Scope,timing and strategic adjustment in emerging markets: Manufacturer strategies and the case of MRI

This study examines the realized strategies of all domestic manufacturers in a growing, high technology, industrial market characterized by high levels of regulatory, demand, and technological uncertainty. These manufacturers have behaved quite differently and experienced varying levels of success in the market. A typology of entry strategies grounded in an intensive analysis of these data is presented. Specifically, it addresses the timing and scope of a firm's entry into the market, strategic adjustments over time, and the impact of these decisions on the firm's performance. It is proposed that these strategies represent trade-offs between the risks of resource commitment and competitive preemption. Specific, testable hypotheses based on this typology are also provided.     

Followers' entry timing: evidence from the Spanish banking sector after deregulation

Much of the literature dedicated to the analysis of entry timing decisions has been devoted to the study of their consequences in terms of performance. However, only a limited amount of effort has been dedicated to analyzing the factors that determine these decisions. In addition, previous papers have centered their efforts on the product dimension, paying no attention to entry into new geographical markets. This paper departs from previous works in this respect and extends the entry timing literature through a consideration of the geographical side of entry. Our analysis shows that organizational size, organizational competence, and organizational experience appear as key factors when explaining the pattern of geographic diversification. Our results also indicate that diversification takes place sequentially, first proceeding to closer locations, then occupying markets further from the origin. Copyright © 2002 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Industrial Concentration Reverses the Timing in a Trade Policy Game

Faced with an export subsidy by a foreign government, importing countries have to decide whether they should impose countervailing duties or not. Using a Cournot duopoly model, Collie (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv 130: 191–209) shows that the subgame perfect equilibrium occurs when the importing country sets its production subsidy and tariff at stage one and the foreign government sets its export subsidy at stage two. That is, an importing country will choose to commit itself not to use countervailing duties. In this paper, we extend Collie's duopoly model to the case of a Cournot oligopoly and show that the country in which industry is less concentrated tends to emerge as the Stackelberg leader.     

入世后,我国国有专业外贸公司持续发展的思考

我国入世后，外贸经营权逐步由审批制过渡到注册登记制，国有专业外贸公司面临的机遇和挑战并行，国有专业外贸公司应彻底转变贸易观念，组建生产销售一体化的外贸企业(集团)，实施国际化经营，大力推行外贸代理制度，实施品牌战略，稳定外贸人才队伍，以应对入世挑战。     

Better late than never: a study of late entrants in household electrical equipment

For the most part, studies on timing of entry have attempted to determine the advantages that early entrants may be able to develop and hold over subsequent entrants. Given that a large number of firms attempt to enter at a much later stage in the development of the market, it is particularly surprising that little research has attempted to examine the differences in the ability of late movers to penetrate the market. In this paper, we focus exclusively on late movers and examine the extent to which their early success can be tied to existing market conditions, their resource strengths, and their strategic positioning. Copyright © 2003 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

Entry encouragement

In this paper, we investigate the possibility that a dominant firm will encourage rather than deter entry of a potential competitor. We find that entry can be encouraged by a dominant firm in order to induce a new entrant to resolve the demand uncertainty in a new market. We propose a specific incentive mechanism that the incumbent can use to encourage entry and find plausible circumstances under which entry encouragement is a dominant competitive strategy.INSEADInstituto de Analisis EconomicoINSEAD     

Foreign entrant survival and foreign market share: Canadian companies' experience in united states medical sector markets

We show that successful foreign market entry is related to the extent of foreign presence in an industry at the time of entry. Survival of 31 Canadian-based businesses that entered 24 U.S. medical sector markets between 1968 and 1989 tended to be somewhat longer in product markets in which foreign-based businesses held a moderate market share when the Canadian businesses entered than in low and high foreign share product markets. The result controls several other industry and business-level factors, including industry concentration, entry year, corporate size, related diversification, entry mode, and service sector status.     

Endogenous Stackelberg equilibria with incomplete information

In this paper, the endogenous order of quantity decision is studied in a duopoly model with incomplete information. One firm knows the state of the demand curve while the other firm remains uninformed. Firms have to commit to a quantity in one out of two periods. While, a priori, simultaneous-move Cournot equilibria are possible, only Stackelberg equilibria, with either the informed or the uninformed firm moving first, emerge endogenously.     

民营企业代际传承时机与公司业绩的关系研究

学者们普遍认为保持家族企业的连续性、保证有效的传承极大地依赖于传承计划。通过实证研究我国民营企业权力传承时机与公司业绩的相互关系发现,传承时机将影响到公司未来的业绩表现,因此选择合适的传承时机显得非常重要。研究还发现,公司规模、公司的成长性、公司的盈利变化以及贷款的限制都会影响到传承时机的选择。     

Binary games with many players

Summary. We examine a problem with n players each facing the same binary choice. One choice is superior to the other. The simple assumption of competition - that an individual’s payoff falls with a rise in the number of players making the same choice, guarantees the existence of a unique symmetric equilibrium (involving mixed strategies). As n increases, there are two opposing effects. First, events in the middle of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as many others - become more likely, but the payoffs in these events fall. In opposition, events in the tails of the distribution - where a player finds itself having made the same choice as few others - become less likely, but the payoffs in these events remain high. We provide a sufficient condition (strong competition) under which an increase in the number of players leads to a reduction in the equilibrium probability that the superior choice is made.Received: 24 July 2003, Revised: 24 January 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D02, D49, L19.Flavio M. Menezes: Correspondence toThis paper has benefitted from comments by an anonymous referee and seminar participants at the ANU, Boston University, Harvard University Law, Economics and Organization Seminar, University of Wisconsin and at the Econometrics Society Australasian Meetings, Auckland New Zealand. We also thank Lucian Bebchuk, Eddie Dekel, Oliver Hart, Luis Kaplov, Paulo Monteiro and John Quiggin for very useful comments. All errors are our own. Menezes acknowledges the financial support from ARC (grant no. 00000055) and the hospitality of EPGE/FGV and RSPAS/ANU.