金融发展对出口贸易规模与结构的影响

金融发展对一国专业化分工模式的选择及其对外贸易的开展具有深远的影响。利用中国大陆省级面板数据(2001—2005),本文基于一阶差分GMM估计技术检验了金融发展对对外出口规模及其出口商品结构的影响。在控制了人均实际资本存量、人均受教育年限等众多因素后,本文发现,金融发展规模与金融发展效率对对外出口规模及其制成品在出口总额中的份额皆有显著的正向影响,而金融发展效率对对外出口结构的影响较对对外出口规模的影响更加明显。     

地根经济视角下土地政策反周期调节的机理分析

本文把"地根经济论"与土地"三位一体"属性相结合,分析金融危机背景下土地宏观调控的作用机理,这一机理包括实物配置、价值配置和产权配置三个方面。本文认为,基于"三位一体"属性和地根经济论,把握土地政策参与反周期调节的作用机理,有助于形成更加清晰有效的宏观经济政策框架。     

简单会计分录转换成现金流量表两个项目群内项目的等式研究与验证

编制现金流量表的方法,一般以主表“经营活动产生的现金流量净额”金额为准,“人为调节”补充资料的“其他”项目金额使补充资料的“经营活动产生的现金流量净额”金额与主表的该项目金额相等。本研究是将企业日常发生的会计分录,套用从“净利润=收入-费用”推导出来的“群间借贷等式”（数学模型）,平衡转换成主表项目金额与补充资料项目金额,保证编制过程中两个主要项目金额随时“自然相等”,提高了现金流量表的编制技术。     

The optimal degree of cooperation in the repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments

In the infinitely repeated Prisoners' Dilemma with side payments, we characterize the Pareto frontier of the set of subgame perfect equilibrium payoffs for all possible combinations of discount factors. Play paths implementing Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are uniquely determined in all but the first period. Full cooperation does not necessarily implement these payoffs even when it maximizes total stage game payoffs. Rather, when the difference in players' discount factors is sufficiently large, Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs are implemented by partial cooperation supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. When both players are sufficiently patient, such payoffs, while implemented via full cooperation, are supported by repeated payments from the impatient to the patient player. We characterize conditions under which public randomization has no impact on the Pareto dominant equilibrium payoffs and conditions under which such payoffs are robust to renegotiation.     

Strategic pollution control under free trade

This paper designs a reciprocal dumping model to address the control of industrial pollution between two trading partners. Firms generate transboundary pollution from production and environmental taxes represent the pollution control instrument. We ask whether environmental taxes implemented in a non-cooperative setting are more stringent than the globally efficient level. Relative to the globally efficient case, we find in the linear Markov Perfect Nash Equilibrium (MPNE) context that the tax rate for both countries is smaller and individual emissions are larger. However, these results may not hold in the non-linear MPNE case depending on market structure and environmental conditions. Unlike the symmetric equilibrium case, the tax rates are always discontinuous under asymmetric MPNEs. The asymmetric equilibrium scenario can give rise to higher individual payoffs relative to the symmetric equilibrium case.     

寻找虚拟经济与实体经济之最优发展平衡区间探讨

虚拟经济源于实体经济的再分配环节,随着经济和社会的进步不断发生深刻的变化,对实体经济发展产生深刻的影响。虚拟经济与实体经济存在协调发展的平衡区间,如果以科学发展观为指导,将二者发展保持在相对的平衡区间内,可以有效防范和降低金融风险。因此,在依据经济动力系统模型的基础上,提出虚拟经济自增值的数理基础及对应的适度平衡区间。     

Natural vs. financial insurance in the management of public-good ecosystems

In the face of uncertainty, ecosystems can provide natural insurance to risk averse users of ecosystem services. We employ a conceptual ecological-economic model in which ecosystem management has a private insurance value and, through ecosystem processes at higher hierarchical levels, generates a positive externality on other ecosystem users. We analyze the allocation of (endogenous) risk and ecosystem quality by risk averse ecosystem managers who have access to financial insurance, and study the implications for individually and socially optimal ecosystem management, and policy design. We show that while an improved access to financial insurance leads to lower ecosystem quality, the effect on the extent of the public-good problem and on welfare is determined by ecosystem properties. We derive conditions on ecosystem functioning under which, if financial insurance becomes more accessible, (i) the extent of optimal regulation increases or decreases; and (ii) welfare, in the absence of environmental regulation, increases or decreases.