美国贸易逆差:增长惯性与可持续性

美国的经常项目逆差特别是贸易逆差“历史悠久”，尤其是近年来高速增长，已引起人们广泛的关注。1990年代来的美国贸易逆差，已很难单从汇率、贸易政策及产品竞争力等单个变量来加以解释。通过运用滞后一年的时间数列回归分析及相关分析，本文得出的结论是：当期美国贸易逆差是前期美国贸易逆差的惯性增长，并且只要美国能够维持强势美元，资本与金融账户的盈余足够冲抵贸易逆差，美国的贸易逆差便具有可持续性。在本文的最后一部分，作者针对近期美国人制造的“人民币升值论”，结合近10年来中美双边贸易现实，说明美国贸易逆差与人民币汇率之间没有必然联系，人民币升值不可能改善美国的贸易收支状况。     

产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究述评

合作R＆D是企业整合研发资源的有效组织形式。本文对产业组织角度的合作R＆D研究进行了较为细致的综述。首先列举了对合作R＆D理论具有一定影响的经验研究；然后梳理了产业组织角度的合作R＆D主流理论；之后介绍了较有代表性的非主流理论研究；最后是全文结论和留待进一步研究的论题。     

我国财政支出结构的优化问题研究

当前,我国正处在经济高速发展的快车道,市场经济体系逐步成熟和完善起来,市场逐步放开,市场化程度日益提高.而财政作为国家调控经济的最主要手段,尤其是财政支出方面对整个社会阶层都产生敏感而切身的利益影响.对此,运用实证分析和对比分析等方法针对我国当前财政支出结构的扭曲状况,才能进一步提出优化对策.     

西部地区大开发前后财政支出比较研究

西部大开发实施五年多来,西部地区财政支出规模、结构都发生了变化.通过比较分析西部大开发财政支出规模、结构的变化及其对西部地区经济、社会发展的影响后发现,从财政支出规模看,中央不断加大对西部的财力扶持,显著提高了西部地方政府财政支出规模;从支出结构看,基本建设、科技投入、文教事业费和行政管理费在绝对量上都有所增长,但其比重却呈现下降趋势;财政支出规模结构的变化,一方面推动地区经济发展,提高人民生活水平,另一方面加深了社会不公.基于上述分析,文章探析了今后西部财政支出的变化趋势.     

医药行业变革下医药代表及团队管理

近年来,随着我国现代医疗环境的不断改革,我国的药品营销工作以及整个医药行业呈现快速变革的趋势,尤其是在现代化的医改方案不断发展的背景下,医药企业在发展过程中受到了现代相关工作人员的高度重视。相关工作人员需要了解,在医药行业变革下,医药行业内的医药代表及医药行业管理者应当如何在充满不确定性的职业环境内开展人员以及团队管理,这样才能使医药企业在现代医疗环境的背景下不断发展。     

Regulating Availability with Demand Uncertainty

Abstract. I evaluate a new German regulation that requires retail discounters to guarantee the availability of their products in bargain sales. The regulation is meant to prevent loss leaders. Retailers undermine the regulation's rationale by claiming that rationing is due to demand uncertainty. This paper shows that under demand uncertainty the regulation has ambiguous welfare effects. Effectively, it raises production, which, under imperfect competition, tends to be beneficial. However, the regulation overshoots and decreases welfare if it requires availability for a state of high demand that is relatively unlikely. In this case more sophisticated regulation is required.     

Buyer power and supplier incentives

This paper analyzes the origins and welfare consequences of buyer power. We show that if suppliers are capacity constrained or have strictly convex costs, there are two different channels through which large buyers can obtain more favorable terms from their suppliers. In particular, we show how the presence of large buyers can then erode the value of suppliers’ outside option. Somewhat surprisingly, we show how this can induce suppliers to undertake strategies that lead to higher output and potentially higher welfare.     

Anonymous voting and minimal manipulability

We compare the manipulability of different choice rules by considering the number of manipulable profiles. We establish the minimal number of such profiles for tops-only, anonymous, and surjective choice rules, and show that this number is attained by unanimity rules with status quo.     

A note on cheap talk and burned money

Austen-Smith and Banks [Cheap talk and burned money, J. Econ. Theory 91(1) (2000) 1-16] study how money burning can expand the set of pure cheap talk equilibria of Crawford and Sobel [Strategic information transmission, Econometrica 50(6) (1982) 1431-1451]. I identify an error in the main Theorem of Austen-Smith and Banks, and provide a variant that preserves some of the important implications. I also prove that cheap talk can be influential with money burning if and only if it can be influential without money burning. This strengthens a result of Austen-Smith and Banks, but uncovers other errors in their analysis. Finally, an open conjecture of theirs is proved correct.     

The role of independence in the Green-Lin Diamond-Dybvig model

Green and Lin study a version of the Diamond-Dybvig model with a finite number of agents, independence (independent determination of each agent's type), and sequential service. For special preferences, they show that the ex ante first-best allocation is the unique equilibrium outcome of the model with private information about types. Via a simple argument, it is shown that uniqueness of the truth-telling equilibrium holds for general preferences—and, in particular, for a constrained-efficient allocation whether first-best or not. The crucial assumption is independence.