Does resorting to online dispute resolution promote agreements? Experimental evidence

This paper presents an experiment performed to test the properties of an innovative bargaining mechanism (called automated negotiation) used to resolve disputes arising from Internet-based transactions. The main result shows that the settlement rule tends to chill bargaining as it creates incentives for individuals to misrepresent their true valuations, which implies that automated negotiation is not able to promote agreements. However, this perverse effect depends strongly on the conflict situation. When the threat that a disagreement occurs is more credible, the strategic effect is reduced since defendants are more interested in maximizing the efficiency of a settlement than their own expected profit. The implications of these results are then used to discuss the potential role of public regulation and reputation mechanisms in Cyberspace.     

Institutions and concentration

In a new dataset of 1.3 million firms from over 100 countries, I establish a number of regularities in cross-country differences in economic concentration. Concentration of sales and employment is substantially higher in smaller countries and in less-developed countries; these two factors alone explain roughly half the cross-country variation in concentration. Nevertheless, a number of institutional factors offer additional explanatory power for concentration. Concentration is higher in countries with higher entry costs for new firms, in countries with weaker antitrust policy, in countries with less financial development, in countries with weaker rule of law, and in countries with more burdensome regulation. Weak institutions are associated with higher concentration especially in industries that do not have naturally high levels of concentration. In addition, the relationships between institutions and concentration are more pronounced in nontradable and investment-intensive industries, suggesting that natural barriers to competition facilitate the monopolization of sectors especially when institutions are weak.     

Prostitutes,Pimps, and Brothels: Intermediaries,Information, and Market Structure in Prostitution Markets

Prostitution is a multi‐billion dollar, globally distributed, low‐concentration service industry that is receiving increasing attention in the economics literature. This article focuses on a widespread, but little studied, feature of this environment—the role of intermediaries (pimps or brothel owners) on market outcomes. Prostitution laws and markets are perhaps unique in that transactions between principals (prostitutes and johns) are legal in many countries, while intermediary activity (pimping) is illegal. After surveying the varying cross‐country legality of agents we develop a simple theoretical model to analyze how the presence or absence of intermediaries shifts the distribution of market surplus. We show that eliminating pimps and brothels may shift surplus in non‐obvious ways, depending on the precise function they perform and on whether equilibrium is pooling or separating across “high quality” and “low quality” market segments. The implications of alternative policy regimes (intermediaries legal or illegal) are considered.     

优化我国企业年金资产配置方法探讨

从分析我国目前企业年金的资产配置的现状出发,在借鉴国外特别是美国成功经验的基础上,结合我国目前各种投资工具的收益率,提出了优化我国企业年金资产配置的方法。     

EFFICIENCY OF LIABILITY RULES WITH MULTIPLE VICTIMS

Abstract. This paper investigates the structure of liability rules from the efficiency perspective when there are multiple victims. It is shown that, when there is one injurer and multiple victims, there is no liability rule with the property of invariably yielding efficient outcomes. The fact that there is no rule which is efficient for all applications of course does not in any way preclude the possibility of a rule being efficient with respect to some subclass of applications which may be of interest. We consider in this paper the important subclass of applications (     ') which are such that the expected loss of a victim depends only on the care level taken by that victim and the care level taken by the injurer. It is shown that a sufficient condition for a one-injurer multiple-victim liability rule to be efficient with respect to the above subclass of applications      ' is that its structure be such that: (i) whenever the injurer is negligent and a particular victim is non-negligent, the entire loss incurred by that victim must be borne by the injurer; and (ii) whenever a particular victim is negligent and the injurer is non-negligent, the entire loss incurred by that victim must be borne by the victim himself. In fact, for an important subclass of one-injurer multiple-victim liability rules, characterized by the condition that the proportions in which the loss incurred by a particular victim is to be borne by the injurer and that victim must depend only on the non-negligence proportions of the injurer and that victim, the above condition is both necessary and sufficient for efficiency with respect to the restricted subclass of applications      '.     

What drives international financial flows? Politics,institutions and other determinants

This paper uses a large panel of financial flow data from banks to assess how institutions affect international lending. First, employing a time varying composite institutional quality index in a fixed-effects framework, the paper shows that institutional improvements are followed by significant increases in international finance. Second, cross-sectional models also show a strong effect of initial levels of institutional quality on future bank lending. Third, instrumental variable estimates further show that the historically predetermined component of institutional development is also a significant correlate of international bank inflows. The results thus suggest that institutional underdeveloped can explain a significant part of Lucas [Lucas, Robert E. 1990. “Why Doesn't Capital Flow from Rich to Poor Countries?” American Economic Review (Papers and Proceedings), 80 (2): 92–96. 1990] paradox of why doesn't capital flow from rich to poor countries. The analysis also does a first-step towards understanding which institutional features affect international banking.     

Factors Influencing the Incidence of Bribery Payouts by Firms: A Cross-Country Analysis

This article explores micro- and macro-level variables that influence the incidence of bribery payouts by firms. A rich data set with information from 55 countries was utilized to achieve this objective. Results of logit regression models indicate that there are a number of micro- and macro-level factors that significantly affect the incidence of bribery payouts. This suggests that it is not only the characteristics of a firm but also the environment of doing business that affect the firm’s bribery decision. The results of this study provides information that may help firms develop strategies to reduce corruption in their respective industries and thereby improve their image of corporate social responsibility. The analysis also points to possible policy directions that governments could undertake in order to reduce the incidence of bribery in their country.      

What is the objective of professional licensing? Evidence from the US market for lawyers

According to public interest theory, professional licensing solves the lemon problem generated by asymmetric information. In contrast, the capture theory claims that licensing aims at increasing professional salaries by restricting supply. This paper shows that the two theories can be identified using data from one regulated profession and provides an empirical application to the US market for entry level lawyers. The empirical results support capture theory.     

The effect of mandatory CSR disclosure on firm profitability and social externalities: Evidence from China

We examine how mandatory disclosure of corporate social responsibility (CSR) impacts firm performance and social externalities. Our analysis exploits China's 2008 mandate requiring firms to disclose CSR activities, using a difference-in-differences design. Although the mandate does not require firms to spend on CSR, we find that mandatory CSR reporting firms experience a decrease in profitability subsequent to the mandate. In addition, the cities most impacted by the disclosure mandate experience a decrease in their industrial wastewater and SO₂ emission levels. These findings suggest that mandatory CSR disclosure alters firm behavior and generates positive externalities at the expense of shareholders.     

The consequences of managerial indiscretions: Sex,lies, and firm value

Personal managerial indiscretions are separate from a firm's business activities but provide information about the manager's integrity. Consequently, they could affect counterparties’ trust in the firm and the firm's value and operations. We find that companies of accused executives experience significant wealth deterioration, reduced operating margins, and lost business partners. Indiscretions are also associated with an increased probability of unrelated shareholder-initiated lawsuits, Department of Justice and Securities and Exchange Commission investigations, and managed earnings. Further, chief executive officers and boards face labor market consequences, including forced turnover, pay cuts, and lower shareholder votes at re-election. Indiscretions occur more often at poorly governed firms where disciplinary turnover is less likely.