Valuation and classification of company issued cash and share-puts

This paper examines whether investors’ valuations of cash and share-put warrants are influenced by their potential differential effect on firm solvency. It is motivated by the enactment of SFAS 150, which requires that all contingent put warrant obligations be classified as balance sheet liabilities regardless of put type. Consistent with the critics of SFAS150, we show that market participants differentially value cash and share-puts based on their solvency characteristics beyond the firm’s recorded assets and liabilities. Our results add to existing capital structure literature by suggesting that complex financial instruments (such as cash and share-puts) be reported separately from each other on a firm’s balance sheet.

The non-neutrality of debt in investment timing: a new NPV rule

Summary Limited liability debt financing of irreversible investments can affect investment timing through an entrepreneur’s option value, even after compensating a lender for expected default losses. This non-neutrality of debt arises from an entrepreneur’s unique investment opportunity, and it is shown in a standard model of irreversible investment that includes the equilibrium effect of a competitive lending sector. The analysis is partial, in that it takes as exogenously given an entrepreneur’s use of debt. Intuitively, limited liability lowers downside risk for the entrepreneur by truncating the lower tail of risks, and lowers the investment threshold. Compensating the lender for expected default losses reduces project profitability to the entrepreneur, and increases the investment threshold. The net effect is negative, because lower downside risk has an additional impact on the option value of delaying investment. The standard NPV rule in real options theory implicitly assumes debt to be neutral. With non-neutrality of debt, an investment threshold is higher than investment cost, but lower than the standard NPV rule. Comparisons with other standard investment thresholds show similar relationships.     

养老保险制度"划资偿债"战略研究

由于允许转制成本由制度内措施解决,加之制度设计不规范,当前我国基本养老保险制度已经陷入财务危机。本文认为通过“划资偿债”方式,做大全国社保基金事关我国基本养老保险制度改革成败,并提出了“划资偿债”的思路:划转中央企业和国家重点企业中地方企业国有资产;划转部分国有土地收益。     

彩票发行中委托代理的博弈分析及制度选择——以即开型彩票为例

我国即开型彩票发行中普遍存在着由承销商进行市场销售的委托-代理关系,受信息不对称影响,彩票发行机构与承销商之间便产生了委托-代理的道德风险.本文分别建立了委托-代理关系中政府与承销商间一次博弈模型和重复博弈模型,分析政府与承销商间相互依存行为的影响要素及作用机制,为我国彩票发行中承销制度改革提供建议.     

债务重组、退市压力与审计意见

本文以新准则实施后2007年和2008年中国A股上市公司为样本,研究发现新准则下进行机会主义债务重组的公司主要是已经连续两年亏损面临停牌风险的公司,而一年亏损的公司则对这一极端盈余管理手段的使用比较谨慎,并不倾向于进行债务重组来避免被特别处理。同时,发挥外部公司治理功能的审计师能够在一定程度察觉这些公司的机会主义行为,但是由于我国退市制度中没有对审计意见的严格规定,使得审计意见对公司进行机会主义债务重组行为的制约作用较弱。     

中国省际债务结构的差异化——基于面板数据的实证研究

我国各地债务融资结构存在很大差别,是当地的经济发展水平和金融市场格局不同导致吗？尤其是法律环境差的地区相对法律环境好的地区企业发债比率更高,有违经典的债务契约理论,这一悖论又如何解释？本文研究发现：（1）地方经济规模越大,对外依存度越高,当地企业发债越多;企业债券比银行贷款对通胀更敏感,而银行贷款是各地基础设施建设等固定投资的首选;（2）各地债券融资、银行贷款与股票融资在融资结构上此消彼长;（3）地方政府干预程度越高,当地企业发债比率越高。地方法律治理环境越完善,当地企业发债比率反而越低。其原因在于地方的政府干预是法律治理的替代机制,并且企业债券的发行受到更多的政府管制。     

试论民间借贷中借出方权益的自我保护

民间借贷是指公民与公民之间、公民与法人以及其他经济组织之间的借贷,是具有广泛群众性和深远传统性的信用补偿机制.民间借贷不同于非法集资,合法的民间借贷是受国家法律保护的,民间借贷在社会经济活动中不可或缺.但是,由于民间借贷具有自发性、随意性、风险性,一旦遇到情况变化,非常容易引发纠纷,造成诸多社会问题.因此,公民在出借资金时应注意保护自身的合法权益,以避免不必要的借贷纠纷发生,使民间借贷活动在社会经济发展中发挥其应有的积极作用.     

配股融资股价效应的实证研究

随着我国股市的发展,上市公司的融资方式也不断创新,配股融资作为股权融资的一种方式逐渐成为上市公司再融资的首选。配股融资虽然具有许多优点,但是我国上市公司没有充分发挥配股融资的长处,为了“圈钱”而“圈钱”,并且资金配置效率低下,对股市的负面影响日渐突出。通过2000年实施配股的43家样本公司配股公告日股价的变动,对配股融资的股价效应进行实证分析,并提出相应的政策建议。