Political entrepreneurship and bidding for political monopoly

An analytical framework for dealing with political entrepreneurship and reform is proposed which is based on some new combinations of Schumpeterian political economy, an extended version of Tullock's model of democracy as franchise-bidding for natural monopoly and some basic elements of New Institutional Economics. It is shown that problems of insufficient award criteria and incomplete contracts which may arise in economic bidding schemes, also – and even more so – characterise political competition. At the same time, these conditions create leeway for Schumpeterian political entrepreneurship. The same is true for various barriers to entry in politics. These barriers affect a trade-off between political stability and political contestability which will be discussed with special emphasis on incentives and opportunities for political entrepreneurship in the sense of risking long-term investments in basic political reforms.     

Waiting and following: Within-industry herding behavior in annual report disclosure

Using the unique scheduled disclosure system for annual reports in China’s stock market, we examine within-industry herding behavior in annual report timing. The results reveal the waiting and following behavior strategies used in the annual reporting process within industry. Firms that originally schedule an early (late) disclosure date within their industry are more likely to reschedule to a later (earlier) date. Informational pressure is the dominant mechanism underlying herding in annual reporting, and capital market reputation incentives mainly induce the herding of bad news. Further analysis shows that delaying disclosure via the waiting strategy reduces the future occurrence of restatements, whereas bringing forward disclosure does not change the propensity of future restatements. Overall, we enrich the limited empirical studies on sequential mandatory disclosure decisions within industry.     

Managerial Firms,Entry, and Switching Costs

Empirical evidence shows that switching costs are important in many industries. We analyze the welfare effects of entry into markets with switching costs when firms can be run by managers and the entrant may be partially foreign-owned. We find that with profit-maximizing firms, the welfare effect of entry depends crucially on the ownership of the entrant firm. We also show that entry is less likely with managerial firms than it is with profit-maximizing firms. In the latter case, entry always reduces welfare if the share of the entrant firm owned by foreign investors is high. However, with managerial firms, entry always increases welfare.     

The odd notion of “reversible investment”

Irreversible investment and the attendant concept of real-option value have been well discussed. Complete reversibility has been frequently invoked but less studied, especially for the case of lumpy investment typically considered in capital budgeting. We examine a simple lumpy investment problem for the full range, from complete irreversibility to completely reversibility, with a focus on the latter. The optimal stopping rules under complete reversibility are to invest when the project generates enough net cash flow to cover Jorgenson’s opportunity cost of investment and to disinvest when it does not. Given the static nature of these rules, net present value as a timing criterion under reversibility is not pertinent. Investments that are partially reversible have much in common with completely irreversible investments but nothing in common with completely reversible investments. The case of reversible investment provides a foil for understanding that the distinguishing feature of investment as treated in corporate finance is that it entails at least some irreversibility.     

Dynamic Entry and Exit Linkages in the Brazilian Manufacturing Industry: An Econometric Investigation

The paper investigates dynamic linkages between entry and exit rates in Brazilian manufacturing in the context of 231 (four-digit) industries during the 1996–2005 period. The empirical analysis focuses on the estimation of a dynamic panel data model for entry and exit rates, and controls for the business cycle and structural characteristics, such as industrial concentration and suboptimal scale. The empirical evidence is partially consistent with a multiplier effect where synergetic factors prevail by exit inducing exit. Evidence partially supports a competition effect that could be related to a selection process favoring efficiency, as exit induces entry. The business cycle control variable and the aforementioned structural variables appear to play no role in delineating entry and exit linkages. The results are similar, although not identical, to previous evidence for developed countries.     

市场时机效应难以对资本结构产生持久性影响的原因——基于债务成本视角的实证研究

提出投资者情绪影响资本结构选择的一条渠道,即价格偏离会造成企业债权人预期变化,进而影响债务成本、融资约束,最终改变经理人的融资决策。应用我国上市公司1999—2008年的财务数据进行横截面实证检验。结果表明:市场情绪在很大程度影响上市公司的债务融资成本;在投资者非理性假设下,考虑市场情绪对债务成本的影响并结合市场时机理论才能解释上市公司的长期资本结构选择的经验数据。     

我国开放式基金业绩持续性、经理选股和择时能力——基于2005～2009数据

2008年我国股市进入熊市,基金净值缩水达40%以上,很多基金跌破面值,由于我国开放式基金采用基金经理负责制,基金经理的选股能力和择时能力直接影响基金公司业绩,本文选取了2005~2009年数据进行实证分析,发现我国基金经理选股和择时能力仍没有显著提高,也正因为如此,造成基金公司业绩仍然不具有明显持续性。     

基于期权博弈的投资时机选择

在不确定性和竞争性的策略互动环境中,根据投资时机相对性和绝对性的不同要求可以将期权博弈模型划分为绝对时机选择和相对时机选择两个类型。我们首先综述投资时机选择的期权博弈理论文献;然后以"随机最优停止问题"为研究基点,分别探讨投资时机选择的完全信息与不完全信息期权博弈模型;最后论述基于"追随-抢先模型"的投资时机选择期权博弈评价。     

The price stabilization effects of the EU entry price scheme for fruit and vegetables

The article assesses the stabilization effects of the EU import regime for fresh fruit and vegetables based on the entry price system (EPS). The analysis is carried out on the EU prices of tomatoes and lemons and those of imports from some of the main competing countries on the EU domestic markets: Morocco, Argentina, and Turkey. It is based on the estimation of a threshold vector autoregressive econometric model that is shown capable of taking the workings of the import regime into account. The model shows that prices behave differently when import prices are above/below the trigger entry price. This article allowed to highlight the cases for which the isolation effect of EPS seems reached and the resulting stabilization effects.