Tariff evasion in global trade data

ABSTRACT

We find evidence of pervasive tariff evasion in the global data on trade from 1988 to 2015. Using over 35 million observations of data on import and export flows at the HS6 product category level, we find evidence of substantial underreporting of imports relative to export data on average and particularly when tariffs on product categories are high. These effects are stronger in more corrupt destination countries, as measured by the World Bank's Worldwide Governance Indicators [World Bank. 2016. Worldwide Governance Indicators. September 25, 2016]. In addition, evidence of tariff evasion increases significantly in economic downturns. We document these patterns in the global data and explore the welfare effects of this evasion by (1) putting a lower bound on the extent to which there are revenue losses from tariff evasion, and by (2) estimating the effects of corruption as measured by this indicator on global trade in a simple gravity model. We estimate that in total, revenue losses from tariff evasion are currently likely to exceed 400 to 670 million USD globally per year, and find that the effects of corruption on trade flows are ambiguous overall but change from weakly positive (‘grease the wheels’) to largely negative over the years in our sample.     

Organized crime and business subsidies: Where does the money go?

Business support policies are widespread in advanced countries, to foster employment and productivity. This paper analyses the role of organized crime in the allocation of public subsidies to businesses. We assemble an innovative data set on the Italian mafia at municipality level and test whether mafia-ridden municipalities receive a disproportionally higher amount of funds. We exploit exogenous variation at municipality level to instrument mafia activity and show that the presence of organized crime positively affects the probability of obtaining funding and the amount of public funds. Organized crime is also found to lead to episodes of corruption in the public administration sector. A series of robustness checks confirms the above findings.     

Public sector transparency and countries’ environmental performance: A nonparametric analysis

Based on the theoretical background of the link between countries’ public sector transparency and environmental policy, our paper provides empirical evidence for a sample of 49 countries for the time period of 1995–2000. Assuming that countries’ environmental performance is a product of their environmental regulations and policies, we utilize a nonparametric estimator for investigating the link with public sector's transparency levels. Specifically, by applying conditional directional distance function models, we incorporate on the measurement of countries’ environmental performance the effect of their public sector transparency levels. In a second stage analysis applying local constant estimators, the results reveal an inverted ‘U’-shape relationship between countries’ public sector transparency levels and their environmental performance.     

The political economy of corruption and the role of economic opportunities1

In many developing and transition countries, we observe rather high levels of corruption. We argue that the missing political support for anti‐corruption policies is due to a lack of economic and financial reforms. Our model is based on the fact that corrupt officials have to pay entry fees to get lucrative positions. In a probabilistic voting model, we show that this, together with the lack of economic opportunities, makes anti‐corruption policies less likely. Compared to a reformed economy, more voters are part of the corrupt system and, more importantly, rents from corruption are distributed differently. Economic liberalization increases the support for anti‐corruption measures. The additional effect of financial liberalization is ambiguous.     

Fiscal centralization and the form of corruption in China

Fiscal recentralization in China in the 1990s introduced incentives that changed the form of corruption at the local government level from the helping-hand to the grabbing-hand type. Against the background of the experience of China, this paper describes how the central–local government revenue-sharing rule introduces strategic considerations that affect the form of corruption and thereby economic growth. Information regarding the possibilities for substitution in the form of corruption is shown to be relevant for decisions regarding fiscal centralization. However, the consequences of the decisions made in China suggest that such information was either not available or was not taken into account.     

Money laundering—a global obstacle

One of the biggest obstacles to maintaining an effective operating international financial system is money laundering. A global phenomenon and international challenge, money laundering is a financial crime that often involves a complex series of transactions and numerous financial institutions across many foreign jurisdictions. In addition, money laundering is also extremely difficult to investigate and prosecute. In this paper, I present a clinical examination of the money laundering process, the international extent of the problem and global efforts to introduce anti-money laundering measures and regulation in recent years.     

Corrupción como proceso organizacional: comprendiendo la lógica de la desnormalización de la corrupción

This article discusses the basic assumptions of an individualist vision on corruption. A different argument based on “social density” of the phenomenon is proposed instead: the process of normalization of corruption. Under this umbrella, corruption is a political concept that looks to impose a particular vision on what are “right” behaviors based on a sharp and unrealistic separation of the public and private sphere. A review of the organizational literature on corruption is developed, with the aim of understanding how organizational processes of socialization triggers behaviors that make corrupt acts to appear as “normal” under the organizational logic. Persons find themselves in a “slippery slope”, generating agreements and social dynamics that are able to produce corrupt logics under the normal life of an organization. A plea for discussing the social processes needed to “un-normalize” corruption is defended a conceptualization that goes beyond an individualist and moralist vision of the phenomenon.     

外汇体制、税收与腐败

本文研究了外汇体制、税收和腐败之间的关系,比较了在有外汇管制和无外汇管制两种情况下,外汇体制对税收和腐败的影响。研究结果表明,当腐败对产出有正作用时,外汇管制将导致较高的税收和较严重的腐败。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,那么外汇管制将导致税收增加。如果税收扭曲的作用非常大,那么外汇管制将导致腐败下降。当腐败对产出有负作用时,外汇管制将会导致较轻微的腐败和较高的税收。如果腐败对产出的正作用非常大,足以弥补由于高税收所造成的产出减少时,政府会采取外汇管制措施。如果腐败对产出的正作用较小,并且高税收对产出负作用很大,那么政府将采取没有外汇管制的体制。