Stackelberg leadership in a dynamic duopoly with stochastic capital accumulation

I propose a dynamic duopoly model where firms enter simultaneously but compete hierarchically á la Stackelberg at each instant over time. They accumulate capacity through costly investment, with capital accumulation dynamics being affected by an additive shock the mean and variance of which are known. The main findings are the following. First, the Stackelberg game is uncontrollable by the leader; hence, it is time consistent. Second, the leader invests more than the follower; as a result, in the steady state, the leader’s capacity and profits are larger than the follower’s. Therefore, the present analysis does not confirm Gibrat’s Law, since the individual growth rate is determined by the timing of moves.JEL Classification: C61, C73, D43, D92, L13Financial support within the project The post-entry performance of firms: technology, growth and survival lead by Enrico Santarelli, co-financed by the University of Bologna and MIUR, is gratefully acknowledged. I thank Uwe Cantner, Roberto Cellini, Roberto Golinelli, Helen Louri, Enrico Santarelli, Antonello Scurcu, Peter Thompson, two anonymous referees and the audience at the final workshop of the project (Bologna, November 22-23, 2002) for useful comments and discussion. The usual disclaimer applies.     

Optimal vs satisfactory transparency: The impact of global macroeconomic fluctuations on corporate competitiveness

Being able to separate temporary global macroeconomic influences – caused by fluctuations in exchange rates, interest rates and inflation – from intrinsic performance – related to a superior product, production process or management – is crucial to assessing the development of a firm’s competiveness. Against that background, this paper analyzes institutions’ role in making firms supply outside shareholders with relevant information corresponding to satisfactory transparency from the shareholder perspective. Based on a sample of the 100 largest public European firms, it is found that no firm provided information to a level deemed satisfactory by the outside shareholder. One explanation may be that optimal transparency for the firm does not equal satisfactory transparency for the outside shareholder. However, the implementation of IFRS/IAS 1 in the EU as of 2005 and a company’s international cross-listing activities exhibit associations with a better supply of information and a narrowing of the gap. Shareholders in the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance system are provided with more relevant information than those in other corporate governance systems. The paper adds to the literature on the role of institutions in international corporate governance, with a particular focus on information asymmetries in an international business context.     

Optimal lockdown in altruistic economies

The recent COVID-19 crisis has revealed the urgent need to study the impact of an infectious disease on market economies and provide adequate policy recommendations. The present paper studies the optimal lockdown policy in a dynamic general equilibrium model where households are altruistic and they care about the share of infected individuals. The spread of the disease is modeled here using SIS dynamics, which implies that recovery does not confer immunity. To avoid non-convexity issues, we assume that the lockdown is constant in time. This strong assumption allows us to provide analytical solutions. We find that the zero lockdown is efficient when agents do not care about the share of infected, while a positive lockdown is recommended beyond a critical level of altruism. Moreover, the lockdown intensity increases in the degree of altruism. Our robust analytical results are illustrated by numerical simulations, which show, in particular, that the optimal lockdown never trespasses 60% and that eradication is not always optimal.     

Moral hazard,debt overhang and capital structure

This paper investigates the impact of managerial moral hazard on the debt overhang of a firm by constructing a contingent claims model in which the manager faces costly effort. Using a calibrated capital structure model, we show that the costs of debt overhang become more serious in the presence of managerial moral hazard. Such costs even account for more than half of the total agency costs at a high level of cash flow. Moreover, in contrast to the results of Hackbarth and Mauer (2012), our model predicts a U-shaped relationship between the leverage ratio and investment opportunities of a firm, which is caused by managers’ moral hazard. Finally, by considering this moral hazard, we also show the coexistence of low leverage ratios and high credit spreads, which explains the phenomenon of “low debt levels and high credit spreads” observed in practice.     

Equity premium prediction and optimal portfolio decision with Bagging

We propose using the statistical method of Bagging to forecast the equity premium out-of-sample for multivariate regression models. Bagging allows for the flexible and efficient extraction of valuable informational content from a large set of predictors, leading to statistically and economically significant gains relative to not only the historical mean, but also other soft-threshold methods such as forecast combinations and shrinkage estimators in our empirical results. Furthermore, we find that the source of economic gains for Bagging primarily comes from the fact that it encourages the investor to actively manage portfolio by flexibly utilizing short selling or leveraging to better time the market following correctly prognosticated trends. However, other strategies such as forecast combinations keep the equity shares nearly fixed regardless of the predicted market prospect.     

Examining the change in wellbeing following a holiday

Building on existing evidence that tourism contributes to wellbeing, this study aims to investigate how both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing changes after a holiday. A longitudinal inquiry involving three waves of observation (during, the fourth week, and the eighth week following a holiday) was carried out in five tourism cities in China, using Latent Growth Curve models to analyze change. Results suggest that life satisfaction – an indicator of hedonic wellbeing – does not decline as expected whereas other indicators of hedonic wellbeing declined dramatically in the first month and then mildly in the second month following a holiday. Comparatively, eudaimonic wellbeing declined gradually and mildly during the same two-month intervals. Higher levels of optimal tourism experiences predicted slower declines of both hedonic and eudaimonic wellbeing. Theoretical, methodological, and practical implications are discussed.     

Is econometrics useful for private policy making? A case study of replacement policy at an auto rental company

The goal of this paper is to illustrate the potential usefulness of econometrics as a tool to assist private policy makers. We provide a case study and detailed econometric analysis of the automobile replacement policy adopted by a large car rental company. Unlike public policy making–where the benefits from using econometric models and “science-based” approaches to policy making are hard to quantify because the outcomes of interest are typically subjective quantities such as “social welfare”–in the case of firms there is an objective, easily quantifiable criterion for judging whether policy A is better than policy B: profits. We introduce and estimate an econometric model of the rental histories of individual cars in the company’s fleet. Via stochastic simulations, we show that the model provides a good approximation to the company’s actual operations. In particular, the econometric model is able to reproduce the extraordinarily high rates of return that the company obtains on its rental cars, with average internal rates of return between purchase and sale of approximately 50%. However, the econometric model can simulate outcomes under a range of counterfactual vehicle replacement policies. We use the econometric model to simulate the profitability of an alternative replacement policy under pessimistic assumptions about the rate maintenance costs would increase and rental rates would have to be decreased if the company were to keep its rental cars longer than it does under the status quo. Depending on the vehicle type, we find that the company’s expected discounted profits would be between 6% to over 140% higher under the suggested alternative operating strategy where vehicles are kept longer and rental rates of older vehicles are discounted to induce customers to rent them. The company found this analysis to be sufficiently convincing that it undertook an experiment to verify the predictions of the econometric model.     

Gains from international monetary policy coordination: Does it pay to be different?

In a two country world where each country has a traded and a non-traded sector and each sector has sticky prices, optimal independent policy in general cannot replicate the natural-rate allocations. There are potential welfare gains from coordination since the planner under a cooperating regime internalizes a terms-of-trade externality that independent policymakers overlook. If the countries have symmetric trading structures, however, the gains from coordination are quantitatively small. With asymmetric trading structures, the gains can be sizable since, in addition to internalizing the terms-of-trade externality, the planner optimally engineers a terms-of-trade bias that favors the country with a larger traded sector.