The impact of social norms on entrepreneurial action: Evidence from the environmental entrepreneurship context

Using insights from institutional theory, sociology, and entrepreneurship we develop and test a model of the relationship between centralized and decentralized institutions on entrepreneurial activity. We suggest that both decentralized institutions that are socially determined as well as centralized institutions that are designed by governmental authorities are important in promoting firm foundings in the environmental context. In a sample of the U.S. solar energy sector we find that state-sponsored incentives, environmental consumption norms, and norms of family interdependence are related to new firm entry in this sector. Our findings also suggest that the efficacy of state-level policies in the sponsoring of entrepreneurial growth is dependent upon the social norms that prevail in the entrepreneur's environment. We expand entrepreneurship theory and the study of institutions and the natural environment by demonstrating the integral role that social norms play in influencing the creation of new firms and by illustrating the potential effect social norms have on the effect of policy that seeks to encourage environmentally responsible economic activity.     

Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Holmström’s [Holmström, B., 1982/1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Originally published in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki] career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: (i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; (ii) decision errors take time to decrease; (iii) while subjects’ average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner’s curse arises on the labor demand side.     

THEORY AND EVIDENCE IN PSYCHOLOGY AND ECONOMICS ABOUT MOTIVATION CROWDING OUT: A POSSIBLE CONVERGENCE?

The empirical relevance of motivation crowding out is a controversial issue in economics and psychology. As already pointed out by Frey and Jegen ( 2001 ), this is partly due to the historical development of two distinct and parallel strands of literature that stem from different theoretical traditions, have radically different tenets and therefore, are difficult to reconcile. In this survey, we go back to the details of the debates that took place independently among psychologists and economists, and sketch an integrative interdisciplinary approach likely to favor a more fruitful collaboration between economics and psychology. From this perspective, experimental economics (both field and laboratory) is viewed as a major research field shedding new light on the conditions of relevance of motivation crowding out.     

New market socialism: a case for rejuvenation or inspired alchemy?

The aim of this paper is to examine the relative merits anddrawbacks of two recent models of market socialism proposedby Bardhan and Roemer. This is done, first, by putting thesemodels into the perspective of the history of economic thought.Thus, after presenting the basic elements of the early Langemodel as well as the Austrian and ‘new information economics’critiques, the necessary comparisons and contrasts are madeto see what new light these new models bring into this debate.In addition, the internal consistency and coherence of thesemodels is checked in terms of their own proclaimed goals. Last,a more radical methodological critique is provided.     

Incentives for subjects in internet experiments

Providing incentives to subjects in internet experiments can be tricky. One simple method is a high score (as in computer games). We test whether high scores provide adequate incentives in comparison to the usual performance based incentives. We find significant differences.     

When punishment fails: Research on sanctions, intentions and non-cooperation

People can become less cooperative when threatened with sanctions, and previous research suggests both “intentions” and incentives underlie this effect. We report data from an experiment aimed at determining the relative importance of intentions and incentives in producing non-cooperative behavior. Participants play a one-shot investment experiment in pairs. Investors send an amount to trustees, request a return on this investment and, in some treatments, can threaten sanctions to enforce their requests. Decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by investors are compared to decisions by trustees facing threats imposed (or not) by nature. When not threatened, trustees typically decide to return a positive amount less than the investor requested. When threatened this decision becomes least common. If the request is large relative to the sanction then most trustees return nothing. If the request is small, trustees typically return the requested amount. These results do not vary with investors' intentions.     

众筹中创新项目质量和报酬率的激励效应研究

众筹是整合社会分散财力资源从而实现筹资投资双方获得便利目的的一种有效的新型融资投资模式,属于互联网金融的一种形式.本文针对众筹过程中两大参与主体筹资方和投资方各自特征,依据成本收益理论,建立激励效用模型,考虑创新项目质量和报酬率两大因素的变化对众筹双方的期望效用的影响作用.研究结果表明:在三种不同的假设条件下,项目质量和报酬率两大因素影响众筹双方期望效用,进而可以激励双方主体,并且提出了众筹双方效用最优化状态的存在性.     

A SURVEY OF THE ECONOMICS OF PATENT SYSTEMS AND PROCEDURES

The last several decades have seen increases in patenting activity worldwide, as well as growing issues related to patent quality. In response to these quality issues a recent patent literature has emerged, that investigates the behavior and incentives of patent examiners, applicants, and third parties. In this paper, we provide an overview of patent procedures, patent systems and a survey of the new economic literature on patent systems. Both theoretical and empirical papers are considered. Policy implications coming from this literature are presented.     

上市公司年报粉饰行为的动机、手段与识别

上市公司年报粉饰行为的动机主要有:取得上市资格、获得配股资格、防止亏损、侵占股东利益、牟取二级市场暴利、满足经理人员业绩需要等。本文指出上市公司年报粉饰主要靠利润操纵、编制虚假报表、补充公告隐瞒信息等手段,并提出从上市公司的利润构成、年报中虚拟资产项目、现金流量分析、上市公司关联交易事项等方面对上市公司年报粉饰行为进行识别。