系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度：历史与未来方向

系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度是后金融危机时代国际金融监管领域的重要理论和实践问题。探讨了系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度的重要性,在此基础上,梳理了系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度路径的历史演变,主要包括存款保险制度与最后贷款人机制。最后,讨论了“太大而不能倒”危机管理理念的缺陷,指出完善系统重要性金融机构危机监管制度的紧迫性及其最新发展趋势。     

Floating a “lifeboat”: The Banque de France and the crisis of 1889

When faced with a run on a “systemically important” but insolvent bank in 1889, the Banque de France pre-emptively organized a lifeboat to ensure that depositors were protected and an orderly liquidation could proceed. To protect the Banque from losses on its lifeboat loan, a guarantee syndicate was formed penalizing those who had participated in the copper speculation that had caused the crisis bringing the bank down. Creation of the syndicate and other actions were consistent with mitigating the moral hazard from such an intervention. This episode contrasts the advice given by Bagehot to the Bank of England to counter a panic by lending freely at a high rate on good collateral, allowing insolvent institutions to fail.     

The Moral Imperative and Social Rationality of Government-Guaranteed Employment and Reskilling

Unemployment exacts a high cost to its victims, not only in lost income, but also in terms of quality of life (insecurity, depression, abandoned families, divorce, suicide and poorer health). It also exacts a high cost to society in terms of lost output, foregone tax revenue, depreciating human capital, and increased costs of welfare, crime and health care. Yet modern wealthy societies have, principally for the sake of price stability and to avoid the budget costs of a full remedy, chosen to tolerate a substantial level of permanent unemployment. This article explores the moral conditions of this social choice and its rationality in terms of social welfare. It makes and develops support for two claims: society's tolerance of involuntary unemployment is morally wrong, and it is socially and economically irrational. It concludes that government should guarantee employment by serving as employer of last resort and where appropriate provide for retraining.     

Insuring Banks Against Liquidity Shocks: The Role of Deposit Insurance and Lending of Last Resort

Abstract.  It has long been recognized that banks' simultaneous provision of monitoring and liquidity services is advantageous but leaves them susceptible to liquidity shocks that may culminate in a system failure. Because a system failure is costly, this provides a rationale for adopting arrangements, including a lender of last resort and deposit insurance (DI), to insure banks against liquidity shocks. These arrangements have proven themselves very successful, but they have also been the source of problems. Researchers have identified some of the main sources of these problems and have suggested ways to improve the design of these arrangements, but there are still many issues that remain unaddressed. This paper reviews the literature on the two arrangements that most countries have adopted to insure banks against liquidity shocks, a lender of last resort and DI, and compares the design of these arrangements across countries. The paper ends with a brief summary of the key lessons learned about the design of these arrangements and the issues related to them that remain unaddressed.     

论旅游景区几种戏剧表演空间范式

戏剧表演空间可以理解为戏剧行动发生的地方,即剧院剧场或者除房间界限的剧场形式。从“正统戏剧”剧院剧场形式的空间之外,属于谢克纳所说“环境戏剧”表演空间出发,探讨我国旅游景区存在的埃及式、希腊式、巴厘式等几种戏剧表演空间范式．     

对后危机时代最后贷款人法律制度创新的思考

无论一种制度如何先进,与动态的社会而言,其都是一个此一时彼一时的问题。若具有相对真理性的制度意图\"常青不败\",那么它就必须与时俱进。虽然古典的最后贷款人制度实现了既定史命,但是金融自由化、金融电子化与国际化已从另一侧面检测着该制度的精致或拙劣。是急流勇退,还是迎难而新,这是后危机时代该制度因时而化中所必须权衡的重大问题。     

Interventions in Markets with Adverse Selection: Implications for Discount Window Stigma

I study the implications for central bank discount window stigma of a workhorse model of adverse selection in financial markets. In the model, firms (banks) need to borrow to finance a productive project. There is limited liability and firms have private information about their ability to repay their debts, which gives rise to the possibility of adverse selection. The central bank can ameliorate the impact of adverse selection by lending to firms. Discount window borrowing is observable and it may be taken as a signal of firms' credit worthiness. Under some conditions, firms borrowing from the discount window may pay higher interest rates to borrow in the market, a phenomenon often associated with the presence of stigma. I discuss these and other outcomes in detail and what they suggest about the relevance of stigma as an empirical phenomenon.     

延长桂林旅游地生命周期的对策

针对桂林旅游地生命周期的主要影响因素提出了加强环境保护，提高旅游产品质量、优化旅游产品结构、完善旅游产品种类，加强旅游宣传促销，加强区域合作等一系列对策，以期能延长桂林旅游地生命周期，使桂林旅游业得到持续稳定发展。