Market perceptions of discretionary accruals by debt renegotiating firms during economic downturn

This study addresses how a stock market prices earnings components around a sudden and severe economic downturn. In particular, the study examines the market valuation of discretionary accruals for debt renegotiating Malaysian firms during the Asian financial crisis. Our analysis shows that negative discretionary accruals for debt renegotiating firms are associated with higher market values of equity and are not related to the firms' future earnings. These findings are consistent with investors placing a positive value on the probability that negative accruals increase the likelihood that concessions can be extracted from lenders during renegotiation. In contrast, discretionary accruals for a control sample of non-debt renegotiating firms are not significantly associated with stock prices but are positively associated with future earnings.     

不同来源金融资本对企业研发投入的影响研究

以中小板上市公司为样本,就不同来源金融资本对企业研发投入的影响进行了理论分析与实证检验。结果发现：①内源融资与企业研发投入正相关,高成长性企业表现尤为显著;②政府补助与企业研发投入正相关,资产负债率与企业研发投入负相关,且资产负债率负向调节政府补助与企业研发投入的正相关关系。企业应适度控制债权融资水平,提高企业研发投入动机,并有效发挥政府补助对研发投入的积极作用;③风险投资、外商直接投资与机构投资者对企业研发投入的影响不显著。     

The dynamic interrelation between external finance and bank credit

This article studies the interrelation among the volumes of bonds and stocks issued by non-financial firms, and levels of industrial loans outstanding in the United States. These aggregates are co-integrated and characterized by asymmetric volatility. Their co-movements are driven by financial indicators such as the yield spread, size of loan market and market volatility. Bond and stock issuance are positively correlated, and even more so during the expansionary phase of the cycle. Loans outstanding and bond issuance are negatively correlated, and their substitutability increases in periods of economic downturn, highlighting the importance of bond markets to mitigate credit crunches.     

Net share issues and the cross‐section of equity returns under a dividend imputation tax system

Despite considerable empirical evidence reporting a negative relationship between net share issuance and subsequent returns, it remains unresolved whether this anomaly is explained by risk or investor irrationality. This study examines the net share issuance anomaly using seasoned equity offerings before and after the introduction of an imputation tax system. We report robust evidence of a negative relationship between net share issuance and returns post‐imputation, but no relationship pre‐imputation. Our results provide evidence to support the international pervasiveness of the net share issuance anomaly, but more importantly suggest that this anomaly may be explained by risk.     

农村产权抵押物变现的现实困境与破解对策

农村产权抵押融资是盘活农村“沉睡资产”的重要渠道,也是增加农民财产收入的重要途径,而产权抵押物变现难是目前制约我国农村产权抵押融资健康发展的主要因素之一。由于我国农村产权流转存在刚性制度约束、农村产权的有效市场需求和流动性不足及其确权成本高且操作难,导致农村产权抵押物的收储与管理难、价值发现难、价值评估难和价值变现难。应完善农村产权抵押物变现的法律支撑体系,优化政府主导的宏观调控机制,构建包括资产管理中心、信息中心、交易中心、价值评估中心的农村产权交易市场体系,并完善农村产权确权颁证制度和农村社会保障制度等相关配套措施,以有效破解农村产权抵押物变现难困境,推动农村产权抵押融资发展。     

担保物权制度改革降低了企业债务融资成本吗?——来自中国《物权法》自然实验的经验证据

本文运用双重差分法考察以《物权法》出台为标志的担保物权制度改革是否降低了企业的债务成本。实证结果显示,《物权法》出台后,与固定资产占比较高的企业相比,固定资产占比较低企业的债务成本显著降低。进一步,与《物权法》出台通过扩大可抵押资产范围、加强债权人保护等渠道降低企业债务成本的经济直觉一致,三重差分检验结果表明,担保物权制度改革对企业债务成本的降低作用表现出丰富差异性:其一,与法律制度环境较好地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在法律制度环境较差地区相对更大;其二,与金融市场化程度较高地区相比,《物权法》对企业债务成本的降低作用在金融市场化程度较低地区相对更大;其三,与融资约束较弱企业相比,对于融资约束较强的企业而言,《物权法》对债务成本的降低作用相对更强。这些基于中国经济实践的经验证据识别并揭示出了担保物权制度改革促使企业债务成本下降的作用机理,从而对有效缓解企业融资难、融资贵等问题具有借鉴意义。     

法制环境、金融发展与企业长期债务融资

本文分别从长期负债比率和债务期限结构两个方面,从法与金融的视角考察了我国地区法制环境、金融发展以及它们之间的相互作用对上市公司长期债务融资的影响。研究结果表明:我国地区法制环境的改善并不能使上市公司获得更多的长期债务融资,地区法制环境和金融发展的水平越高,上市公司获得的长期债务融资越少,然而在法制环境比较好的地区,金融发展水平的提高却有助于上市公司获得更多的长期债务融资。本文的研究结果不仅丰富了国内外的研究成果,而且有助于我们更加深入地了解我国上市公司长期债务融资偏低的制度因素。     

CEOs versus CFOs: Incentives and corporate policies

We undertake a broad-based study of the effect of managerial risk-taking incentives on corporate financial policies and show that the risk-taking incentives of chief executive officers (CEOs) and chief financial officers (CFOs) significantly influence their firms’ financial policies. In particular, we find that CEOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with lower (higher) leverage and higher (lower) cash balances. CFOs’ risk-decreasing (-increasing) incentives are associated with safer (riskier) debt-maturity choices and higher (lower) earnings-smoothing through accounting accruals. We exploit the stock option expensing regulation of 2004 to establish a causal link between managerial incentives and corporate policies. Our findings have important implications for optimal corporate compensation design.     

国家信用风险的传导与影响研究——以欧元区债务危机为例

本文以欧元区债务危机为例研究国家信用风险的传导效应,首先,基于“欧猪五国”相对德国的十年期国债利差数据,分析债务危机在欧元区境内风险传导效应;其次,运用GVAR模型分析世界主要经济体对欧元区冲击的反应,重点分析欧元区GDP冲击对欧元区自身以及贸易关系密切的英国、美国和中国的影响。结果表明:希腊和爱尔兰对各国家信用风险产生的累积影响最为显著,西班牙和意大利较弱;欧元区经济萎缩造成的需求冲击对英国、美国和中国均有显著影响。     

The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right: Reply to M. Pierru

In this journal [Miller, R. A. (2009). The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 128–138], I argued that the standard WACC formula is inadequate in most circumstances to reward stockholders and bondholders where the necessary cash flows are calculated separately to exactly cover the respective costs of capital. Axel Pierru [2009. ‘The weighted average cost of capital is not quite right’: A comment. The Quarterly Review of Economics and Finance, 49, 1219–1223] observes correctly that my assumed repayment schedules (equal periodic payments to bondholders; similarly for stockholders) imply a temporal drift in the debt (or leverage) ratio; he would recalculate the WACC annually. He proposes an alternative calculation of the repayment schedules under the constraint of a constant debt ratio. Here I suggest three additional possible repayment schedules; in general repayment schedules determine the drift in the debt ratio. However, the expected repayment schedules are established at the time the project is accepted and financed, hence the relevant debt ratio is that which exists at that time. The WACC for a specific project need not (and should not) be recalculated for that project throughout its financial life when that project has already been accepted and financed.