METROPOLITAN HOUSE PRICES IN SOUTH AFRICA: DO THEY CONVERGE?

The question this paper investigates is whether or not different metropolitan areas each constitute a separate housing market or whether or not there is a single South African housing market. Theory on the Law of One Price suggests that if products or geographic areas belong in the same market, their absolute prices must converge, so that their relative prices are stationary. By using cross-sectional time series data of five metropolitan areas, the paper tests for the Law of One Price by applying the Im, Pesaran and Shin panel unit root test. The paper finds strong evidence of convergence in large middle-segment house prices and weaker support for convergence in medium middle-segment house prices. In addition, the paper finds no evidence for convergence in small middle-segment house prices. This suggests the existence of a national market for large and possibly middle-segment houses in metropolitan areas, but separate metropolitan markets for small middle-segment houses. In addition, the paper estimates the speed of convergence and finds that large middle-segment house prices converge within two to seven quarters, while the speed of convergence for medium middle-segment house prices in three of the five areas is five to eight quarters.     

Hedging,Financing and Investment Decisions: A Simultaneous Equations Framework

We empirically investigate the interactions among hedging, financing, and investment decisions. We argue that the way in which hedging affects a firm's financing and investing decisions differs for firms with different growth opportunities. We find that high growth firms increase their investment, but not leverage, by hedging. However, we also find that firms with few investment opportunities use derivatives to increase their leverage.     

Why Money Growth Determines Inflation in the Long Run: Answering the Woodford Critique

Woodford argues that it is not appropriate to regard inflation in the steady state of New Keynesian models as determined by steady‐state money growth. Woodford instead argues that the intercept term in the monetary authority's interest rate policy rule determines steady‐state inflation. In this paper, I offer an alternative interpretation of steady‐state behavior, according to which it is appropriate to regard steady‐state inflation as determined by steady‐state money growth. The argument relies on traditional interpretations of the central bank's power in the long run and appeals to model properties that are common to textbook and New Keynesian analysis. According to this argument, the only way the central bank can control interest rates in the long run is via affecting inflation, and its only means available for determining inflation is by determining the money growth rate.     

Technical Efficiency Estimates of Scottish Agriculture: A Note

Within the UK there has been a lack of studies of technical efficiency at the Scottish level. This note compares the results obtained using Scottish data with a recent study by Hadley [Journal of Agricultural Economics (2006) Vol. 57, pp. 81–100] for English and Welsh farms. Four major sectors are investigated, namely: (i) cereals, (ii) dairy, (iii) sheep and (iv) beef over the period 1989 to 2004. Some distinct differences in efficiencies, returns to scale and causes of efficiency are found.     

Technological innovation and real investment booms and busts

We investigate why new, high-risk technologies can attract excessive and often unprofitable investment. We develop an equilibrium model in which rational, risk-averse agents overinvest in a risky technology, possibly to the point that its expected return is negative. Overinvestment results from relative wealth concerns which arise endogenously from the imperfect tradability of future endowments. Competition over future consumption leads to an indirect utility for wealth with “keeping up with the Joneses” properties that can induce herding. Because overinvestment increases with the risk of the technology, our model can explain why new, risky technological innovations may promote investment bubbles.     

Corporate investment myopia: a horserace of the theories

This paper tests two theories of corporate investment myopia which predict a distortion in investment policy with respect to the standard net present value rule. The theories are confronted with the empirical evidence, allowing the theories to compete to explain investment behavior. Research and development expense is used to proxy for long-term investment in a pooled, cross-sectional time-series regression. I find that research and development expense is decreasing in the age of the Chief Executive Officer. Results are consistent with the hypothesis that agency costs are lower when the firm invests myopically, rather than follow a standard net present value rule.     

Wage and price controls in the equilibrium sequential search model

In this paper, we study the effects of wage and price controls on employment, output, and welfare in a simplified version of the Bénabou (J. Econom. Theory 60 (1993) 140) equilibrium sequential search model with bilateral heterogeneity. We show that a price ceiling increases output but the change in welfare depends on three effects: the reduction in aggregate search costs, the increase in surplus due to increased output, and the transfer of production to the least efficient firm. The model is formally identical to a standard equilibrium search model of the labor market so analogous results hold for the minimum wage.     

Demand fluctuations and capacity utilization under duopoly

Summary.  This paper studies the impact of uncertain demand on firms’ capacity decisions when they operate in an oligopolistic environment. We define a two-stage game where firms choose capacity in the first stage without knowing which state of Nature is going to realize, and output levels in the second, knowing which state is realized. We prove the existence of a symmetric subgame perfect equilibrium at which firms are in excess capacity compared with the capacity they would choose in the Cournot certainty equivalent game. Received: May 17, 1996; revised version July 31, 1996     

Condorcet efficiency of positional voting rules with single-peaked preferences

Consider a three-alternative election with n voters and assume that preferences are single-peaked. LetC(λ,n) be the Condorcet efficiency of the rule that assigns 1,λ and 0 points (respectively) to each first, second and third place vote. An exact representation is obtained forC(λ,∞). This relation shows that Borda rule (λ=1/2) is not the most efficient rule. In addition to this result, exact closed form relations are provided forC(0,n),C(1/2,n) andC(1,n). All these relations are obtained by assuming that every admissible configuration of preferences is equally likely to occur. This research was supported in part by the Swedish Insitute