On discrimination in the optimal management of teams

We study the optimal management of teams in which agents’ effort decisions are mapped (via a production technology) into the probability of the team’s success. Optimal wage schemes in such context are largely discriminatory, but we show that the extent of the discrimination crucially depends on the existence of moral hazard. More precisely, for teams with a flat structure, the domain of production technologies giving rise to discrimination is broader when agents’ actions are observable and contractible. For teams with a sequential structure, the result reverses and the domain of production technologies giving rise to discrimination is broader when there exists moral hazard. Finally, in more cooperative environments in which agents are allowed to collude, optimality does not entail discrimination, with or without moral hazard.     

Fiscal financing and the efficacy of fiscal policy in Korea: An empirical assessment with comparison to the U.S. evidence

This paper aims to assess the empirical implications of fiscal financing in Korea and study how they differ from those of the U.S. We estimate two versions of the dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model—a small open economy (SOE) model for Korea and its closed economy counterpart for the U.S.—in which the former nests the latter as a special case. The fiscal policy specification posits that government spending, lump-sum transfers, and distortionary taxation on labor income, capital income and consumption expenditures respond to the level of government debt and the state of economic activity. Analysis of the data from 2000 to 2015 shows that distortionary capital taxes play a critical role in stabilizing government debt in the U.S., whereas non-distorting fiscal instruments are the primary means of fiscal adjustment in Korea. Regarding the magnitude of debt-financed fiscal stimuli, the substantial trade openness of Korea is significant in that it produces relatively smaller government spending and transfer multipliers compared to the U.S.     

Nonparametric learning rules from bandit experiments: The eyes have it!

How do people learn? We assess, in a model-free manner, subjectsʼ belief dynamics in a two-armed bandit learning experiment. A novel feature of our approach is to supplement the choice and reward data with subjectsʼ eye movements during the experiment to pin down estimates of subjectsʼ beliefs. Estimates show that subjects are more reluctant to “update down” following unsuccessful choices, than “update up” following successful choices. The profits from following the estimated learning and decision rules are smaller (by about 25% of average earnings by subjects in this experiment) than what would be obtained from a fully-rational Bayesian learning model, but comparable to the profits from alternative non-Bayesian learning models, including reinforcement learning and a simple “win-stay” choice heuristic.     

The effects of mid-career military enlistment on civilian career prospects: evidence from the Australian banking industry during World War II

This paper uses personnel records of employees from an Australian bank to analyse the labour market consequences of career interruptions due to voluntary military service during the Second World War. The records contain the employees’ career position and pay histories, and pre-war outcomes are used to control for selection bias caused by non-random enlistment. It is shown that, despite losing human capital during the War, upon their return veterans did not face a wage penalty relative to non-volunteers. Finally, evidence from non-wage outcomes suggests that the absence of a wage penalty was a form of positive discrimination by the Bank.

Ethnic identities,public spending and political regimes

Do democracies discriminate less against minorities as compared to non-democracies? How does the dominance of an ethnic group affect discrimination under various political regimes? We build a theory to analyse such questions. In our model, political leaders (democratically elected or not) decide on the allocation of spending on different types of public goods: a general public good and an ethnically-targetable public good which benefits the majority ethnic group while imposing a cost on the other minorities. We show that, under democracy, lower ethnic dominance leads to greater provision of the general public good while higher dominance implies higher provision of the ethnically-targetable good. Interestingly, the opposite relation obtains under dictatorship. This implies that political regime changes can favour or disfavour minorities based on the ambient level of ethnic dominance. Several historical events involving regime changes can be analysed within our framework and are consistent with our results.     

Remittances as a social status signaling device

Like all human beings, migrants may have a concern about their prestige or social status in the eyes of left-home family and friends. They can remit money in order to signal their economic success and increase their status. We show that if migrants’ income is private information, unsuccessful migrants might accept a worsening of their living conditions and send back home large amounts of remittances only in order to make residents believe that they are successful. In some cases, successful migrants can signal their true favorable economic situation by remitting an even larger amount. The game presents various equilibria that differ with respect to the proportion and nature of the migrants who sacrifice consumption opportunities to status revealing actions.     

电网故障模型中贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的应用

由于电网的复杂性和多变性,导致电网故障中存在信息不确定性问题,这就需要依靠贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论的自动生成方法。文章主要描述了这两种方法的原理,讨论了贝叶斯网络和DS证据理论在电网故障模型领域应用的可能方式和情况,并运用一些实例证明了这种方法的可靠性。     

Simultaneous versus sequential information processing

Subjects update prior information simultaneously versus sequentially. The mean prediction is remarkably close to the correct Bayesian estimate with simultaneous information, but differs significantly conditional on whether good news precedes bad news or vice versa.     

Monetary and fiscal policy interactions in the post-war U.S.

A New Keynesian model allowing for an active monetary and passive fiscal policy (AMPF) regime and a passive monetary and active fiscal policy (PMAF) regime is estimated to fit various U.S. samples from 1955 to 2007. The results show that data in the pre-Volcker periods strongly prefer an AMPF regime, even with a prior centered in the PMAF region. The estimation, however, is not very informative about whether the Federal Reserve's reaction to inflation is greater than one in the pre-Volcker period, because much lower values can still preserve determinacy under passive fiscal policy. In addition, whether a PMAF regime can generate consumption growth following a government spending increase depends on the degree of price stickiness. An income tax cut can yield an unusual negative labor response if monetary policy aggressively stabilizes output growth.     

The impact of entry costs on export market participation in agriculture

Theoretical models of market entry imply that sunk costs are an important factor in the decision to export. Following Helpman, Melitz, and Rubinstein (2008) , we develop a simple model of foreign market participation and use a Bayesian method to estimate the resulting dynamic discrete‐choice model with lagged dependent variable. Employing a balanced panel data that follows 81 trading partners for 30 years from 1971 to 2000, we estimate our model and compute the marginal effect of sunk costs on the likelihood of export market participation. We find that such costs are economically and statistically important for trade in all of the six major agricultural commodities (Cereals, Dairy, Fish, Meat, Vegetables and Fruits, and Sugar), for agricultural producers in both developed and developing countries. We also find evidence suggesting that, in general, market access for both developed and developing exporters had improved in the years following the Uruguay round of trade negotiations (1995–2000).