Second Sourcing with Capacity Constrained Firms and Locked-In Buyers

I begin by surveying the motivations for second-sourcing agreements in the absence of licensing fees. I then focus on a particular motivation – that of an incumbent wanting to relax a capacity constraint. I develop a general model with buyers locked into a product, and find necessary and sufficient conditions for an incumbent to benefit from the presence of rivals without any need to sign contracts with them, in contrast with Dick (1992) and with the literature on subcontracting. I show that multiple equilibria due to the self-fulfilling expectations of rivals are possible. With regards to policy, I find that, with homogeneous buyers, a monopolist incumbent will produce where price and marginal cost coincide. I illustrate the model’s results with observations from the semiconductor industry.     

Hit and Run or Sit and Wait? Contestability Revisited in a Price-Comparison Site-Mediated Market

The price-comparison site, with its (near-)zero sunk costs of entry, would appear to approximate the “almost perfectly contestable market” envisaged by the contestability theorists where “hit-and-run” entry was conjectured to constrain sellers to zero-profit outcomes. We investigate hit and run using a unique unbalanced panel of 295 digital-camera markets mediated by NexTag.com. We find, however, in line with Farrell (1986a)’s prediction, a bifurcation of strategies with low reputation/smaller participants favouring a hit-and-run strategy involving lower entry prices and shorter forays into the market than their high reputation/larger rivals. Furthermore, the former entrants induce a much larger price response from low-reputation incumbents, reflecting the more intense rivalry for the price-sensitive consumers willing to eschew retailer reputations.     

International Hotel Companies in Russia

Abstract

Existing studies addressing the modal choice in the global hotel industry have discussed to a limited extent the restrictions posed to the choice of entry mode by the local environment, mainly the host government. This paper describes entries of foreign hotels in a market, Russia, in which the local (city) government has an active role in the hotel industry. The study proposes that, in the Russian market, the foreign hoteliers have to take into account the interests of the local governments regardless of the operation mode. On the basis of secondary data collected mainly from industry reports and Russian newspapers, the strategic choices made by the foreign hotel companies can be divided into two categories. First, some hotel chains have brought their brands to the Russian market early, but have made strategic concessions in the mode of entry. Second, there are companies that have stuck to their general strategies and postponed entry to Russia until it could be done with the mode preferred by the company.     

Towards a framework for the study of franchising as an operating mode for international retail companies

In recent years franchising has become a popular operating strategy for companies competing in the global marketplace. In particular, international retailing companies have increasingly been adopting franchising as a marketentry mechanism. While this growth in the popularity of franchising has led to increased research interest in the topic, there has only recently been a recognition of the need to consider franchising within the wider context of retailer internationalization activity. This paper attempts to provide a framework for the study of franchising as a strategy for retailers expanding into international markets. The discussion examines key findings to date from the established literature on international franchising concerning the motivations underlying internationalization, the internationalization process itself and the operating problems encountered. It is argued that a careful examination of findings from the international franchising literature can provide further development of retail internationalization conceptualization.     

Entry liberalization and export performance: a theoretical analysis in a multi-market oligopoly model

This paper is an attempt to demonstrate how the entry (costless) of firms in an industry may have a dramatic effect on exports from an industry in a country. The results have tremendous implications for LDCs suffering from resource and BOP constraints but having reservoirs of cheap labor. The welfare effects of such entry liberalization policy (or subsidy) can be stated from the Bhagwati theorem that a reduction in an only (single) distortion is necessarily welfare improving by reducing monopoly or oligopoly distortions. However, we have shown that the entry liberalization policy is welfare superior to an equivalent subsidy policy where equivalent is defined in terms of the impact on exports. As a by product, we have also shown how one can integrate the oligopoly models of trade with the general oligopoly literature. The results on the limiting behaviour of an open economy oligopoly model extend the standard results in the oligopoly theory in a closed economy.     

入世5周年对我国工业制成品国际竞争力的影响分析

2006年12月11日,是我国加入世贸组织5周年纪念日。回望这5年,入世给我国的经济带来了深刻的影响,我国对外贸易快速增长,融入世界经济的步伐不断加快,使得我国企业参与到更加激烈的国际竞争中。本文利用最新的进出口数据,对我国工业制成品的国际竞争力在入世5周年后的现状以及与入世前相比发生了怎样的变化做了对比分析。结果表明,加入世贸组织促进了我国工业制成品国际竞争力的提升。     

一种基于插值和卡尔曼滤波的接收机钟差预测方法

针对多模多频接收机面临同时处理大量数据的压力,提出了一种基于插值和卡尔曼滤波的接收机钟差预测方法。插值方法分别用拉格朗日和三次样条,三次样条端点的一阶导数采用“差分法代替求导法”来确定。首先由插值方法得出每隔1 s的卫星坐标、速度、钟差、频漂和伪距测量值,然后基于单星授时方法计算出静止接收机钟差,接着用卡尔曼滤波算法对接收机钟差和频漂进行预测,最后将预测的接收机钟差与加拿大空间参考系统（CSRS） 提供的精密接收机钟差数据进行比较。结果表明,拉格朗日插值由于存在龙格效应,其接收机钟差的抖动幅度比三次样条略大,它们与CSRS钟差数据相比,均方根误差在3 ns之内。     

基于LMS估计的卫星移动通信定时同步优化

针对采用长期演进（LTE）通信标准的地球静止轨道（GEO）卫星移动通信系统上行定时误差会影响单载波频分多址技术正交性的问题,在LMS线性估计算法的基础上提出了一种适用于大时延环境下单载波频分多址定时同步优化方法。该方法对用户与卫星之间传输时延的变化进行估计,通过闭环控制补偿减小上行定时误差。仿真表明：该方法在使用LTE标准帧结构时,能保护用户上行信号正交性,避免符号间干扰,且传输速率损失约为9%,远低于传统拓展帧结构方法带来的损失,验证了方法的优越性。     

机动定位平台间时间同步系统的误差分析与控制

高精度双向时间同步是分布式机动无源定位系统的一项关键技术。结合机动平台的特点,对基于伪码相位测量的双向时间同步系统的误差来源和影响误差的因素进行了分析,并针对其中一些引起误差的主要因素给出了控制误差的有效方法。仿真和实测表明,最终可以在机动平台间实现0.2 ns左右的时间同步精度。     

Competition in Local Markets: Some Evidence from the Spanish Retail Banking Market

Using the entry threshold concept developed by Bresnahan and Reiss (Brookings Pap Econ Act 3:833–882, 1987), this paper examines how competitive conditions vary in independent local banking markets when the number of depository branches grows. With data on the Spanish retail banking sector in 2003, I estimate a discrete choice model to calculate the entry thresholds. The empirical evidence suggests that the entry of a new branch implies competition on a local level. Local branches seem to have some scope for changing prices fixed on national and regional levels. Moreover, the entry of new branches increases the competition among branches with instruments other than price (e.g., advertising, location, and promotion).