Exposure to corruption and political participation: Evidence from Italian municipalities

This paper aims to study the effects of exposure to corruption on all the aspects of political participation. Focusing on Italian municipalities in the period 1999–2014, we generate a daily and local measure of exposure to corruption, screening newspaper articles of the main Italian press agency. We concentrate on local elections and, in an event-study analysis, we find three main results. First, corruption exposure affects citizens' participation in election by reducing voter turnout. Second, corruption impacts on politicians’ participation: the number of candidates and electoral lists decreases after a scandal and candidates with political tenure are more likely to run. Finally, these changes affect local political outcomes as tenured politicians are more likely to be elected, while freshmen lose ground. These results suggest that exposure to corruption has general and negative effects on political participation, leading people to lose interest in politics.     

Illegal drugs and public corruption: Crack based evidence from California

Do illegal drugs foster public corruption? To estimate the causal effect of drugs on public corruption, we adopt the synthetic control method and exploit the fact that crack cocaine markets emerged in California in 1981, before reaching any other U.S. state. Our results show that public corruption more than tripled in California in the first three years following the arrival of crack cocaine. We argue that this resulted from the particular characteristics of illegal drugs: cheap technology and rigid demand, which fosters a convergence of interests between criminals and corrupted public officials resulting in a positive causal impact of illegal drugs on corruption.     

Can judicial efficiency improve territorial attractiveness to FDI? The Italian experience

This paper explores the role that judicial efficiency may play as a determinant of inward FDI at sub-national level. Italy is an ideal case to deal with this still unexplored issue since the same law apply in all the national territory, but the degree of law enforcement varies considerably across different courts. We found that judicial efficiency affects positively FDI inflows. This result, though heterogeneous across different economic sectors, is robust to different specifications and sample selections. Our results have interesting policy implications, since they highlight the importance of non-targeted FDI policies as factors driving inward flows.     

Competition policy and market leaders

We study the potential loss in social welfare and changes in incentives to invest in R&D that result when the market leading firm is deprived of its position. We show that under plausible assumptions like free entry or repeated market interactions there is a social value of market leadership and its mechanical removal by means of competition policy is likely to be harmful for society.     

Unemployment and Right‐wing Extremist Crime*

It is frequently argued that unemployment plays a crucial role in the occurrence of right‐wing extremist crimes (RECs). We test this hypothesis empirically using data from Germany. We find that right‐wing criminal activities occur more frequently when unemployment is high. The substantial difference in the numbers of RECs occurring in the East and West German states can mostly be attributed to differences in unemployment. This finding reinforces the importance of unemployment as an explanatory factor for RECs, and it questions explanations based solely on the different socialization in former communist East Germany and the liberal West German states.     

The use of trade measures against illicit fishing: Economic and legal considerations

Illegal, Unreported and Unregulated (IUU) fishing activities are a threat for both the marine environment and society. By undermining effective management systems, IUU fishing activities affect economic performance, social welfare and compliance decisions. So far, “traditional” control and surveillance-like measures have had a limited success in deterring IUU fishing, so this paper aims at throwing light on several forms of trade-related initiatives that can be more effective. The paper suggests that both the effectiveness and further development of such measures strongly depend on the way they are designed, especially with respect to their trade-law compatibility. However, current discussions on future trade-based policy developments within some key economic areas suggest that trade measures are a sound option for policy makers. While the paper focuses on fisheries issues, it is also expected to inform the international debate surrounding the sustainable use of natural resources in general, as many sectors face similar biodiversity and trade challenges (e.g. tropical forest, mangroves, etc.).     

A NOTE ON SELECTION EFFECTS OF THE HAND RULE

The famous Hand rule weighs the burden of precaution against the reduction in expected harm. The burden may be type‐specific, implying different standards of care for different injurer types. We show that this fact may be exploited by principals in their search for minimized individual costs. Principals may hire agents with high cost of care‐taking although other agents are available. This is shown in a unilateral‐care setting either with perfect or with asymmetric information. We therefore highlight a neglected downside of the negligence rule.     

Pirates and fishermen: Is less patrolling always bad?

Motivated by the Somali fishermen-pirates, I explore the time allocation decision of potential pirates between piracy and an alternative non-violent occupation, fishing, when the returns of both piracy and fishing are sensitive to patrolling intensity. For a range of parameters, the static model yields multiple equilibria, an “efficient” one with no patrolling and low piracy, a less efficient equilibrium with intermediate levels of both piracy and patrolling and a highly inefficient high-patrolling high-piracy equilibrium. Analyzing the dynamic analogue, I obtain the surprising result that sufficiently low patrolling can be a good strategy.     

Bargaining power and enforcement in credit markets

In a credit market with enforcement constraints, we study the effects of a change in the outside options of a potential defaulter on the terms of the credit contract, as well as on borrower payoffs. The results crucially depend on the allocation of “bargaining power” between the borrower and the lender. We prove that there is a crucial threshold of relative weights such that if the borrower has power that exceeds this threshold, her expected utility must go up whenever her outside options come down. But if the borrower has less power than this threshold, her expected payoff must come down with her outside options. In the former case a deterioration in outside options brought about, say, by better enforcement, must create a Lorenz improvement in state-contingent consumption. In particular, borrower consumption rises in all “bad” states in which loans are taken. In the latter case, in contrast, the borrower's consumption must decline, at least for all the bad states. These disparate findings within a single model permit us to interpret existing literature on credit markets in a unified way.     

Beneficial collusion in corruption control: The case of nonmonetary penalties

We analyze a corruption model where a principal seeks to control an agent's corruption by supplementing a costless noncollusive outside detector such as the media with a collusive internal supervisor. The principal's objective is to minimize the overall costs, made up of enforcement costs and social costs of corruption. If the penalties on the corrupt agent and a failing supervisor are nonmonetary in nature and yet the two parties can engage in monetary side-transfers, the principal may stand to benefit by allowing supervisor–agent collusion. This benefit may even prompt the principal to actively encourage collusion by hiring a dishonest supervisor in strict preference over an honest supervisor.