多个大股东治理机制的有效性——基于制度环境的分析

结合制度环境深入考察了多个大股东的行为选择及其作为一种治理机制的有效性问题,我们发现,多个大股东的公司治理作用只有在特定的制度环境下才是有效的,而在制度环境很不完善的条件下,外部大股东的监督是不存在或者说多个大股东的公司治理作用是无效的。     

防范合谋的激励机制研究综述

通过对合谋内涵、舍谋成因以及防范合谋的激励机制设计三个方面的国内外主要文献进行的回顾与述评结果发现，我国在防范合谋的激励机制设计方面主要存在下列问题：国内许多文献认为信息不对称是合谋的成因，但实际上合谋的成因是互惠，信息不对称只是为合谋提供了条件；现有理论主要从激励经济学角度研究防范合谋的机制设计的，但人类行为动机的产生和发展、变化是一个复杂、微妙的心理过程，仅从激励角度研究合谋问题不足以取得满意的效果。     

Is capital a collusion device?

Summary. We examine how irreversible capital reduces the possibility of a duopoly to sustain implicit collusion by grim strategies, when the product is homogenous and firms compete in quantities. Compared with the case of reversible capital, there are two countervailing effects: Deviation from an existing collusion is less attractive, because capital once installed causes costs forever. But the punishment will also be less severe due to the high capacity the deviating firm can build before punishment starts. The last effect dominates, meaning that the commitment value of capital is negative for all firms. If capital is irreversible, collusion breaks down for realistic magnitudes of interest rates. Received: April 30, 1999; revised version: November 30, 2001     

Collusive Long-Run Investments Under Transmission Price-Caps

In the short run, constraints in the electricity transmission system may give market power to generators. This paper examines whether the constraints themselves are a long-run equilibrium outcome in a competitive environment. We show that independent transmission companies and generators can tacitly collude to raise prices to consumers and divide the resulting profits. We also show that price cap regulation does not prevent this behavior and may in fact contribute to it. The mechanism for collusion is that generators locate their plants so that a capacity-constrained transmission line lies between them and their consumer market. We show that this constraint-based collusion can be sustained in a static game without any punishment strategies.     

中国保险业的合谋倾向强度:一个理论分析框架

从结构、需求与信息三个维度构建了一个产业合谋倾向强度理论分析框架，并用该框架分析了我国保险业的合谋强度。研究认为，我国保险业合谋强度比较大。     

Effective regulation versus tacit collusion in the long-distance market: an empirical analysis

Regulatory decisions often must be made in an atmosphere of uncertainty, and arguments presented by the affected parties frequently add to, rather than resolve, that uncertainty. Here, we examine several of the deregulatory decisions affecting the long-distance market that were rendered by the FCC over the two-decade period following the divestiture of AT&T. Our purpose is to provide empirical evidence relevant to some of the arguments regarding market conditions that were presented during that period. Findings suggest that some of the more prominent allegations are not supported by the data.      

Selected Economic Analysis at the Antitrust Division: The Year in Review

Of the many activitiesof the Antitrust Division of theU.S. Department of Justice, we havesummarized some that raise interestingeconomic issues. We describe recentimprovements in the methodology to beused in ``coordinated effects' analysisof mergers. We also discuss four casesbrought by the DOJ that raise issues ofmarket definition, the influence ofcommon partial ownership of competitors,and the effects of fringe suppliers inconstraining collusion by large firms.     

Spreads, Depths, and Quote Clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq: Evidence after the 1997 Securities and Exchange Commission Rule Changes

This paper examines liquidity and quote clustering on the NYSE and Nasdaq using data after the two market reforms—the 1997 order–handling rule and minimum tick size changes. We find that Nasdaq–listed stocks exhibit wider spreads and smaller depths than NYSE–listed stocks and stocks with higher proportions of even–eighth and even–sixteenth quotes have wider quoted, effective, and realized spreads on both the NYSE and Nasdaq. This result differs from the findings by Bessembinder (1999, p. 404) that "trade execution costs on Nasdaq in late 1997 are no longer significantly explained by a tendency for liquidity providers to avoid odd–eighth quotations," and "odd–sixteenth avoidance has little relevance for explaining post–reform Nasdaq trading costs."     

Tacit collusion in housing markets: the case of Santiago,Chile

In this article, using a detailed micro-database from Santiago, Chile, the potential existence of tacit collusion in housing markets is investigated. In order to perform the test, Santiago’s housing market is split into four different submarkets using hedonic price analysis and household’s socioeconomics characteristics. Then, using a GMM panel data model, regressions are run for each submarket, correlating industry’s markups with the aggregate level of activity. The main finding is that low and middle income submarkets present higher average markups and a pro-cyclical behaviour. This finding is consistent with a market where participants do not face capacity constraints and behave strategically to sustain tacit collusion during increasing demand periods.     

合谋理论的演进与新发展

合谋理论作为激励的一个分支,近年来已经进入主流经济学的研究前沿。本文的分析表明:合谋的早期的研究,主要用来解释组织间企业价格合谋,一般属于静态分析;博弈论引入后的分析则更多的是对合谋均衡的动态研究;同时合谋理论也拓展到拍卖和决策等领域。近年来,在不完全契约等理论发展的基础上,合谋理论转入到组织内研究,以拉丰等人的相关研究文献为代表。他们的研究奠定了合谋理论研究的基本范式,建立的模型解释了合谋的产生、合谋的防范以及影响合谋的因素。隧道效应理论则进一步从法律经济学的视角分析了不同法系下的公司治理中的控股股东侵害中小股东利益这一广泛存在的合谋现象。