中国“最高工资”制度的思考与设想

随着金融危机从美国蔓延到全球,金融危机暴露出来的高管薪酬问题也成为各国政府和社会公众关注的一个焦点,中国也不例外。中国高管薪酬问题的原因主要是：对市场经济下企业收入分配的思想认识有偏差,对高薪作用的认识有偏差,高管薪酬制度有缺陷,高管薪酬不透明。限制高管薪酬的根本理由在于：现代企业已经不是纯私有企业,而是“社会企业”;限制高管薪酬,应当包括所有规模企业,所有的事业单位和挂靠单位。     

攀比行为与高管薪酬——一个基于中国企业的实证分析

通过对中国企业高管问卷调查研究发现,正向攀比和负向攀比与高管薪酬都具有显著正相关关系;业绩薪酬、激励性薪酬与正向攀比呈正相关关系,业绩薪酬与负向攀比也呈正相关关系。经理市场失灵、行业垄断是引发正向攀比行为的重要因素,从众心理是引发负向攀比的重要因素。在此基础上,提出了解决高管薪酬问题的思路和建议。     

Performance pay and worker cooperation: Evidence from an artefactual field experiment

We report the results of an artefactual field experiment with bicycle messengers in Switzerland and the United States. Messenger work is individualized enough that firms can choose to condition pay on it, but significant externalities in messenger behavior nonetheless give their on-the-job interactions the character of a social dilemma. Second-mover behavior in our sequential prisoner's dilemma allows us to characterize the cooperativeness of our participants. Among messengers, we find that employees at firms that pay for performance are significantly less cooperative than those at firms that pay hourly wages or who are members of cooperatives. To examine whether the difference is the result of treatment or selection we exploit the fact that firm type is location-specific in Switzerland and that entering messengers must work in performance pay firms in the U.S.     

论环境资源林投资的补偿机制

环境资源林投资问题是当前人们议论的热点,本文分析了影响投资梗阻的三个因素,投资额,投资期及风险,并对三种环境资源林补偿模式进行了比较,认为在政府干预下的半市场化模式较适合目前的实际状况,并提出,为了能较好地解决环境资源林的补偿问题,建立相应的补偿机制,体制风险收益的对等原则,在这一基础上,国家进行补偿收入与生态质量的行政干预。     

基于新疆生态补偿的财政转移支付制度的建立

我国现行财政体制中,财政转移支付制度和专项基金对建立生态补偿机制具有重要作用。但现行转移支付制度还不能完全适应作为国家重点生态功能区的西部地区转移支付的需要,西部地区依然面临着保护和发展的现实困境。本文以生态补偿与财政转移支付理论为基础,对新疆生态补偿与财政转移支付的现状和存在的问题进行了分析,进而提出了生态补偿视角下新疆财政转移支付制度的优化设计。     

工薪所得税筹划与企业创新

本文结合我国工薪所得税税负较重及实施创新驱动发展战略的现实背景,探讨工薪所得税筹划是否以及如何对企业创新产生影响。研究发现:(1)工薪所得税筹划程度与企业创新显著正相关;(2)员工应税压力越大,二者正相关关系越显著,且2011年个人所得税税制改革会抑制二者之间的正向关系,表明纳税筹划主要通过降低工薪税负的不利影响,强化薪酬的激励效应,进而促进企业创新;(3)当公司为国有企业或公司处在税收征管强度较大的地区时,二者的正向关系更强;(4)当企业人均薪酬波动较大时,二者的正向关系削弱;(5)当创新员工更有可能是避税行为的受益者时,二者的正相关关系更强。本研究对于降低工薪阶层税负,以及如何提高企业创新意愿,实现创新驱动发展战略,具有重要的理论和现实意义。     

从一则商业秘密纠纷谈竞业禁止的必要性

本文从一起医药行业的商业秘密纠纷案谈起,详细分析了商业秘密保护与劳动权的冲突与协调、竞业禁止的正当性与必要性等问题,肯定了应将补偿金视为竞业禁止合同的有效要件。在充分强调研发和创新的制药行业,运用好竞业禁止具有非常深远的意义,因为只有实现商业秘密权和劳动者就业权的利益平衡才能保证行业健康发展。     

The effect of financial reporting quality on CEO compensation structure: Evidence from accounting comparability

This study examines the effect of accounting comparability on the design of CEO compensation structure. After controlling for firm-specific attributes, we find that accounting comparability is positively associated with CEO equity-based compensation intensity and pay-performance sensitivity. This suggests that the improved comparability increases the usefulness of equity-based compensation and a firm is willing to offer more equity-based compensation contracts to CEOs and increase their pay-performance sensitivity. Further, we find that the impact of comparability on the CEO’s compensation contract increases with information asymmetry, which is consistent with the notion that accounting comparability is a quality of financial reporting that facilitates the use of equity-based compensation in a poor information environment. Our analysis also reveals that the effect of accounting comparability on CEO compensation structure is greater when a firm’s corporate governance is strong, consistent with the complementary relation between comparability and the exiting corporate governance in determining CEO compensation schemes. Overall, our evidence suggests that firms utilize more equity-based compensation as a proportion of total compensation under greater accounting comparability and enhance the alignment between equity-based compensation and firm performance.     

It's OK to pay well,if you write well: The effects of remuneration disclosure readability

We examine whether, and how, shareholders’ votes in the Say-on-Pay (SOP) are affected by the readability of the Compensation Discussion and Analysis (CD&A). Despite the SEC's Plain English requirement, qualitative disclosures on executive remuneration are generally long and complex. Extant evidence on whether low readability results in higher or lower shareholder dissent in the SOP, however, is ambiguous. We resolve this debate by demonstrating that the effects of readability on SOP voting are heterogeneous; while obfuscation may reduce dissent when CEO compensation is close to “normal” levels, diminished readability results in increased scepticism when pay levels are clearly excessive. The moderating role of readability is most pronounced for firms with less sophisticated shareholders, consistent with readability acting as a heuristic cue. Our results are robust to propensity score matching, and are less pronounced (1) when shareholders have less time to review the CD&A, and (2) when shareholders are distracted by competing AGMs, suggesting they are driven by readability, directly. Overall, our results highlight that greater use of Plain English in remuneration disclosures can have a substantial persuasive impact on shareholders.