Domestic financial market frictions,unrestricted international capital flows,and crises in small open economies

Summary. We present an example of a small open economy where small increases in the world interest rate may induce a sharp decline in output and a precipitous depreciation of the exchange rate. Due to a costly state verification problem in domestic credit markets, combined with unrestricted international capital flows, our economy generates two long-run equilibria, one with low GDP and a relatively depreciated real exchange rate (RER), and one with high GDP and a relatively appreciated RER. The first is always a saddle, while the second may be a sink or a source, depending on the level of the world interest rate. A crisis is identified with the economy switching from an equilibrium path approaching the high-output steady state to the saddlepath approaching the low-output steady state. In Mexicos recent history, periods of growth associated with appreciation of the RER have alternated with periods of sharp contraction and depreciation of the RER. Our economy displays such behavior in response to changes in the world interest rate.Received: 9 April 2002, Revised: 20 March 2003JEL Classification Numbers: E5, F4.G. Antinolfi, E. Huybens: We thank Steve Fazzari, Tim Kehoe, Todd Keister, Manuel Santos, Karl Shell and especially Bruce Smith for very helpful discussions. Jaime Calleja Alderete, Eduardo Camero Godínez, and Juan Vargas Hernández provided excellent research assistance. All remaining errors are ours. Huybens was an assistant professor in the Centro de Investigación Económica, ITAM, at the time this article was written, and part of this work was completed while Antinolfi was a visiting scholar at the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. The views expressed herein are those of the authors, and do not reflect those of the World Bank or the Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis. Correspondence to: G. Antinolfi     

亚洲金融危机之后的深层思考

进入20世纪90年代以来,全球各类金融危机频频发生。影响国际经济金融秩序的因素发生了新变化,目前的国际金融秩序已经不能适应国际政治格局和经济、技术发展趋势,不能适应调整当前国际金融关系的需要,必须进行变革,并建立公正、合理的国际金融新秩序。     

商业银行危机与房地产泡沫破裂临界值的研究

本文从房地产泡沫破裂会对商业银行贷款产生风险的角度出发,首次提出了房地产泡沫破裂临界值的概念,并且用数理形式给出了定义,分析了影响临界值大小的因素,论述了临界值和贷款风险的关系;另外,参照其它国家和地区的房地产泡沫情况,对我国的房地产泡沫大小及可能的破裂速度给出了估计,计算了泡沫破裂临界值。     

汇率制度、资本流动与金融危机:理论和实证分析——东亚金融危机视角

20世纪90年代,几乎所有发生金融危机的国家当时都实行固定或钉住汇率制度。东亚金融危机爆发前,东亚各经济体大多实行钉住美元的相对固定汇率制,大量国际资本流入,本币严重高估,经常项目巨额逆差,宏观经济严重失衡。在汇率贬值的预期下,国际投机资本对东亚经济体货币发动攻击,大量资本流出,受攻击的经济体外汇储备耗尽,最终导致实际钉住美元的固定汇率制崩溃,金融危机爆发,蔓延成危及东亚乃至世界的金融危机。东亚金融危机的事实表明,金融危机、资本流动和汇率制度之间存在着密切关系。     

Cointegration and causality in the Asian and emerging foreign exchange markets: Evidence from the 1990s financial crises

This article examines the cointegration level, changes in the existence and directions of causality of the foreign exchange (FX) rates in the Asian and emerging markets during the 1990s financial crises. Engle and Granger's simple bivariate and Johansen's multivariate cointegrations are applied to the FX rates for the 1994 Mexican, 1997 Asian, 1998 Russian, and 1999 Brazilian crises. In addition, the article conducts the Granger causality test and impulse response analysis to examine the causality pattern in all the FX rates. The analysis shows most of the pre-Mexican causality disappears and significant numbers of new causality emerge in the 1994 Mexican crisis while the 1997 Asian crisis generates significant spillover effects into the later part of the 1998 Russian and 1999 Brazilian crises.     

WTO financial services commitments: Determinants and impact on financial stability

The paper investigates the factors that have influenced WTO members to take on their chosen level of liberalization commitments in the framework of liberalization of trade in financial services and the impact of such commitments on financial sector stability. The most important factors are economic growth, current account, trends in banking sector development, policy restrictiveness, and peer-group effects. The econometric evidence suggests that more liberal commitments may be associated with greater vulnerability to currency and banking crises—most likely a short-term effect, which should be mitigated with time through increased market efficiency and better resource allocation.     

The effects of resolution methods and industry stress on the loss on assets from bank failures

In this paper, we examine how the value of failed bank assets differs between two types of FDIC resolution methods: liquidation and private-sector reorganization. Our findings show that private-sector reorganizations do not deliver the expected cost-savings from 1986 to 1991, a period of industry distress. On a univariate basis, the net loss on assets is lower for a private-sector reorganization than for a liquidation in both a period of industry distress and of industry health. However, institutions with higher quality assets and higher franchise values are more likely to be resolved using a private-sector resolution. Once we control for this selection bias, we find that institutions that are resolved during periods of industry distress result in higher resolution costs than liquidation. During periods of industry health, private-sector resolutions are less costly than liquidations. We show that if a bank that failed during the post-crisis period instead failed during the crisis period, its net loss as a percent of assets would have been 3.232 percentage points higher. Given that the average net loss on assets ratio is 21.42 percent during our sample period from 1986 to 2007, the increase in costs is economically significant.     

Why is credit-to-GDP a good measure for setting countercyclical capital buffers?

We examine banks’ loan losses in Europe in 1982–2012 using a nonlinear three-factor model that takes into account output growth, real interest rate, and the ratio of private credit to GDP relative to its trend (i.e., “excessive indebtedness”). We find that a drop in output has an intensified impact on loan losses if the private sector is excessively indebted. Because increased bank credit risk should be matched with higher bank capital, the result motivates the Basel III's countercyclical capital buffers as a function of private indebtedness relative to its trend. The result also helps to explain differences in the amount of loan losses in different recessions across time and across countries. The model also indicates that low interest rates during the recent recession have clearly mitigated loan losses.     

Which Net Capital Flows Matter?

This article classifies extreme net capital flow episodes into four types and analyzes the macroeconomic impacts of each type. First, we find that all types of episodes increased drastically in the 2000s relative to previous years. Second, we conclude that liability-flow-driven episodes have more significant macroeconomic impacts than do asset-flow-driven episodes. Third, we show that only drastic positive net capital flows that were driven by liability flows were associated with a higher probability of banking crises in the 2000s. The results suggest that the detailed classification of extreme net capital flows provides insight into these movements’ macroeconomic impacts and policy implementations.     

Sovereign debt markets in turbulent times: Creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects

In 2007, countries in the euro zone periphery were enjoying stable growth, low deficits, and low spreads. Then the financial crisis erupted and pushed them into deep recessions, raising their deficits and debt levels. By 2010, they were facing severe debt problems. Spreads increased and, surprisingly, so did the share of the debt held by domestic creditors. Credit was reallocated from the private sector to the public sector, reducing investment and deepening the recessions even further. To account for these facts, we propose a simple model of sovereign risk in which debt can be traded in secondary markets. The model has two key ingredients: creditor discrimination and crowding-out effects. Creditor discrimination arises because, in turbulent times, sovereign debt offers a higher expected return to domestic creditors than to foreign ones. This provides incentives for domestic purchases of debt. Crowding-out effects arise because private borrowing is limited by financial frictions. This implies that domestic debt purchases displace productive investment. The model shows that these purchases reduce growth and welfare, and may lead to self-fulfilling crises. It also shows how crowding-out effects can be transmitted to other countries in the euro zone, and how they may be addressed by policies at the European level.