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91.
试图从政治经济、社会文化以及企业内部运作机制的差异使全球金融危机对中日两国企业不同程度的影响进行比较,以期为中国企业顺利度过危机提供借鉴。 相似文献
92.
This paper develops a post-Keynesian dynamic model of capacityutilisation and growth, in which the supply of credit-moneyis endogenous and firms' debt position—and thus the financialfragility of the economy à la Hyman Minsky—is explicitlymodelled. The interest rate is set by banks as a markup overa base rate exogenously determined by the monetary authority.The banking markup varies with changes in capacity utilisation,while the debt ratio varies with changes in the rates of interest,capital accumulation and growth. Regarding dynamics, it is shownthe possibility of relating the stability properties of a systemwith the interest rate and the debt ratio as state variablesto the prevailing Minskyan regime—hedge, speculative orPonzi. 相似文献
93.
Francisco Candel-Snchez 《European Journal of Political Economy》2007,23(4):863-884
This paper presents a mechanism to mitigate the adverse consequences of the political budget cycle on social welfare. We use a simplified two-period version of Rogoff's [Rogoff, K., 1990. Equilibrium political budget cycles. American Economic Review 80, 21–36.] rational budget cycle model to address the normative issue of reducing the budget deficit in pre-electoral periods. A regulation consisting of a sanction scheme contingent on fiscal policy joint with a fixed transfer is shown to provide the appropriate incentives for budget discipline in the presence of elections. 相似文献
94.
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about
(what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians may
have stronger incentives to behave opportunistically if other politicians are more likely to behave opportunistically. A political
culture may therefore be self-reinforcing and multiple equilibria may arise. We also show that politicians’ incentives to
behave opportunistically increase with politicians’ pay and with polarization of policy preferences.
JEL Code D72 · D78 相似文献
95.
Eric Rodríguez 《Journal of Business Research》2008,61(6):640-647
Foreign market entry strategy involves choices about which markets to enter and how to do it. Most of the literature on foreign direct investment reflects an interest in ownership structure decisions and the risks foreign investing firm may face. As recognized in many studies, one set of risks arises from public expropriation hazards, a function of the ability of the host country's institutional environment to credibly commit to a given policy or regulatory regime. Empirical research has shown this hazard to have an impact on ownership levels. This study is a theoretical model that describes how multinational firms face moral hazard risk from their local partners and political risk from the host country when they decide to go abroad in a joint-venture alliance. I found that the greater the level of hazard expropriation, the lower the participation of the multinational firm in the final cash flow, except for when the multinational firm has the negotiation power and there is a high level of local investment protectionism. In that case, the multinational firm increases its participation in the final cash flow. 相似文献
96.
《Economic Systems》2015,39(2):288-300
This study applies the bootstrap panel causality test proposed by Kónya (2006. Econ Modell 23, 978) to investigate the causal link between political uncertainty and stock prices for seven OECD countries over the monthly period of 2001.01 to 2013.04. This modeling approach allows us to examine both cross-sectional dependency and country-specific heterogeneity. Our empirical results indicate that not all the countries are alike and that the theoretical prediction that stock prices fall at the announcement of a policy change is not always supported. Specifically, we find evidence for the stock price leading hypothesis for Italy and Spain, while the political uncertainty leading hypothesis cannot be rejected for the United Kingdom and the United States. In addition, the neutrality hypothesis was supported in the remaining three countries (Canada, France and Germany), while no evidence for the feedback hypothesis was found. 相似文献
97.
Scott Bradford 《Journal of International Economics》2003,61(1):19-39
This paper develops a model of protection and tests it using US data, including new protection measures. We find that protection in an industry increases with its employment but not with its level of output. We also find that lobbying entails significant transactions costs. We have limited evidence that industry characteristics, such as the number of firms and geographical concentration, affect protection. Nested tests imply that assuming lump-sum rebating of import revenues or rents is justified. The results also suggest that US policy makers weight a dollar of campaign contributions about 15% more heavily than a dollar of national income. 相似文献
98.
We develop a two-country, two-sector model of trade where the only difference between the two countries is their distribution of human capital endowments. We show that even if the two countries have identical aggregate human capital endowments the pattern of trade depends on the properties of the two human capital distributions. We also show that the two distributions of endowments also completely determine the effects of trade on income inequality. We also look at a simple majority voting model. It turns out autarky and free trade with and without compensation may be the voting outcome. 相似文献
99.
Devashish Mitra 《Journal of International Economics》2002,57(2):473-485
In a bargaining model of endogenous protection, I introduce fixed costs of political-organization that need to be incurred by capitalists prior to actual lobbying. Unlike Maggi and Rodriguez-Clare [J. Pol. Econ. 106(3) (1998) 575] intersectoral capital mobility is disallowed. Nevertheless, I am still able to obtain their main result that a government with low bargaining power vis-à-vis the import-competing lobby precommits to a free-trade agreement. Further, with high fixed organizational costs, the government prefers to stay out of such agreements. Its maximum bargaining power consistent with signing a trade agreement has an inverse-V-shaped relationship with respect to the size of fixed costs. 相似文献
100.
本文首先简要介绍了现行国际体系———牙买加国际体系,接着从其自身的特点分析得出牙买加体系内生与外生两方面的不稳定因素,最后针对内生与外生不稳定因素分别给出相应的改进建议。 相似文献