The curse of natural resources in the transition economies*

The curse of natural resources is a well‐documented phenomenon for developing countries. Economies that are richly endowed with natural resources tend to grow slowly. Among the transition economies of the former ‘Eastern Bloc’, a similar pattern can be observed. This paper shows that a large part of the variation in growth rates among the transition economies can be attributed to the curse of natural resources. After controlling for numerous other factors, there is still a strong negative correlation between natural resource abundance and economic growth. Among the transition economies the prime reasons for the curse of natural resources were corruption and a neglect of basic education. In order to overcome the curse of natural resources and move to a sustainable path of development, the resource abundant transition countries should fight corruption and ensure that their resource revenues are invested in human capital or the preservation of natural capital.     

国家审计在反腐败中的作用透视——以捷克为例

防范与揭露腐败,是国家审计义不容辞的责任,也是国家审计参与国家治理的重要途径。捷克最高审计署依法参与反腐败的经验与做法,在国有企业财务收支、政府采购合同和欧盟资金管理等方面的审计实践,尤其是针对腐败的预防提出的建设性的要求,可以为我国国家审计所借鉴。另外,捷克最高审计署为了提升自身的反腐败审计水平,在加大对员工信息化审计培训的同时,积极参与国际反腐败审计的合作,取得了一些成果。我国国家审计可以借鉴捷克最高审计署的反腐败审计经验,更好地参与国家治理。     

Optimal regulation under imperfect enforcement: Permits,tickets, or both?

Economic activity is often regulated through both permits and tickets (subsequent inspections). We study the effectiveness of such policies where corruption and an underground economy make enforcement imperfect. In the theoretical model, asymmetric information justifies regulatory action which is enforced by corruptible bureaucrats. We find that regulation through permits alone is useless when corruption exists, while tickets still offer some benefit. Surprisingly, we also find that a system with both permits and tickets achieves welfare that is higher than that which can be achieved with only tickets—that combining the two mechanisms has an effect that is greater than the “sum of the parts.”     

Privatization and corruption in transition economies: a panel study

By using three corruption indices, six privatization indicators, and taking the endogeneity problem into consideration, we test the hypothesis that privatization contributes to a decrease in corruption in transition economies. We identified a highly statistically significant and negative association between privatization and corruption in transition economies for three different corruption indices and six different privatization indicators.     

Are new states more corrupt? Expert opinions versus firms’ experiences

We find that new states are perceived to be more corrupt even though businesses do not report more bribery in newer states. This is suggestive of an unearned, and likely high, reputational cost to being a new state. These findings hold over a number of specifications that include additional economic, historical and geographic controls.     

Analysis of China＇s Convention Industry： Problems and Countermeasures

As a new tourist product that can generate large expenditure to economy, convention industry is highly regarded by the government and enterprises of different countries. In China, convention industry develops steadily and has brought great economic benefits for national economy. However, compared with those countries in which convention industry is much developed and mature, the convention industry in China still faces great challenges when competing in world market. Based on the analysis of the current situation of development of convention industry in China, the paper focuses on the main problems of convention industry in China and then put forwards some countermeasures of how to develop convention industry in a sound and scientific way.