上市商业银行董事会治理结构对高管薪酬的影响研究

本文从董事会治理结构的角度,选取我国12家上市商业银行2006～2010年间的面板数据,考察我国上市商业银行董事会治理机构对高管薪酬及绩效敏感性的影响程度。本文中将采用熵权法计算出上市银行的综合绩效来作为绩效指标,然后运用EVIEWS6.0软件对所设方程进行回归,检验其相关性。研究结果表明,董事会规模对高管薪酬有正相关作用,对薪酬—绩效敏感性有负相关作用;独立董事所占比例及董事长与总经理两职分任对高管薪酬有负相关作用,对薪酬—绩效敏感性有正相关作用。     

Offering stock options to gauge managerial talent

Besides the commonly cited reasons for the use of stock options, including motivating employees, conserving cash, exploiting favorable accounting and tax treatment, and retaining managers, we demonstrate a complementary benefit of option-based compensation: options also prove efficient in matching managerial pay to ability. Options are useful because they force a manager to put his pay on the line. If a manager wants to overstate his worth to the firm, he must naturally also overstate the firm's worth with him at the helm. As a result, the firm offers a generous package of stock options in lieu of cash for assertions of high ability. Since both the likelihood of option exercise and firm value in the event of exercise are tied to managerial ability, only a gifted manager takes such a gamble.     

财政体制与区际利益补偿:联结、影响与协调

区际利益补偿,是近年来中央积极推进的治理机制,其建立在区域外部性理论基础之上.通过考察外部性的治理方式可知,"庇古税"模式和"科斯模型"均具有理论可行性.而选择何种模型,往往与一国之财政体制密切相关.我国基于现行财政体制所选择的"纵向转移支付",是一种不完整的"庇古税"模式.这一现实决定了目前所试点的区际利益补偿,只是对既有责任逻辑的另一种加持,导致区际利益补偿存在着补偿动力不足、补偿标准低下、补偿范围狭小等问题,应当回归到权利思维逻辑中.而要构建权利逻辑下的区际利益补偿,需要对财政体制进行改革,包括事权的细化以明确补偿范围;财权(力)的差异化配置以增强补偿能力;转移支付制度的多维度完善以规范补偿体系,最终构建起"中央与地方"之间的三角财政关系.在这一基础之上,区际利益补偿才能调整适应理论界所设计的权利化补偿机制.     

高频谱纯度的小数分频频率合成器

小数分频频率合成器输出频率分辨率高,换频速度快。但合成信号频谱中存在着固有而严重的相位杂散,即小数杂散。本文分析了小数杂散产生的机理,推导了小数杂散的数学表达式,并首次给出了三位小数时实测的小数杂散大小。文中还给出了一种高频谱纯度的小数分频频率合成器系统框图及性能指标。数据表明,本文所用的相位补偿法在合成器整个输出范围内,对小数杂散有45dB以上的抑制。     

由日本东北大地震看日本现行的农业灾害补偿制度

3.11日本东北大地震的主要受灾地区是日本重要的农业地区之一。灾区农林水产业受损巨大。按日本现有的灾害应对机制,本次损失弥补的资金来源将是多元的,其中,包括基于《日本农业灾害补偿法》而建立的日本农业灾害补偿制度。本文在对大地震对日本农业的影响作分析后,也对日本农业灾害补偿制度的建立背景、互助共济与政府支持相结合的组织结构、发展演变与这一制度的的实施状况作了分析。     

对农村土地承包经营权流转的再思考

土地承包经营权的流转有很多方式,对流转的受让方条件限制相当严格,无论是转让、互换还是转包,都要求必须在农户之间进行,只有出租可以对外。征地补偿款和转让费用,作为土地承包经营权的交换价值的体现,在承包成员去世之前取得的,应当有其份额,否则,由其他承包人员共有,不预留份额,也不发生继承。     

Executive pay dispersion,corporate governance,and firm performance

Much of the research on management compensation focuses on the level and structure of executives’ pay. In this study, we examine a compensation element that has not received so far considerable research attention—the dispersion of compensation across managers—and its impact on firm performance. We examine the implications of two theoretical models dealing with pay dispersion—tournament versus equity fairness. Tournament theory stipulates that a large pay dispersion provides strong incentives to highly qualified managers, leading to higher efforts and improved enterprise performance, while arguments for equity fairness suggest that greater pay dispersion increases envy and dysfunctional behavior among team members, adversely affecting performance. Consistent with tournament theory, we find that firm performance, measured by either Tobin’s Q or stock performance, is positively associated with the dispersion of management compensation. We also document that the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion is stronger in firms with high agency costs related to managerial discretion. Furthermore, effective corporate governance, especially high board independence, strengthens the positive association between firm performance and pay dispersion. Our findings thus add to the compensation literature a potentially important dimension: managerial pay dispersion.

商业银行的行业特征与管理报酬

本文在综述了国内外相关研究的基础上认为,银行业的行业特征对管理报酬有显著影响:高负债率导致的风险转移要求商业银行使用较低的管理激励;低增长性和波动性一定程度上解释了银行业较低的报酬-绩效敏感性,但是这一点随着银行业投资机会的增加在发生根本性变化;不透明性意味着管理报酬更多地基于股票而不是会计的绩效测度;相似的生产技术表明较少的公司专有人力资本激励;银行监管则通过影响银行业市场结构、激励成本和资本监管从而在根本上影响管理报酬结构。     

The Effect of CEO Risk Appetite on Firm Volatility: An Empirical Analysis of Financial Firms☆

This paper examines the effect of CEO risk appetite on the return volatility of a sample of large, listed financial firms over the period 2000–2008. After controlling for firm specific characteristics, the results give strong evidence that the CEO risk appetite has an important effect on firm volatility. The biographical measures for CEO risk appetite are significant explanatory variables of all measures of firm volatility employed in this study. The effect of CEO age is significant and positive for all four volatility measures, while CEO education and current job tenure are negative and significant for all four measures. Executive experience with other firm boards has a negative and significant effect on total and idiosyncratic volatility. Interestingly, CEO wealth is complementary to the other biographical variables with a positive effect on all but the default volatility measure. Our results carry implications for shareholders, financial regulators, governments, and managers.