完善我国社会保障财政制度的法律思考

财政作为社会保障的核心组织者和保障资金的重要提供者，在社会保障中起有着十分重要而独特的作用。本文分析了建立和完善我国社会保障财政制度的必要性，并从社会保障预算、社会保障税、社会保障财政转移支付三个方面对我国社会保障财政制度的法律完善进行了探讨。     

The minimum variance hedge and the bankruptcy risk of the firm

In this paper, we analyze the influence of hedging with forward contracts on the firm's probability of bankruptcy (POB). The minimization of this probability can serve as a substitute for the maximization of shareholders' wealth. It is shown that the popular minimum variance hedge is generally neither necessary nor sufficient for the minimization of the firm's POB. Moreover, our model suggests a correction of the widespread view that a reduction in the variance of the future value of the firm is inevitably accompanied by a reduction in its default risk. We derive an analytical solution for the variance-minimizing hedge ratio of a firm exposed to both input and output price uncertainty that takes into account the issue of correlation. Based on this solution, we provide a graphical analysis to prove our claim that there is a fundamental difference between hedging policies focused on bankruptcy risk and those following conventional wisdom even if positive correlation constitutes a “natural” hedge.     

Default- and call-adjusted duration for corporate bonds

Call and default can potentially alter the timing and amounts of promised cashflows for callable, corporate bonds. While prior research has indicated the theoretical importance of adjusting Macaulay duration for the impacts of default and call, the question of their relative impact remains a matter of debate [The High Yield Debt Market, Dow Jones Irwin, New York, 1990, p. 18; J. Finan. 53 (1998) 2225]. We develop a theoretical analysis incorporating both default and call effects on duration and test its implications employing a previously unexplored data base of Canadian, investment grade, corporate bond indices containing an unusual provision making it possible to identify callable and noncallable indices.     

Capital, corporate income taxes, and catastrophe insurance

We provide estimates of the equity capital needed and the resulting tax costs incurred when supplying catastrophe insurance/reinsurance using a partial equilibrium model that incorporates a specific loss distribution for US catastrophe losses. After consideration of insurer investment in tax-exempt securities, tax loss carry-back/forward provisions, and personal taxes, our results imply that the tax costs of equity finance alone have a substantial effect on the cost of supplying catastrophe reinsurance. These results help explain a variety of industry developments that reduce tax costs. Also, when coupled with non-tax costs of capital, these results help explain the limited scope of catastrophe insurance/reinsurance.     

高管层内部的级差报酬研究

本文通过对我国上市公司2004年度数据的实证研究发现, (1)随着高成长公司竞争者人数的增加、公司所处地区发达程度的提高和公司规模的扩大,公司高管层级差报酬会随之增加;随着低成长公司竞争者人数的增加和公司所处地区发达程度的提高,公司高管层级差报酬会随之增加。(2)高成长公司和低成长公司在赋予高管层级差报酬影响因素的权重上没有显著差别。(3)高成长公司的高管层级差报酬与公司市场业绩之间存在正相关关系,低成长公司的高管层级差报酬与公司每股收益指标之间存在正相关关系;竞赛理论在我国上市公司中成立。     

公司治理与IPO抑价——来自中国股票市场的经验证据

Jensen与Meckling(1976)认为,代理成本是投资者愿意支付的价格与公司内在价值之间的差异。投资者对公司代理成本的预期也会体现在IPO定价过程中,良好的公司治理结构有助于降低公司IPO抑价。本文以我国2002—2003年的133家IPO公司为研究样本,研究样本公司治理结构特征对IPO抑价的影响。结果发现,控制权结构特征以及关联交易性质对IPO抑价有显著的影响,而董事会独立性对IPO的抑价影响则不显著。本文的结果表明,良好的公司治理结构可以显著地降低IPO抑价,降低公司股权融资成本。     

实现社会公平是政府财政不可推卸的责任

当前我国在收入分配上出现了比较严重的分配不公现象,分配不公问题已经严重的影响了我国经济和社会的发展,分析其产生的原因,除了经济方面以外,还有其他方面,本文主要从政府行为方面做一些分析,以求在政府财政政策方面做一些探讨。     

Social reporting by islamic banks

The last thirty years have witnessed the appearance and rapid expansion of Islamic banking both inside and outside the Islamic world. Islamic banks provide financial products that do not violate Sharia , the Islamic law of human conduct. The Islamic principles upon which the banks claim to operate give an important role to social issues. Applying these principles, we develop a benchmark set of social disclosures appropriate to Islamic banks. These are then compared, using a disclosure index approach, the actual social disclosures contained in the annual reports of twenty-nine Islamic banks (located in sixteen countries) to this benchmark. In addition, content analysis is undertaken to measure the volume of social disclosures. Our analysis suggests that social reporting by Islamic banks falls significantly short of our expectations. The results of the analysis also suggest that banks required to pay the Islamic religious tax Zakah provide more social disclosures than banks not subject to Zakah .     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

Board Members and Company Value

This essay surveys research about the value of individual members of boards of directors. When directors join or exit corporate boards, company stock prices respond, often in magnitudes of 1% of firm value or more. Related research shows that when a significant event impacts the stock price of one company, the effects are transmitted to other companies that share board members in common with the primary company. Share price reactions are sensitive to variables such as a director’s occupation, independence, and professional qualifications. Together, this evidence suggests that a well-functioning market for directors might already exist, making direct regulation unnecessary and possibly counter-productive.