Private enforcement,corruption, and antitrust design

We examine how the rationale for enabling versus precluding private antitrust enforcement depends on whether antitrust enforcement is corruption-free or plagued by corruption. Corruption in courts affects the incentives to bring forth private antitrust lawsuits. This, in turn, along with corruption in antitrust agency enforcement, alters the incentives to commit antitrust violations. The social welfare effect of enabling private antitrust enforcement in the presence of corruption depends on whether corrupt officials in the ensuing bribery contests favor a particular firm and if so which one and to what extent. Under some circumstances, corruption actually increases the social desirability of private antitrust enforcement relative to the no-corruption scenario. Our analysis highlights that the effects of a given legal arrangement for antitrust enforcement critically depend on the corruption environment and, thus, that the appropriate design of antitrust institutions is context-specific.     

An Equilibrium Selection Theory of Monopolization

We develop a duopoly model in which firms compete for the market (e.g., investing in process innovation or product development) as well as in the market (e.g., setting quantities or prices). Competition for the market generates multiple equilibria that differ in the firms’ investment levels, relative size, and profitability. We show that monopolization that affects competition in the market can act as an equilibrium selection device in competition for the market. In particular, it eliminates equilibria that are undesirable for the monopolizing firm, while not generating new equilibria. This result complicates the task of determining whether a firm's dominance in a given market is the result of fair competition or unlawful monopolization. We discuss a number of implications for antitrust policy and litigation, and illustrate these by means of two well‐known antitrust cases.     

Real-life cost of vitamin K antagonist treatment in patients with non-valvular atrial fibrillation in France in 2013

Aims: Data highlighting the cost drivers for non-valvular atrial fibrillation (NVAF) patients in terms of vitamin K antagonist (VKA) treatment and monitoring are lacking in France. This study aimed to evaluate the real-life daily cost of VKA treatment in 2013, in French patients suffering from NVAF.

Methods: This longitudinal observational study was performed using the EGB (Echantillon Généraliste des Bénéficiaires) database, a random sample of the French national insurance (NHI) database, which covers 80% of the population. All adult patients whose first NVAF anticoagulant treatment in 2013 was a VKA were analyzed. Costs were calculated for the duration of follow-up and then divided by the number of days of therapy. The analysis was performed both from the French NHI perspective (amount reimbursed by the NHI) and from a collective perspective.

Results: In this study, 3,254 NVAF patients treated with VKA in 2013 were included, and this sample comprised 52.6% males. The mean daily cost of VKA treatment was €1.13 (±1.18) according to the collective perspective (89.4% of this cost was associated to INR measurement) and €1.05 (±1.16) according to the NHI perspective.

Limitations: As diagnoses associated with procedures are not available in the EGB database, proxies were used, and an algorithm was created to define the AF population.

Conclusions: This analysis is the first to consider an exhaustive spectrum of the costs of VKA treatment in France using EGB data. VKA medication requires exhaustive follow-up, and, thus, associated costs are important. The results of the present study confirmed this close follow-up for VKA patients, making the cost of treatment by VKA nearly 10-times more expensive than the cost of medication itself.     

Political and Economic Inequities and the Shaping of Institutions and Redistribution

This article studies the joint effect of political and economic inequalities on redistributive taxation and institutional quality. The theoretical model suggests that income inequality, coupled with political bias in favor of the rich, decreases redistribution and lowers institutional quality. The effect of the former is to increase productive investment, and the effect of the latter is to decrease it—with resulting ambiguous implications for economic growth. Testing these predictions empirically in a panel of countries, we find that inequality has a negative effect on both institutional quality and redistribution.     

The Demand for Healthcare Regulation: The Effect of Political Spending on Occupational Licensing Laws

Using data on political spending in state elections, this study considers the role of political contributions by healthcare professional interest groups in states' decisions to enact occupational licensing laws. These laws govern how different professions may operate in healthcare markets, and while they ostensibly exist to protect consumers, licensing laws can also insulate professionals from competition in healthcare markets. Higher political spending by physician interest groups increases the probability that a state maintains licensing laws restricting the practices of nurse practitioners (NPs) and physician assistants (PAs). Conversely, increased spending by hospital interest groups increases the probability that a state allows NPs and PAs to practice with more autonomy. Nurse groups, which include groups affiliated with NPs, have a smaller effect on licensing laws. And nonphysician groups, which include groups affiliated with PAs, have almost no effect on licensing laws. These results are consistent with the investment theory of political spending.     

Competition in bureaucracy and corruption

This paper studies the consequences of introducing competition between bureaucrats. Firms are supposed to invest into eliminating negative externalities of production, while bureaucrats administer the process by issuing licences. Some bureaucrats are corrupt, that is, they issue a licence to any firm in exchange for a bribe. The competition regime is found to create more ex ante incentives for firms to invest, while the monopoly regime is better at implementing ex post allocation, that is, distributing the licences given the firms' investment decisions. Additional results on the effect of punishments and bureaucrats' rotation are provided.     

A survey-based choice experiment on coca cultivation

From 1997 to 2005, an astonishing 5200 million USD was invested to reduce cocaine production in Colombia, the world's main cocaine producer. However, little is known about the effectiveness of policies targeting coca cultivation. This paper uses a survey-based experiment to evaluate the effects of the two main policies: eradication and alternative development programs. Our results support Becker's (1968) model of crime participation and in addition shed light on other non-monetary factors that affect the coca cultivation decision: religion, legitimacy, remoteness, and poverty are found to be important. We find that coca cultivation is inelastic to increases in perceived risk and relative profit so eradication and alternative development would have a rather small effect on coca cultivation. A simple simulation exercise predicts that investing additional hundred thousand dollars in eradication decreases coca cultivation in only 1.5%.     

Do stronger patent rights raise high-tech exports to the developing world?

Despite over 20 years of debate, the TRIPs agreement remains very contentious. This paper evaluates the impact of strengthening patent rights (PRs) in developing countries on developed countries' exports over the 1962-2000 period. Colonial origin is used to isolate exogenous variation in PRs. The impact is then identified by examining the cross-industry difference in sensitivity to PRs. I find that the increase in PRs made in response to the TRIPs agreement added about $35 billion (2000 US dollars) to the value of developed countries' patent-sensitive exports into 18 developing countries. This amount is equivalent to an 8.6% increase in these developing countries' annual value of patent-sensitive imports. The increase in the value of exports was driven by a quantity, rather than a price, increase.     

柳坝沟金矿床重要的找矿标志——钾长石化与硅化

柳坝沟金矿为著名的哈达门沟金矿床的外围岩金矿床,位于华北克拉通北缘西段。本文通过柳坝沟金矿床钾长石化和硅化蚀变特征的实践和理论研究,指出了钾长石化和硅化的野外找矿指示意义,为今后野外勘探同种类型矿床的找矿工作提供线索。     

Bankruptcy law and corporate investment decisions

Major European countries have recently adopted bankruptcy codes that strengthen entrepreneurs’ power to renegotiate outstanding liabilities. Renegotiation in bankruptcy allows lenders to increase recovery rates, however it also weakens the contract’s ability to solve the moral hazard problem embedded in the production project. Hinging on this trade-off, I show in which circumstances a soft bankruptcy law that resembles Chapter 11 in the balance of lenders’ and entrepreneur’s rights encourages the choice of investments that privilege the achievement of long-term results. However, I also show that, in contrast to the common wisdom, soft bankruptcy can lead to the choice of investments that are biased towards the achievement of short-term outcomes.