Capital indivisibility and tax competition: Are there too many business areas when some of them are empty?

In this paper, we propose a model where local jurisdictions must engage a development cost before competing for hosting a firm with uncertain preferences among possible sites. We first show that even an optimizing central planner managing all the jurisdictions develops more sites than there are plants to host. Doing so, he diversifies his supply and has a higher probability of hosting the firm. Then, we show that, if every jurisdiction is managed by a local government, there are more developed sites than with the central planner, which implies excess supply.     

Ownership Structure,Business Group Affiliation,Listing Status,and Earnings Management: Evidence from Korea*

Using a large sample of both publicly traded and privately held firms in South Korea (hereafter “Korea”), we investigate whether, and how, the deviation of controlling shareholders' control from ownership, business group affiliation, and listing status differentially affect the extent of earnings management. Our study yields three major findings. First, we find that as the control‐ownership disparity becomes larger, controlling shareholders tend to engage more in opportunistic earnings management to hide their behavior and avoid adverse consequences such as disciplinary action. The result of our full‐model regression reveals that an increase in the control‐ownership wedge by 1 percent leads to an increase in the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals by 1.3 percent of lagged total assets, ceteris paribus. Second, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for group‐affiliated firms than for nonaffiliated firms by 0.8 percent of lagged total assets. This result suggests that business group affiliation provides controlling shareholders with more incentives and opportunities for earnings management. Finally, we find that for our full‐model regression, the magnitude of (unsigned) discretionary accruals is greater for publicly traded firms than for privately held firms by 1.2 percent of lagged total assets. This result supports the notion that stock markets create incentives for public firms to manage reported earnings to satisfy the expectations of various market participants that are often expressed in earnings numbers.     

Just how unethical is American business?

This study of reports in the business news between January 1, 2000 and June 30, 2005 found that as of 1999, 40 corporations in the Fortune 100 had committed behaviors that can be considered unethical. The behaviors of concern included three types of fraud (accounting, securities, and consumer), discriminatory practices, undisclosed executive pay, antitrust activities, patent infringement, and other violations of the law. Based on the “unacceptability” of the misdeeds committed, this article ranks the 40 firms into three categories. Further, it uses the research on business ethics and the behaviors of executives, boards of directors, and even government officials to suggest why these unethical behaviors were allowed to happen. Finally, it concludes with recommendations for improving business behavior, and suggests important roles for future business leaders and the broader American public.     

A longitudinal test of price effects on brand choice behavior

The introduction and withdrawal of marketing variable inputs at various intervals of time and the subsequent observation of their impact on buyer behavior provide an invaluable aid as to how certain promotional changes work. Results of the present longitudinal experiment using a consumer panel of 133 households provide further evidence that for artificial brands, penetration and repeat buying can be influenced significantly by the introduction and retraction of a substantial price reduction. Yet, the effects on penetration are consistently greater than the effects on repeat buying. After-effects appear negligible. These results generally confirm prior research findings.     

A note on evaluating the representivity of samples taken in less developed countries

The representivity of many samples taken in less developed countries is left open to question because researchers have no dependable tools for evaluating samples taken from imperfectly known parent populations. In this paper a method designed to perform that function is explained. It is based on comparisons of proportions estimated from two independent samples, focusing on situations where the larger sample size is unknown. This method is also demonstrated via illustrative examples.     

Coalitions in organizational buying

It has been argued that many, if not most, organizational buying decisions are made not by individuals, but by coalitions. At the same time, coalition formation has been all but ignored in theoretical and empirical research on the buying process. This article discusses the nature of coalitions and their likelihood in industrial buying. Managerial implications of the presence of coalitions are drawn for both the industrial buying and selling organization.     

The Economics of Business Process Design: Motivation,Information and Coordination Within the Firm

This paper presents a transaction cost analysis of the internal business processes of firms. Business processes are collections of activities which are technologically or managerially linked so that they jointly affect value added. Their organisation is characterised by their ‘architecture’—the allocation of responsibilities amongst individuals and groups and communication between them for information and coordination—and their incentive structure. The overall costs of organisation are determined by losses due to imperfect motivation of process members, which flows from the incentive structure, and imperfect information and coordination, which flow from the architecture, together with the resource costs associated with incentives and architecture. Perfect motivation corresponds to ‘team behaviour’ and a quantitative model, based on team theory, indicates how the best architecture depends on the degree interaction between activities comprising the business process.     

A market index futures contract and portfolio selection

This paper shows that if security returns are generated according to the market model and there is a futures market in the market index, then optimal portfolios can be selected in three steps: 1) select the optimal combination of firm unique characteristics; 2) select the optimal investment in the market; and 3) select the optimal investment in the risk-free asset. The futures market contract separates the choice of firm and market exposure and thus both simplifies the mathematics involved and increases the mean/variance efficiency of the optimal portfolio.