributions and trade costs are low, the small country attracts a more than proportionate share of firms by setting a lower tax rate. The well-known home-market effect, which states that countries with a larger market attract a more-than-proportionate share of firms, may be reversed as a result of tax competition by politically interested governments.     

中国企业集团多样化经营战略研究——西方近期研究成果之借鉴

Lang和Stulz (1994 ) ,Berger和Ofek (1995 )以多样化企业集团的市场价值与集团各部门所在行业中所有单一企业组合的价值之和相比较,发现企业进行多样化经营后会降低其价值。由此,引发了西方理论界对多样化经营同企业价值间关系的大讨论。目前,中国的企业集团正蓬勃发展,随着企业集团的不断强大,企业过剩的资本会流向不同的产业部门,形成多样化集团。中国作为新兴的市场,与西方的成熟市场不一样。所以在借鉴西方理论以及研究成果为我所用的同时,更要结合中国的实际情况,提出切合实际的中国企业集团多样化经营战略。     

The political economy of environmental and social security policies: the role of environmental lobbying

Social security provides retirement benefits to the old at the expense of the working young, while environmental investment benefits the future of the young at the expense of the old. This paper presents a model incorporating this intergenerational conflict on public spending and considers the political determination of environmental investment and social security by focusing on the Markovian political equilibria. It is shown that (1) the political equilibria are generally inefficient, and (2) the introduction of environmental lobbying into politics may improve environmental quality but degrade lifetime utility in the long run.      

Trade and associated groups in the English tourism policy arena

The role and influence of trade and associated groups in England's tourism policy environment is of increasing importance given recent changes in the consultative processes undertaken by the Department of Culture Media and Sport (the government department sponsoring the tourism industry in Parliament). Yet researchers working within the realm of tourism studies have paid little attention to their characteristics, objectives and tactics. This article, therefore, sets out to address these issues by drawing on the results of phase one of a two‐phase research project into the influence of trade and associated groups on policy development. The article reports the findings of a survey into the objectives and tactics used by the groups in policy communications and links this to structural changes in the landscape of the tourism policy. In doing this it suggests how certain relationships have developed between government and groups, how groups collaborate on policy issues and how this may have influenced the direction of tourism policy in the England. Using the results of this research and an analysis of government policy related announcements over the past two years we hypothesise on how successful the groups have been to data, and proposes areas for future research. Copyright © 2001 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Public Affairs Management Activities of German Multinational Corporations in India

In this paper the importance of public affairs management in multinational corporations in India will be examined. After briefly discussing the state of the art in international business and society literature, a conceptual framework for public affairs management in multinational corporations will be developed. This framework serves as the theoretical basis for an empirical study among German multinational corporations in India. In the main part of this paper the results of this study will be presented and discussed. The paper ends with a critical assessment and some major implications for future studies.     

Policy takers or policy makers? The lobbying of global banking regulators

Do financial sector groups act as passive policy takers, or do they ‘shape’ the policies to which they are subject? This article responds to this question with three arguments pertaining to the policy shaping power of the financial industry when it comes to international financial standards. First, industry groups confront a number of additional challenges when it comes to lobbying international regulatory bodies, which tend to be more opaque in their decision making and more difficult to hold accountable when they make unpopular decisions. Second, while these groups are sometimes able to shape financial regulatory policy, the extent of this influence is more partial and contingent than most depictions suggest. The third argument advanced is that since the global financial crisis, business groups have had many of their traditional lobbying tools adversely affected, making lobbying a more uphill battle than before. Financial industry groups are able to influence the governance of their own activities and act as ‘policy shapers’ some of the time, but are less strongly positioned in this role than many existing depictions seem to suggest.     

Bending the rules,breaking the rules: How corruption and lobbying affect the investment market selection of Swedish firms

There is stark evidence that many policies which influence firm gains from engaging in FDI (such as tax and trade policies) are targeted by lobbying groups and that corruption can be an important determinant of market attractiveness. The scarce research that exists on firm behaviour, corruption and lobbying shows that these activities can be regarded as alternative, and interdependent, influence forms. This paper provides the novel contribution of investigating how the market infiltration of corruption and lobbying affects the firm's investment decision. We identify the interdependent effects using census data for Swedish manufacturing firms that allows a complete identification of the firm's market selection. Our results reveal that these private–public sector links influence the firm's investment decision differently, as market selection is deterred by corruption and stimulated by lobbying, and that they function as substitutes. We show that the stimulating lobbying effect largely can be attributed to its interdependency with corruption, which suggests that firms are more shielded from corruption in lobbying environments. Further investigation reveals that the corruption and lobbying effects are not always representative of larger firms: The largest firms are undeterred by corruption in markets where lobbying forms an integral part of the business environment and larger firms are not stimulated by lobbying in markets largely void of corruption.