区域经济合作中的利益分享与补偿机制

随着竞争的加剧,区域经济合作越来越成为我国地方政府获取竞争优势、促进地区经济发展的重要力量。然而,区域经济合作利益分享与补偿机制的缺失,直接影响到我国区域经济合作与一体化进程。利益分享与补偿机制作为不同地方政府在区域经济合作过程中平衡、协调各方利益的制度安排,是突破现有制度瓶颈、促进区域经济合作的有效途径。     

论我国《国有土地上房屋征收与补偿条例》对人权保障理念的贯彻和执行

人权是一种思想观念,也需要建立相关的法律制度保障人权的实现。人权保障一般是以宪法为核心建立整体的法律制度,包括行政法上的制度。于2011年1月21日实施的《国有土地上房屋征收和补偿条例》是一个重要的行政法规,其规范着房屋的征收和补偿的程序,对国家、政府和被征收人都有着非常切实的联系。该法规在总则和分则部分也较好地贯彻了人权理念并建立了相关的制度,但仍需要做出一些符合时代发展的完善。     

Employers’ Estimates of Market Wages: Implications for Wage Discrimination in the U.S.

In the U.S., public and private employers often survey each other’s wages in order to estimate the prevailing “market wage” for a job. I examine this process to see how it can lead to underpaying women, relying on a 1989 study of government wage-setting in the State of Washington and my own study of government wage-setting in the State of California. Gender biases can appear because numerous decisions are involved in each step of the process, and these decisions are often influenced by the gendered social and political environment, including the different levels of political organization of male and female employees.     

On the Dynamic Consistency of Reform and Compensation Schemes

To make reform possible, politically strong losers have to be bought out. Whether the losers are fully compensated upfront or given running compensation depends on their political influence after reform. We build a simple but general model to study dynamic consistency of compensation and political support for reform. We find that positive but decreasing compensation is required in every period up to the last period the losers have political influence. In that period it increases dramatically. If there are limited resources available to compensate the losers upfront, increasing the cost of reversing the reform may reduce the political feasibility of reform.     

Compensating the dead

An early death is, undoubtedly, a serious disadvantage. However, the compensation of short-lived individuals has remained so far largely unexplored, probably because it appears infeasible. Indeed, short-lived agents can hardly be identified ex ante, and cannot be compensated ex post. We argue that, despite those difficulties, a compensation can be carried out by encouraging early consumption in the life cycle. In a model with heterogeneous preferences and longevities, we show how a specific social criterion can be derived from intuitive principles, and we study the corresponding optimal policy under various informational assumptions.     

Look before you leap: Why politicians may have a point to be hesitant about the gains from trade

Economists emphasize the welfare gains of unrestricted trade, but politicians worry about the income distribution effects of increased competition. We show that the welfare gains of a trade shock become ambiguous if inaccurate information hinders optimal income redistribution with distortionary policy instruments. To be sure about the net welfare outcome of a compensated trade shock, the government must know the size of the trade shock and the corresponding size of the policy instrument that is needed to generate a balanced budget. If this is not the case, politicians may have a point when being hesitant about the gains from trade.     

《专利法》法定赔偿下限修改对企业创新的影响机理研究

专利侵权诉讼与企业创新活动密切相关,侵权损害赔偿以经济补偿形式通过改变企业创新回报预期影响企业创新策略选择。构建司法救济社会成本模型与企业创新成本模型,分析法定赔偿下限修改对企业创新的影响机理,并探讨《中华人民共和国专利法》（以下简称《专利法》）第四次修订中提出的三项法定赔偿下限修改方案对企业创新的影响。研究发现,大幅提升赔偿下限能够激励企业突破性创新,但其对侵权的过度威慑将增加创新活动的无谓损失,并产生司法寻租空间;而取消赔偿下限将减少企业对累积性创新的投入,弱化《专利法》的侵权威慑力度,并增加法院裁判成本。在新修订的《专利法》中,3万元赔偿下限能够对企业累积性创新活动产生激励,但亦将导致低质量专利侵权诉讼挤占司法资源。据此,提出优化法定赔偿制度效果的政策建议。     

When should households be compensated for land-use restrictions? A decision-making framework for Chinese forest policy

Competing uses of land mean that regulations aimed at environmental conservation often conflict with the land-use rights of rural households. Several reports suggest that this has occurred with the introduction of the Natural Forest Protection Programme (NFPP) in China, one of the world's largest logging ban programmes. This paper investigates whether households should be compensated for infringements on property rights, drawing on institutional economics literature on regulation. We distinguish between cases where regulation solves local collective action problems and increases the welfare of those affected, and those where regulation involves a redistribution of rights from one group to another. We apply this to the NFPP by estimating the net welfare impacts, using household level stated preference data with econometric techniques that explicitly account for zero and negative values of the dependent variable. We find that the ban on logging does not affect the net welfare of the affected forest communities. This indicates that the losses resulting from the restrictions on property rights are offset by the benefits from restrictions on other local households. We also find evidence that a partial reduction in logging would be welfare increasing, indicating that the NFPP is to some extent addressing local collective action problems in forest areas. Broader implications for the question of compensating for infringement of property rights as the result of regulatory interventions in contexts of institutional imperfections are also drawn.     

中国国有控股上市公司高管薪酬激励与盈余管理

以中国国有控股上市公司为样本,从盈余管理对高管薪酬及其薪酬业绩敏感性的影响两方面,研究高管薪酬激励与盈余管理的关系,实证检验表明在调高操控性应计利润情况下,盈余管理程度分别与管理者的年度报酬水平和股权激励呈正相关关系,另外,盈余管理对薪酬业债敏感性也有正向影响,据此提出了有效控制盈余管理行为的政策建议.