Optimal pricing when rational consumers anticipate monitoring cost

This article considers a monopolistic firm’s optimal pricing decision over two periods among dynamic pricing, preannounced pricing and single pricing. In the models, consumers rationally determine whether to exhibit strategic waiting by weighing their costs against prospectively lower price. Our analysis yields three main results. First, single pricing that completely eliminates strategic waiting surely would be dominated by intertemporal pricing when facing rational consumers. Second, preannounced pricing may actually yield lower revenue than dynamic pricing when considering its effect on the reduction of consumer monitoring cost. Only when monitoring costs under dynamic pricing and under preannounced pricing are equal, is firm revenue weakly greater under preannounced pricing than under dynamic pricing. Third, in dynamic pricing equilibrium, increasing monitoring cost may increase firm revenue, consumer surplus and social welfare simultaneously.     

Banerjee,Duflo, Kremer,and the Rise of Modern Development Economics*

In 2019, Abhijit Banerjee, Esther Duflo, and Michael Kremer received the Sveriges Riksbank Prize in Economic Sciences in Memory of Alfred Nobel. These three scholars were recognized “for their experimental approach to alleviating global poverty”. This paper reviews the contributions of these three scholars in the field of development economics, to put this contribution in perspective. I highlight how the experimental approach helped to break down the challenges of understanding economic development into a number of component pieces, and I contrast this to understanding development using macroeconomic aggregates. I discuss pioneering contributions in understanding the challenges of education, service delivery, and credit markets in developing countries, as well as how the experimental approach has spread to virtually all aspects of development economics.     

Co-evolution of emerging economy MNEs and institutions: A literature review

This paper provides a review of the existing literature about the co-evolution of emerging economy multinational enterprises (EMNEs) and institutions and proposes directions for future study. We find that many existing studies involving the institution-EMNE relationship focus on the impact of institutions on EMNEs, and the research on their co-evolution is very limited in terms of emerging economies involved and theories and research methods applied. Given varieties of the institution-EMNE relationship we call for more studies by applying more contextualized theoretical perspectives and innovative and multiple research methods to advance our knowledge about the topic.     

农业产业化经营的制度经济理论认识

农业产业化经营是一种制度选择和制度创新,制度变迁有收益,也必然耗费一定成本。本文从制度经济学的角度分析了农业产业化经营的特征,制度变迁的选择和制度创新的意义。     

ADULT EDUCATION AND EARNINGS: EVIDENCE FROM BRITAIN

This paper uses the National Child Development Study to investigate the relationship between adult schooling and labour market earnings for men. In line with several other studies, the findings suggest that there are returns to all educational qualifications acquired early in life. A variety of statistical models are estimated to try to measure the causal effect of adult education on earnings. Careful analysis reveals that there are no genuine returns to additional qualifications awarded in middle adulthood. The central conclusion of this paper is that rates of return to human capital are greater for individuals who were educated early in life.     

浅谈西方经济学教学体系创新

西方经济学进入中国已有几十年,正在改变着国人的思维方式。但是发展到今天,教学内容却变化不大,已经不能适应中国的经济发展,教学体系创新变得非常必要。为了加快创新进度,必须大胆改革,要重视基础研究,提倡差异化教学。     

Bidding ‘as if’ risk neutral in experimental first price auctions without information feedback

Experimental research on first price sealed bid auctions has usually involved repeated settings with information feedback on winning bids and payoffs after each auction round. Relative to the risk neutral Nash equilibrium, significantly higher bidding has been reported. The present paper reports the results of experimental first price auctions with n=7 where feedback on payoffs and winning bids is withheld. Under these conditions, average bidding is below the risk neutral Nash equilibrium prediction but converges to it with repetition.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Strategic alliances: a hospitality industry perspective

The article focuses on strategic alliance theory as it applies to the hospitality industry. Citing research as well as real-world examples, the authors integrate a variety of concepts and develop four propositions about the growing use of strategic alliances in the hospitality industry. These propositions include the following: P1: Hospitality alliances will evolve from equity joint ventures to collaborative joint ventures (non-equity) as competitor alliances will emerge. P2: Contractual agreements will evolve from simple franchise and management contracts to more complex resource-sharing, non-equity agreements. P3: Complex resource sharing between allying partners will help incumbent firms build relationships with partner firms that will lead to the development of competitor alliances. P4: Technology will help in the development of competitor alliances, which will also help to increase incumbent firms’ productivity and profitability.