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101.
Guillaume Haeringer 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,117(1):140-143
To construct their Equilibrium Binding Agreements, Ray and Vohra (J. Econ. Theory, 73 (1997) 30-78) define a concept of an equilibrium between coalitions and prove its existence for any coalition structure. We show that this result crucially depends on the quasi-concavity of the utility functions, which in turn depends on the type of mixed strategies used by the coalitions. When coalitions use uncorrelated mixed strategies utility functions may not be quasi-concave and an equilibrium may not exist. However, if coalitions use correlated strategies, an equilibrium always exist. 相似文献
102.
Alexander Matros 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,111(1):110-124
Saez-Marti and Weibull (J. Econom. Theory 86 (1999) 268) investigate the consequences of letting some agents play a myopic best reply to the myopic best reply in Young's (J. Econom. Theory 59 (1993) 145) bargaining model, which is how they introduce “cleverness” of players. I analyze such clever agents in general finite two-player games and show Young's (Individual Strategy and Social Structure, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1998) prediction to be robust: adaptive learning with clever agents does select the same minimal curb set as in the absence of clever agents, if their population share is less than one. However, the long-run strategy distribution in such a curb set may vary with the share of clever agents. 相似文献
103.
We use a game theoretical framework to analyze the intraday behavior of banks with respect to settlement of interbank claims in a real-time gross settlement setting. The game played by banks depends upon the intraday credit policy of the central bank and it encompasses two well-known game theoretical paradigms: the prisoner's dilemma and the stag hunt. The former arises in a collateralized credit regime where banks have an incentive to postpone payments when daylight liquidity is costly, an outcome that is socially inefficient. The latter arises in a priced credit regime where the postponement of payments can be socially efficient. Banks are risk neutral, but we show that most of the results are unaffected by risk aversion. 相似文献
104.
Hamid Sabourian 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,116(2):189-228
Rubinstein and Wolinsky (Rev. Econ. Stud. 57 (1990) 63-78) consider a simple decentralised market game in which agents meet randomly or voluntarily and bargain over the terms of trade. They show that any individually rational price can be sustained as a sequential equilibrium even though the model has a unique competitive outcome. Here, I consider Rubinstein and Wolinsky's model and show that if complexity costs of implementing strategies enter players’ preferences, together with the standard payoff in the game, then every equilibrium is stationary/Markov and induces the unique competitive price. Thus, I demonstrate that aversion to complexity may provide a justification for the competitive outcome. 相似文献
105.
This paper studies a model of dynamic network formation when individuals are farsighted: players evaluate the desirability of a “current” move in terms of its consequences on the entire discounted stream of payoffs. We define a concept of equilibrium which takes into account farsighted behavior of agents and allows for limited cooperation amongst agents. We show that an equilibrium process of network formation exists. We also show that there are valuation structures in which no equilibrium strategy profile can sustain efficient networks. We then provide sufficient conditions under which the equilibrium process will yield efficient outcomes. 相似文献
106.
Jacob K. Goeree 《Journal of Economic Theory》2003,108(2):345-364
This paper considers auctions where bidders compete for an advantage in future strategic interactions. When bidders wish to exaggerate their private information, equilibrium bidding functions are biased upwards as bidders attempt to signal via the winning bid. Signaling is most prominent in second-price auctions where equilibrium bids are “above value.” In English and first-price auctions, signaling is less extreme since the winner incurs the cost of her signaling choice. The opportunity to signal lowers bidders’ payoffs and raises revenue. When bidders understate their private information, separating equilibria need not exist and the auction may not be efficient. 相似文献
107.
This paper analyses the effects of partially revocable endogenous commitments of a seller in a negotiation with a deadline.
In particular, we examine when commitment is a source of strength, a source of inefficiency and when it does not affect the
bargaining outcome at all. We show that when commitment possesses a minimum amount of irrevocability this crucially determines
the bargaining outcome. In the bilateral bargaining case, commitment becomes a source of inefficiency since it causes a deadline
effect. In the choice of partner framework, however, the deadline effect disappears and there is an immediate agreement and,
moreover, commitment becomes a source of strength since it increases the seller's equilibrium payoff by triggering off competition
between the buyers. 相似文献
108.
We consider general economies in which rational agents interact locally. The local aspect of the interactions is designed to represent in a simple abstract way social interactions, that is, socioeconomic environments in which markets do not mediate all of agents’ choices, which might be in part determined, for instance, by family, peer group, or ethnic group effects. We study static as well as dynamic infinite horizon economies; we allow for economies with incomplete information, and we consider jointly global and local interactions, to integrate e.g., global externalities and markets with peer and group effects. We provide conditions under which such economies have rational expectations equilibria. We illustrate the effects of local interactions when agents are rational by studying in detail the equilibrium properties of a simple economy with quadratic preferences which captures, in turn, local preferences for conformity, habit persistence, and preferences for status or adherence to aggregate norms of behavior. 相似文献
109.
Jason Shachat 《Journal of Economic Theory》2004,114(2):280-309
We describe an experiment based on a simple two-person game designed so that different learning models make different predictions. Econometric analysis of the experimental data reveals clear heterogeneity in the subjects’ learning behavior. But the subjects follow only a few decision rules for basing their play on their information, and these rules have simple cognitive interpretations. There is a unique equilibrium in pure strategies, and many equilibria in mixed strategies. We find that the only equilibrium consistent with the data is one of the mixed strategy equilibria. This equilibrium is shown, surprisingly, to be consistent with Jordan's Bayesian model. 相似文献
110.
Klaus Kultti 《Journal of Economic Theory》2007,137(1):721-728
We establish a link between von Neumann-Morgenstern stable set and the Nash solution in a general n-player utility set. The stable set-solution is defined with respect to a dominance relation: payoff vector u dominates v if one player prefers u even with one period delay. We show that a stable set exists and, if the utility set has a smooth surface, any stable set converges to the Nash bargaining solution when the length of the period goes to zero. 相似文献