论学校违纪处分的司法审查

受教育权是公民的一项受宪法保护的基本权利,当其受到不当行为侵害时理应得到司法的有效救济.学校具备行政主体资格,其违纪处分权是一种教育行政管理权,不当或违法的违纪处分侵犯了学生的合法权益.因此,学生不服学校违纪处分所产生的纠纷应该纳入行政诉讼受案范围.同时为了保障学校教育的自治权,行政诉讼应该遵守行政复议前置和司法审查有限两项原则.     

Methodological Issues in Negotiation Research: A State-of-the-Art-Review

This study provides insight into the dominant methodological practices that have shaped the field of negotiation over the past four decades and sheds light on possible gaps and trade-offs. We content analyzed 941 peer-reviewed negotiation articles (published between 1965 and 2004) and identified the most important methodological trends over time. The results reveal significant changes in reliability, validity, and triangulation issues. In addition, the rise of multivariate statistics and multiple data sources displays positive evolution towards more sophisticated methodologies. Despite these positive evolutions, we want to encourage current and future researchers to conduct more longitudinal and qualitative research to further advance our knowledge on negotiation.     

Corporate Governance Reforms: Redefined Expectations of Audit Committee Responsibilities and Effectiveness

Comprehensive regulatory changes brought on by recent corporate governance reforms have broadly redefined and re-emphasized the roles and responsibilities of all the participants in a public company’s financial reporting process. Most notably, these reforms have intensified scrutiny of corporate audit committees, whose role as protectors of investors’ interests now attracts substantially higher visibility and expectations. As a result, audit committees face the formidable challenge of effectively overseeing the company’s financial reporting process in a dramatically changed – and highly charged – corporate governance environment. This paper discusses the new expectations of audit committee responsibilities and effectiveness in the wake of corporate governance reforms, key challenges, “whistleblower” provisions and shortcomings, and provides some directions for future research.     

天兴洲大桥江北铁路引桥施工便桥设计

在武汉天兴洲大桥铁路江北引桥滠口左线引桥1#桥施工中,为满足施工现场混凝土运输的需要．采取以下措施：8-9#墩处上游附近搭设施工便桥1座;便桥桥面板采用2500×1000×200mm钢筋混凝土槽型板;纵向主梁采用8片H600×200mm型钢横向排列,且每两片一组用1cm厚铜板进行抱箍：每墩采用2片36a工字钢做横抬梁;便桥基础采用铜管排桩基础。经对纵梁、横抬梁、桥面板及基础铜管桩受力进行分析．检算合格,经实践证明以上措施及方案安全可行。     

我国土地整理生态环境评价研究综述

改善土地利用的生态环境是土地整理的重要内容和目标。针对土地整理生态环境评价,国内很多学者从不同领域、学科视角开展了大量理论与实证研究,取得了丰硕的成果。本文主要从土地整理生态环境评价的理论研究、指标体系和评价方法研究等方面对近年来我国土地整理生态环境评价研究进行了梳理和总结,并针对目前存在的问题进行了思考和展望,以期为科学推进我国土地整理乃至农村土地整治工作提供借鉴。     

基于大数据环境的财务报销自动审核系统构建

为了有效地解决当前企业财务报销审核系统中审核差错大、运行效率低的问题,在大数据分析的基础上,对自动财务报销审核系统进行了优化.结合数值概率算法,对大量财务报销数据进行合理分类,并将分类后的数据传输到财务项目配置模块进行审批.优化财务审核安全评价流程,检查审核处理结构的准确性.对系统服务器和处理器模块的硬件配置进行了优化...     

Why do auditors fail? What might work? What won’t?†

Auditing failures and scandals have become commonplace. In response, reformers (including the Kingman Review in the U.K. and a recent report of the U.K.’s Competition and Market Authority) have proposed a variety of remedies, including prophylactic bans on auditors providing consulting services to their clients in the belief that this will minimize the conflicts of interest that produce auditing failures. Although useful, such reforms are already in place to a considerable degree and may have reached the point of diminishing returns. Moreover, this strategy does not address the deeper problem that clients (or their managements) may not want aggressive auditing, but rather prefer a deferential and perfunctory audit. If so, auditors will realize that they are marketing a ‘commodity’ service and cannot successfully compete based on their quality of services. Rationally, they would respond to such a market by seeking to adopt a cost-minimization strategy, competing by reducing the cost of their services and not investing in new technology or higher-priced personnel.

What could change this pattern? Gatekeepers, including auditors, serve investors, but are hired by corporate management. To induce gatekeepers to better serve investors, one needs to reduce the ‘agency costs’ surrounding this relationship by making gatekeepers more accountable to investors. This might be accomplished through litigation (as happens to some degree in the U.S.), but the U.K. and Europe have rules that discourage collective litigation. Thus, a more feasible approach would be to give investors greater ability to select and remove the auditor. This paper proposes a two part strategy to this end: (1) public ‘grading’ of the auditor by the audit regulator in an easily comparable fashion (and with a mandatory grading curve), and (2) enabling a minority of the shareholders (hypothetically, 10%) to propose a replacement auditor for a shareholder vote. It further argues that both activist shareholders and diversified shareholders might support such a strategy and undertake it under different circumstances. Absent such a focus on agency costs, however, reformers are likely only re-arranging the deck chairs on the Titanic.