Ethical choices in the design and administration of executive compensation programs

Within the past few years, executives have come under increased scrutiny and criticism for the levels of compensation they receive. At the same time, corporate practices surrounding the design and review of executive compensation programs have received increased attention. While some recent executive misconduct has involved violations of the law, many academics and other corporate critics view the issues involving executive compensation more from an ethical than a legal perspective. Several dimensions of the executive compensation decision process offer significant opportunities for ethical choices. This article identifies the major components of executive compensation and highlights decision points in the design and administration of each component where ethical issues may arise. Proposals to reduce the potential for ethical misconduct are also offered.     

Can compensation save free trade?

When the median voter loses from trade reform, liberalization is blocked. Allowing the electorate to vote for compensatory subsidies may reverse this outcome. However, the order of the agenda may matter. The winners who pay the compensation may be sufficiently powerful to block compensation if trade is first liberalized. Seeing the inevitable outcome of sequential votes, the median voter realizes he will not be compensated for his losses and opposes liberalization. In contrast, liberalization can be achieved if compensation is placed first on the agenda. Finally, there is a significant chance that the least efficient compensation scheme will be chosen.     

Agents’ incentives under buy-back contracts in a two-stage supply chain

This paper investigates how the behavior of individual decision makers can affect the performance of a supply chain. We study a two-stage supplier–retailer system, using a buy-back contract. Each firm's actions are executed by an agent. The retailer's purchasing agent and the supplier's sales agent are compensated based on certain performance measures, and they act accordingly. We study the impacts of their behavior in both the supplier-as-leader and retailer-as-leader settings. We find that, unless their incentives are carefully constructed, the agents can strongly distort the system's behavior. Specifically, “channel stuffing” (packing the distribution channel with excess inventory) can occur in both settings. Only when the agents are compensated based on net profit do they act in accord with their firms’ objectives. These results may help explain some recent scandals.     

An economic analysis of consumer class actions in regulated industries

Regulation and consumer class actions can complement, duplicate, or oppose each other, depending, among others, on the leanings of regulatory objective functions towards the industry or consumers. In particular, pro-consumer regulators would like to see consumers benefit from class actions while pro-industry regulators would like to prevent regulated firms from being harmed by them. However, because pro-consumer regulators are already doing their best for consumers and pro-industry regulators their best for firms, they are both usually constrained in their policies. The result is that class actions tend to be less efficient under pro-consumer regulators and more efficient under pro-industry regulators.      

内部劳动市场的经济理性及其在我国的适用性

本文利用组织经济学分析内部劳动市场的特征、运作及其有效性 ,指出它在企业人力资本蓄积、鼓励职工和企业的长期行为等方面的重要作用 ,以及这些作用发挥所需的条件 ,同时指出了其固有的缺陷 ,最后分析了内部劳动市场在我国的适用性及如何完善。     

网点增大补偿曲线算法研究

为了得到精确的网点增大补偿曲线,本文对当前采用的补偿算法进行了分析和研究,在此基础上提出了新的算法,并分别以Matlab和Excel为平台,通过编写代码实现现有算法和新算法,绘制出网点增大补偿曲线,同时统计出各算法的平均误差、方差。其中,误差是指经过补偿后得到的网点增大值与对应的网点标准增大值之差的绝对值,平均误差反应了误差的大小,方差反映了误差的集中程度。实验结果表明,新算法能够明显降低误差。一般算法的平均误差为2.96%,而新算法的平均误差达到1.56%。     

Determinants of executive compensation in privately held firms

We examine what determines executive compensation in privately held firms. Our study is motivated by the fact that most studies in this area rely on data from publicly traded firms. Further, the few studies that are based on data from privately held firms only examine a limited number of determinants of executive compensation. Our findings indicate that the pay‐to‐performance relation is weak. Board size and ownership concentration are the only corporate governance characteristics that explain variations in executive compensation. Executive characteristics like skills, title and educational attainment all explain variations in executive compensation. Contrary to our expectations, we do not find a stronger pay‐to‐performance relation in firms with better designed bonus plans.     

国有控股公司高管薪酬激励与中小投资者利益保护

利用2007年我国国有控股公司数据,以中小股东利益保护为因变量,以高管现金薪酬、高管持股比例和在职消费为主要考察对象,并选取公司规模和股权制衡结构作为控制变量,检验在不同激励方式下高管薪酬与中小股东利益的相关性,结论表明:国有控股公司高管薪酬主要集中于现金薪酬和在职消费,对中小股东利益侵害较大,而高管持股则可以保护中小投资者利益.     

An exploratory study of managerial compensation in the restaurant industry

ABSTRACT

Set within the human capital framework, the focus of this exploratory study is to investigate how individual and industry attributes affect the earnings of salaried restaurant managers in the United States. Previous compensation studies in the restaurant industry have almost exclusively focused on executive compensation and its relationship to a firm's financial variables. Given the size of the industry, it is important to investigate compensation practices at various levels of its leadership. The findings show that relevant work experience, gender, education, race, and property size are significant attributes effecting restaurant managers’ compensation. Practical implications are provided.