Petty corruption

This paper analyzes a petty corruption model in which the entrepreneur’s type is drawn from an absolutely continuous probability distribution function F over [0, 1], and perfect Bayesian equilibrium is adopted as the solution concept for a one-stage game. In the one-stage game, if there is more than one bureaucrat, no project is approved with a strictly positive probability. For an infinitely repeated game, I show that the single window policy strictly increases the social benefits in a socially optimal equilibrium. I would like to thank Mukul Majumdar for valuable guidance and encouragement. I am also grateful to Kaushik Basu, Fernando Vega-Redondo, an anonymous referee, seminar participants at the international meeting for public economic theory (PET07) and especially Ani Guerdjikova and Roy Radner for helpful comments. Thanks are due to Hideaki Goto and Eunkyeong Lee for useful conversation.     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: a comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

This comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94] shows that their basic model can be simplified by an alternative formulation. A corrupt auditor gives two choices to a taxpayer: pay bribe and evade tax or be overtaxed. Although harassment can be redressed through court, the taxpayer chooses to pay bribe. However, as this note discovers, the bribe–income ratio will critically depend on whether the taxpayer can afford the court fees. This may lead different income groups to have different preferences for corruption.     

Press freedom and corruption in business-state interactions

We show that press freedom has a role in constraining business corruption. Using firm-level data, we find that countries with greater press freedom have significantly fewer incidences of bribery involving public officials. In particular, we find that a free press is associated with a substantial reduction in the percentage of firms that report corruption during interactions with tax officials and when obtaining construction permits. Furthermore, we find that fewer businesses in these countries report that corruption is the biggest problem that they face. These findings highlight the role of an independent media in combating corruption.     

The interaction effect of economic freedom and democracy on corruption: A panel cross-country analysis

This paper examines the effects of economic freedom, democracy and its interaction term on controlling corruption. Interactive results indicate that economic freedom and democracy significantly combat corruption. Economic freedom reduces corruption in any political environment. Democracy increases corruption when economic liberalization is low.     

"经济人"假设与腐败治理

腐败的蔓延给中国经济社会带来了严重的负面影响,引起社会各界的高度关注。不同的人性假设对腐败的根源有不同的解释。中国传统文化以“性善论”为人性假设,得出了道德防腐的结论;现代经济学以“经济人”为假设前提,得出了制度防腐与法制反腐的主张。在反腐问题上,长期以来存在着分歧。有人认为腐败是“次优选择”,主张有限反腐;有人试图“利用”腐败,任其“腐败出一套新制度来”,因而不主张反腐;多数人是主张坚决反腐的。通过从经济学角度分析腐败问题,认为腐败扰乱了市场的纠错功能,阻碍了改革进程,力主反腐。     

Harassment, corruption and tax policy: A comment on Marjit, Mukherjee and Mukherjee [Eur. J. Political Economy 16 (2000) 75–94]

Our comment on Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] addresses the equilibrium concept used in the game with imperfect information, Section 4 of the original paper. The solution represented in the original paper does not constitute a perfect Bayesian Nash-equilibrium. We develop an alternative solution of the game given the assumptions made by Marjit et al. [Marjit, S., Mukherjee, V., Mukherjee, A., 2000. Harassment, corruption and tax policy. European Journal of Political Economy 16, 75–94.] and find that the results concerning the optimal amount of over-evaluation of income and the existence of a pooling or separating equilibrium are altered.     

中国反腐败机制的解读与完善——基于近五年反腐败典型案件透视

改革开放以来,由于受新旧体制转换、法制不健全、社会伦理道德偏差等因素的影响,腐败现象在我国呈现出不断蔓延的趋势。基于如此态势,执政者和学界从立法建议、制度建设、廉政伦理等角度给予了充分的关注。通过对《反腐倡廉年度报告》（2006~2010）中反腐败典型案例的透视,考察我国反腐败的治理实践,反思我国反腐败的制度表达,进而提出：为了加强反腐败力度,应当进一步完善我国的反腐败机制,将现有的反腐败实践纳入法治化的轨道,并且不断强化法定反腐败机构的职能,整合反腐败的力量,不断协调＂党纪＂和＂国法＂的衔接。     

Initial conditions and privatisation as causes of post-communist corruption

This article investigates the economic determinants of corruption in post-communist countries. We conduct an empirical verification of two research hypotheses using EBRD and World Bank data on 27 post-communist economies over the 1996–2014 period. The first hypothesis suggests that corruption is rooted in the communist past, when these countries embraced communist institutions, social norms, as well as low-development structural factors broadly defined as initial conditions. The second hypothesis is that the flawed transition process led corruption to increase because politics and business were never separated. The elites pushed measures that preserved their status while obstructing reform policies that might endanger their interests. Our empirical results demonstrate that both hypotheses are valid to a limited extent, while revealing a more complex view of the reforms and initial conditions. Corruption seems to be related to the natural resource curse, to the lack of small-scale privatisation and to a long history of underdevelopment that could have preceded communism.     

Empirical linkages between good governance and national well-being

This paper brings together the largest available sets of national-level data, covering 157 countries over the years 2005–2012, to assess the extent to which governance quality contributes to life evaluations. Our most significant new finding is that changes in governance quality within a policy-relevant time horizon can lead to significant changes in the quality of life. For example, the ten most-improved countries, in terms of changes in government service delivery quality between 2005 and 2012, when compared to the ten most-worsened countries, are estimated to have average life evaluations higher by 0.4 points on a 0 to 10 scale. The results also confirm earlier findings that service delivery quality generally dominates democratic quality in supporting better lives until delivery quality has reached sufficient levels. The situation changes as development proceeds, with democratic quality showing a positive influence among countries that have already achieved higher quality of service delivery.     

Political uncertainty and international corruption

This article uniquely considers influences of political uncertainty on corruption. Political uncertainty disturbs existing corrupt (and legal) contractual relations inducing greater corrupt activity to strengthen existing alliances and foster new ones. Results across two measures of cross-national corruption show that political assassinations increase corruption in different variations and time periods, and a general index of political instability mostly has the same effect. The influences of other factors on corruption are in general accord with the literature. These findings are generally robust to consideration of alternate dimensions of political uncertainty.