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61.
腐败控制是制度质量提升的一个重要维度。金融业务的典型“契约密集”特征将强化腐败对外资银行进入的摩擦,而外资银行作为纯粹的市场“新进入者”也面临高昂的“有效腐败”成本,因此,腐败阻碍外资银行进入,通过腐败控制来提升制度质量将有利于银行业开放。本文基于中国分省主观认知数据,以县域人口规模与矿产资源丰裕度作为工具变量,识别了制度质量对外资银行进入的影响。文章表明,坚持以反腐倡廉作为提升制度质量的重要政策支点,将有利于推进银行业乃至整个金融业的对外开放进程。 相似文献
62.
This paper uses panel data from 61 countries at different stages of economic development over a 20-year period to investigate regional differences in the effect of corruption on economic growth and income distribution. Using two measures of corruption, we find that there are statistically significant regional differences in the growth and distributional impacts of corruption. The largest growth impact of corruption is found in African countries while OECD and Asian countries have the lowest growth impact. On the other hand, the largest distributional impact of corruption in found in Latin America. A 10% decrease in corruption increases the growth rate of income by about 1.7% in OECD and Asian countries, 2.6% in Latin American countries, and by 2.8% in African countries. A one standard deviation decrease in corruption decreases the gini coefficient of income distribution (0–1 scale) by 0.05 points, 0.14 points, 0.25 points, and 0.33 points in OECD, Asian, African, and Latin American countries, respectively. The results are robust to various specifications, measurement of corruption, measures of investment, as well as the conditioning variables. The results have interesting policy implications for economic growth, especially in low income countries with high rates of corruption. 相似文献
63.
Kang Chen 《European Journal of Political Economy》2004,20(4):1001-1009
Fiscal recentralization in China in the 1990s introduced incentives that changed the form of corruption at the local government level from the helping-hand to the grabbing-hand type. Against the background of the experience of China, this paper describes how the central–local government revenue-sharing rule introduces strategic considerations that affect the form of corruption and thereby economic growth. Information regarding the possibilities for substitution in the form of corruption is shown to be relevant for decisions regarding fiscal centralization. However, the consequences of the decisions made in China suggest that such information was either not available or was not taken into account. 相似文献
64.
This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption. Interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption. Economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment. Democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low. 相似文献
65.
Joseph Ato Forson Ponlapat Buracom Guojin Chen Theresa Yaaba Baah‐Ennumh 《The South African journal of economics. Suid-afrikaanse tydskrif vir ekonomie》2017,85(2):178-195
In this paper, we argue that the answer to the question of whether the impact of corruption on development is homogenous, is no. Our optimism rest on how development may be conceptualised. When equated to a narrow measure in economic‐wise which fundamentally ignores critical issues, then there is a possibility the outlook could be positive. But when conceptualised using a broad‐based approach such as sustainable development, then the outlook could be negative. We assess a panel of 22 economies in Sub‐Sahara Africa with the most recent dataset (1996–2013) from the World Bank and other reputable agencies. Our finding is quite robust. It holds in pooled OLS, Fixed effects and GMM within IV settings; and it also holds for different measures of institutions and different measures of development using growth per capita GDP and genuine wealth per capita, respectively. Taking stock of major policy blue‐prints of selected countries in the region on the fight against corruption, we are able to point out that institutions play important role in insulating citizens against the devastation caused by corruption. Overall, through this comparison, we are able to signal that both incidental and systematic corruption poses a long‐term threat to sustainable development. 相似文献
66.
《Journal of World Business》2016,51(1):35-49
I analyze corruption in international business, presenting a critical assessment of the topic and providing suggestions for future research. I argue that corruption creates a laboratory for expanding international business studies because its illegal nature, the differences in perception about illegality, and the variation in the enforcement of laws against bribery across countries challenge some of the assumptions upon which arguments have been built, i.e., that managers can choose appropriate actions without major legal implications. Hence, I first provide suggestion for how to analyze the topic of corruption in future studies by analyzing the types, measures, causes, consequences, and controls of corruption. I then provide suggestions for how to extend leading theories of the firm by using corruption as a laboratory that challenges some of the assumptions of these theories: extending agency theory by analyzing the existence of unethical agency relationships; extending transaction cost economics by analyzing illegal transaction costs minimization; extending the resource-based view by studying corporate social irresponsibility capability; extending resource dependency by analyzing the ethical power escape; and extending neo-institutional theory by studying illegal legitimacy. 相似文献
67.
We build an endogenous growth model to analyze the relationships between taxation, corruption, and economic growth. Entrepreneurs lie at the center of the model and face disincentive effects from taxation but acquire positive benefits from public infrastructure. Political corruption governs the efficiency with which tax revenues are translated into infrastructure. The model predicts an inverted-U relationship between taxation and growth, with corruption reducing the optimal taxation level. We find evidence consistent with these predictions and the entrepreneurial channel using data from the Longitudinal Business Database of the US Census Bureau. The marginal effect of taxation for growth for a state at the 10th or 25th percentile of corruption is significantly positive; on the other hand, the marginal effects of taxation for growth for a state at the 90th percentile of corruption are much lower across the board. We make progress towards causality through Granger-style tests and by considering periphery counties where effective tax policy is largely driven by bordering states. Finally, we calibrate our model and find that the calibrated taxation rate of 37% is fairly close to the model׳s estimated welfare maximizing taxation rate of 42%. Reducing corruption provides the largest potential impact for welfare gain through its impact on the uses of tax revenues. 相似文献
68.
寻租与腐败的经济学分析 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
转轨时期,在市场机会大幅增加而制度约束处于不完备的状态下出现了权力资本化现象,导致受权力租金诱惑的政府官员产生出租权力以获得私利的动机与行为,从而形成寻租与腐败蔓延的现象。因此强化权力监督、实行“以薪养廉”,并逐步使政府退出市场就成为抑制寻租与腐败的根本对策。 相似文献
69.
Corruption and cross-border investment by multinational firms 总被引:1,自引:0,他引:1
Motivated by previous studies on the effect of corruption on foreign direct investment, we examine the impact of a distance measure of corruption between host and source countries on cross-border direct investment and find that corruption distance deters cross-border investment. The evidence indicates that corruption distance is not as serious a deterrent of outward direct investment from more-corrupt countries as it is from less-corrupt countries. We conclude that multinational firms with the capacity to engage in bribery can disregard this activity in transparent environments, whereas multinational firms accustomed to operating in transparent environments find it difficult to overcome the administrative complexities in corrupt environments. Journal of Comparative Economics 34 (4) (2006) 839–856. 相似文献
70.
张永进 《福建行政学院福建经济管理干部学院学报》2011,(2):72-79
改革开放以来,由于受新旧体制转换、法制不健全、社会伦理道德偏差等因素的影响,腐败现象在我国呈现出不断蔓延的趋势。基于如此态势,执政者和学界从立法建议、制度建设、廉政伦理等角度给予了充分的关注。通过对《反腐倡廉年度报告》(2006~2010)中反腐败典型案例的透视,考察我国反腐败的治理实践,反思我国反腐败的制度表达,进而提出:为了加强反腐败力度,应当进一步完善我国的反腐败机制,将现有的反腐败实践纳入法治化的轨道,并且不断强化法定反腐败机构的职能,整合反腐败的力量,不断协调"党纪"和"国法"的衔接。 相似文献