Innovative Credit Guarantee Schemes with equity-for-guarantee swaps

Small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs) faces much more severe financial constraints compared to large mature companies and it is more vulnerable to market imperfection. To alleviate SMEs’ financial constraints, Public Credit Guarantee Schemes (CGSs) have been introduced and widely used around the world. Having provided a thorough analysis of the effectiveness of the traditional CGSs, we introduce an innovative financing contract, referred to as equity-for-guarantee swap (EGS), with the aim of reducing SMEs’ financial constraints in a more effective way. We show that EGS effectively alleviates SMEs’ severe financial constraints as it transfers the information asymmetry between lenders and SMEs to that between insurers and SMEs We investigate how asset prices vary across time under the EGS contract and analyze insurers’ risk exposure, i.e. value-at-risk (VaR) and expected shortfall (ES), of participating in the EGS contract. Consistent with pecking order theory, SMEs tend to use debt financing first dispite the benefit of a boosted growth rate from private equity financing in our model.     

BOT项目前期的政府监督问题及对策研究

政府监管是政府或政府指定的特设机构依据法律或法定授权对市场经济主体采取的一系列行政管理与监督的行为。BOT项目前期是由政府占据主导地位的，因此该阶段的政府监管更多的是对自身行为的监督。目前，该阶段存在立项规划欠缺前瞻性、招投标相关法律法规不健全、招投标存在不公平现象以及特许经营协议不完善的问题。必须充分考虑经济发展和城市规划的因素、完善BOT项目相关法律法规、规范招投标程序运作、强化政府监督的内部约束机制，以保障项目下一阶段的顺利进行。     

公众效用约束视角下强化国家审计的治理逻辑及其制度供给

社会公众参与国家治理日益成为国家治理体系的重要组成部分。在政治经济学框架下将社会公众参与国家治理的过程与功能提炼为公众效用约束,并通过构建一个简洁的地方政府公共支出结构选择模型阐明公众效用约束机制。结合公众效用软约束下中国地方发展型政府行为的经济影响以及直接构建公众效用约束机制面临的问题,从理论上解释了中央政府强化国家审计的治理逻辑。中国特色社会主义国家审计制度供给可以从审计方法流程、审计业务体系、审计结果运用等方面进行完善,全面评估效用结果、深度契合效用目标与有效实施问责约束,实现公众效用约束机制的间接构造,成为公共权力治理的“内部—经常性激励约束机制”,从而可以更好地适应当前发展阶段和体制背景下国家治理的需要。     

Industry‐specific Exchange Rate Fluctuations,Japanese Exports and Financial Constraints: Evidence from Panel Vector Autoregressive Analysis

Using a panel vector autoregression approach and industry breakdown data for financial constraints obtained from the Bank of Japan's Tankan (Short‐Term Economic Survey of Enterprises in Japan) database, this study empirically investigates whether and how Japanese firms' financial constraints (internal and external) influence the response of Japanese sectoral exports to an exchange rate shock. Furthermore, we use the industry‐specific real effective exchange rate data developed by to allow for different movements of real effective exchange rates across industries. It is found that financial constraints have a significant influence on Japanese exports in response to exchange rate shocks. Japanese exporters with either lower internal financial constraints or external financial constraints are less affected by the yen's appreciation. In addition, if firms face high external financial constraints, only reducing the internal financial constraints cannot help them mitigate the impact of the yen's appreciation on their exports. Thus, an accommodative financial environment also plays an important role in alleviating the impact that the yen's appreciation has on Japanese exports.     

Are firms accessing venture funding more financially constrained? New evidence from capital structure adjustments

We analyze whether firms that receive venture capital (VC) at a later date face more financial constraints than a one-by-one matched sample of firms that did not receive VC funding (control group). The aim is to check whether their financial flexibility explains why they decide to seek external equity funding. In contrast with other papers, which focus on the sensitivity of investments to cash flow, we study this issue by applying a dynamic model to analyze the speed of adjustment to their target debt levels prior to receiving the first VC investment. We analyze a representative sample of 237 Spanish unlisted firms that received VC between 1995 and 2007 and its corresponding control group. We find that firms that receive VC funding show a significantly lower speed of adjustment than their matched peers before the initial VC round. It seems that the former are more concerned about funding the required investments than about adjusting the firm's debt ratio to a target level. Our results confirm the role of VC in filling the equity gap in constrained unlisted firms. From a capital structure perspective, VC may become a tool for these companies to balance their capital structure in a growth process.     

银行业市场竞争对企业技术创新的影响研究

银行贷款是企业创新的重要融资来源,银行业市场的变化影响着企业技术创新的融资环境.基于2008-2014年沪深A股上市公司的实证检验发现:银行市场竞争性的提高有利于缓解企业的融资约束,促进企业技术创新.企业规模对中小企业的技术创新有正向的影响,对大型企业存在负的效应.银行业市场竞争对企业技术创新的影响也因企业规模不同而不同,中小企业受到的融资约束明显,银行业竞争度的提高更有利于促进中小企业的技术创新.     

融资约束对企业出口影响的Heckman验证-基于银行信用风险的视角

基于中国工业企业数据库1998-2014年7032家企业的平衡面板数据,从银行信用风险内部评级的视角,研究融资约束对企业出口的影响.结果表明:银行信贷融资约束与企业的出口决策及出口强度间有显著负相关关系.同时,使用Heckman二阶段模型研究发现:不同形式的商业信用对企业出口决策及出口强度的影响和作用机制会因企业所处供求端位置的不同而存在差异.其中,需求端的商业信用仅与企业出口决策显著正相关,而与出口强度的相关性并不显著;供给端的商业信用则与企业出口强度显著负相关.     

环境执法监督对企业绿色创新的影响

以环保约谈制度实施为契机,基于合法性理论和遵从理论,考察环境执法监督对企业绿色创新的影响及其机制。研究发现：环境执法监督会有效地促进企业绿色创新,即环保约谈显著地提高了被约谈地区企业的绿色创新水平。拓展性检验与分析后发现,环境执法监督对企业绿色创新的促进作用主要表现在低融资约束企业和低代理成本企业中。影响机制探索后发现,环境执法监督通过提高企业环境成本、环境处罚力度和企业环保投资,进而促进企业绿色创新。     

Optimal mixed taxation,credit constraints,and the timing of income tax reporting

We study optimal income and commodity tax policy with credit‐constrained low‐income households. Workers receive an even flow of income during the tax year, but report their incomes and make tax payments (receive transfers) at the end of the year. They spend their disposable income on multiple commodities over the year. We show that differentiated subsidies on commodities can be optimal even if the Atkinson–Stiglitz Theorem conditions apply. When the optimal policy leaves low‐income households with binding credit constraints, it may be optimal to subsidize differentially the good that they consume in higher proportion. Uniform subsidies would also relax the credit constraint, but would be more costly to the government since they would equally benefit unconstrained households. Numerical examples suggest that commodity tax differentiation increases with basic needs and with the interest rate at which government borrows.