政治关系“力量”与民营企业价值研究:腐败的调节效应

从社会网络理论的强弱关系视角对2012-2014年福布斯中国富豪榜的企业家及其企业进行了政治关系的度量,检验了腐败是否会调节政治关系"力量"对企业价值的影响。研究发现,企业家本身所具有的政治关系对企业价值具有明显的正向影响作用,关系的"力量"越强,对企业价值的正向影响就越大;与此同时,腐败的出现会强化政治关系"力量"对民营企业价值的影响。通过分组验证发现,这种"力量"在腐败程度较高环境下更易对企业价值产生正向影响,但在腐败程度较低的环境中,政治关系对民营企业价值的影响很多时候并不显著。     

企业政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响

从资金需求方出发，以2009年10月至2016年12月深圳创业板和中小板首次公开上市的公司为样本，实证检验了政治关联对风险投资引入方式的影响，以及激励机制和监督机制这两种公司治理机制的调节作用，得到结论如下：政治关联企业倾向于在发展后期引入风险投资；政治关联企业倾向于选择国有性质、经验丰富以及参与程度高的风险投资机构；激励机制会加强政治关联企业在发展后期引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿；监督机制会减弱政治关联企业在发展后期阶段引入风险投资以及选择国有性质、经验丰富、参与程度高的风险投资机构的意愿。结论对拓展政治关联与风险投资领域的理论和实践具有重要启示意义。     

The influence of political risk on the scope of internationalization of regulated companies: Insights from a Spanish sample

Political risk not only constitutes a threat for multinational enterprises but can also be a source of opportunities. Exposure to and accumulated experience dealing with political risk allows firms to better implement a wide set of political actions such as negotiation of entry conditions, lobbying, litigation, campaign contributions and coalition formation, leading to preferential conditions, reduced environmental uncertainty, reduced transaction costs and increased long-term sustainability to the firm. These advantages facilitate investments in countries with higher and more diverse levels of risk and make political risk to be positively associated with the firm's scope of internationalization. This effect is not homogeneous across firms. Drawing from a sample of 164 Spanish companies with investments in 119 countries, we find that the impact is greater for companies in industrial sectors that are the object of greater governmental regulation than it is for firms in non-regulated manufacturing or service sectors, with less frequent interactions with home and host-country institutions.     

Political uncertainty and a firm's credit risk: Evidence from the international CDS market

Using a large sample of firms with single-name credit default swap (CDS) contracts in 30 countries, we document the evidence that political uncertainty, proxied by national election dummy, is positively related to firm-level credit risk. Specifically, this positive relation is more pronounced for the firms that have no political connection or poor international diversification, and in the countries with higher political uncertainty and lower investor protections. Further, by using a difference-in-differences approach, we find evidence to support idiosyncratic volatility and debt rollover channels through which political uncertainty affects the credit risk of individual firm.     

The legal theory of finance and the financial instability hypothesis: Convergences and possible integration

This article presents the legal theory of finance (LTF) and compares it with the financial instability hypothesis (FIH), identifying points of convergence and divergence. The study aims to contribute to the literature by connecting these theories and provides the following main conclusions. First, the LTF incorporates aspects of the FIH, as the theories share several key elements, particularly the presence of fundamental uncertainty, the constraint of liquidity, and the necessity for governments to act as lenders of last resort. Second, the liquidity concept used in the LTF can be better comprehended with the use of Keynesian and post Keynesian literature on the topic. Third, the LTF aims to advance and update certain aspects of Minsky’s theory, particularly with regard to the globalization of markets, power relations, and the interdependencies of the political economy of finance. The study concludes that the theories are more complementary than divergent and future studies should create an analytical framework that integrates the theories’ most insightful aspects.     

Advocacy and political convergence under preference uncertainty

We study the formation of advocacy groups and how they can impact policy outcomes by revealing information about voters׳ preferences to uninformed political candidates. We conduct a laboratory experiment based on a two-candidate spatial electoral competition setting where the policy preferences of voters are (initially) unknown and change over time. In the control treatment candidates learn about the preferred policy of the median voter through the voting outcome of elections. In the advocacy treatments, voters can organize themselves into advocacy groups in order to reveal their policy preferences. We find that voters often overcome the collective action problem of forming an advocacy group. In fact, we observe the formation of both informative advocacy groups, which convey new information, and uninformative advocacy groups, which do not. Overall, advocacy groups significantly speed up the convergence to the preferred policy of the median voter. However, advocacy does not lead to higher earnings as the gains from faster convergence are offset by the costs of group formation.     

Positive welfare effects of trade barriers in a dynamic partial equilibrium model

We develop a simple two-region, cobweb-type dynamic partial equilibrium model to demonstrate the existence of optimal, possibly non-zero, trade barriers. A pure comparative statics analysis of our model suggests that a reduction of trade barriers, modeled as small but positive import tariffs, always enhances welfare. However, taking a dynamic perspective reveals that nonlinear trade interactions between two regions may generate endogenous price fluctuations which can hamper welfare. Finally, we allow special interest groups, such as consumers or producers from these two regions, to lobby for a particular level of trade barriers. Our model predicts that time-varying trade barriers may be another channel for market instability.     

Reassessing the risk conditions for political instability in the light of the Arab Spring

In today’s globalized world, multinational firms contend with a diverse set of risk factors in their worldwide operations. The recent regime changes in northern African countries, also called the Arab Spring, have highlighted that political instability is one of these factors. As researchers and existing indices of political instability largely failed to predict those developments, firms had not incorporated them into their risk calculations and hence incurred losses while having to adapt their operations. This paper examines the conditions that contributed to the recent instability in North Africa using Tunisia and Egypt as case studies. It evaluates the extent to which existing measures of political instability incorporate those conditions. The analysis reveals that the main conditions contributing to the political turmoil can be seen in socio-economic factors, namely inequality, poverty, youth unemployment, a growing youth population, and especially in the case of Egypt an independent military. These findings reveal gaps in current measures of political instability, whose dominant focus is on factors describing violence and changes in the political system while neglecting the influence of a country’s socio-economic environment.     

Revisiting the finance–growth nexus: the Turkish case, 1980–2010

In Turkey, the empirical results on the link between financial development and economic growth are mixed. The existing studies do not take into account the fact that Turkey has experienced endemic political and economic instabilities over extended periods. This study aims to analyse the role of macroeconomic instability and public borrowing on the finance–growth nexus in Turkey by using time series econometric techniques over the 1980–2010 period. In doing so, we attempt to extend the existing literature by taking into account the role of macroeconomic instability as well as public borrowing. Our results reveal that there are additional – albeit indirect – channels between finance and growth via the effects of macro instability and public borrowing on financial development and economic growth. After taking into account the effects of overall instability and public borrowing, we found that growth–financial development relationship is bidirectional and permanent. In other words, in Turkish case, economic growth and financial development are jointly determined. Thus, our results shed some light on the ambiguity of the evidence on the link between financial development and economic growth for Turkey.     

Where to donate: The geographical distribution of corporate philanthropy in China

An emerging body of literature has demonstrated that corporate philanthropy can be an important part of a company’s business strategy. However, we know relatively little about how companies allocate philanthropic resources to achieve their strategic targets. Using geographical distribution data on corporate philanthropy in China from 2009 to 2016, we provide robust evidence of companies’ revenue-driven regional favoritism. Specifically, companies donate more to regions where they obtain revenue than to other regions. Further evidence suggests that this revenue-driven regional favoritism may have both reputational and political motivations. Further analysis suggests that China’s targeted poverty alleviation policy has compromised revenue-driven regional favoritism while increasing the amount of money donated to poor regions. Overall, we enrich understanding of decision-making on corporate philanthropy. We also demonstrate that companies can use the geographical distribution of corporate philanthropy strategically to obtain consumer and government favor in regions where they operate. The results also provide evidence at the micro company level of the effect of China’s implementation of a targeted poverty alleviation policy.