The Korean Air nut rage scandal: Domestic versus international responses to a viral incident

This article investigates responses of the international and domestic (South Korean) publics to one of the most hotly debated corporate scandals in recent years: Korean Air’s so-called nut rage incident. By analyzing both international and domestic media coverage of the occurrence, we reveal contrasting interpretations between the two. Whereas the South Korean public tends to generate intense debates addressing a lack of ethics in Korean Air’s public communication following the incident, international public criticism is dominated by questions regarding South Korea’s chronic chaebol system and its negative image in relation to South Korea’s unique institutional context. Korean Air’s incongruent notice of the employee as a key stakeholder is also discussed in the international media. Our research findings indicate how, rather than focusing on legal responsibility, the normative attitude of businesses toward stakeholder pressures is crucial as a means of escaping legitimacy-threatening events. The results of this study demonstrate how public responses to a single incident are diverse in global society and offer new insights regarding the importance of ethics in management leadership and public communication after a crisis incident.     

Internal capital markets,corporate investment,and the COVID-19 pandemic: Evidence from Korean business groups

This paper examines whether the investment of Korean business group (“chaebol”) affiliated firms behaved differently from that of non-chaebol firms in response to the COVID-19 outbreak. I show that chaebol firms cut back investment to a lesser degree than similar non-chaebol firms. Chaebol firms with higher-than-industry-median market-to-book ratios invested more and experienced less decline in their stock prices, while I do not find such relationships for non-chaebol firms. This paper provides evidence that chaebol internal capital markets helped mitigate the negative effects of the pandemic on firm investment and value.     

Tacit vigilance in an emerging economy: An institution-based perspective of passive blockholder monitoring

We argue that the relative effectiveness of active and passive blockholder monitoring is driven by the institutional context of the Korean financial market, characterized by the dominance of chaebols and the pressure sensitivity of institutional blockholders. We believe that the extensive business ties between chaebols and blockholders effectively increase the cost of shareholder activism in Korea, making passive monitoring a more applicable governance mechanism for blockholders. We test whether passive monitoring affects a firm’s earnings quality, represented by earnings persistence, value relevance, and timeliness. Furthermore, we decompose institutional shareholding by portfolio turnover and nationality and then determine the monitoring channel that influences earnings quality. We find that passive monitoring by domestic blockholders is most effective in improving earnings quality in Korea. In addition, our findings highlight that the difference between the institutional context of developed economies and that of Korea results in different outcomes related to blockholder monitoring.