The influences of governance quality on equity-based entry mode choice: The strengthening role of family control

This study examines the possible heterogeneity of governance quality's influence on entry mode decisions made by firms with different degrees of family control. When entering a country with low governance quality, ceding control of the subsidiary in exchange for local partners’ help enables foreign firms to tackle institutional flaws. However, such a motivation diminishes as governance quality increases. This study thus hypothesizes that firms tend to choose WOSs over JVs when entering a host country with high governance quality.Firms controlled by family members, due to concerns regarding the preservation of socioemotional wealth, prefer to maintain high ownership levels of their affiliates. This study thus hypothesizes that firms with a higher degree of family control are even more likely to choose WOSs when entering a country with high governance quality. The results support the hypotheses.     

To Bundle or Not to Bundle: Firms’ Choices under Pure Bundling

We examine the economic implications of pure bundling under the settings of monopoly and duopoly. We show that under monopoly and pure bundling of goods with independent demands, the bundled price is strictly less than the sum of the unbundled prices. In the setting of duopoly and Nash prices, we examine whether bundling can be used as a tool to deter entry. In contrast to the findings of previous studies, we show that with low entry costs, entry is deterred by unbundled as opposed to bundled sales. With high entry costs, however, the incumbent chooses to bundle.     

一种适用于宽带短波通信OFDM系统符号定时同步的新方法

针对宽带短波通信正交频分复用（OFDM）系统,提出了一种不需要数据辅助的高效符号定时同步方法。该方法利用OFDM符号中的空载波不传输任何数据这一特性,通过最小化空载波上的数据能量来将符号定时点锁定在安全区域内,从而完成符号定时同步。该方法可以有效对抗多径效应,适用于短波通信系统。最后将该方法与Al-Dweik同步方案在宽带短波信道条件下进行了仿真对比,结果表明该方法有着更精确的符号定时同步性能,并且适用于各种星座图调制。     

Determinants of Entry in Turkish Manufacturing Industries

The entry of new firms into markets plays an important role in efficient resource allocation and evolution for long term economic growth. Employing dynamic panel data techniques, this paper investigates entry behavior in 66 four-digit Turkish manufacturing industries for the 1993–1999 period. The results of this paper suggest that potential entrants observe the market before the entry takes place; entry is, in general, a follow-up process; and incumbent firms seem to collude to prevent entry in Turkish manufacturing industries. In addition, the real interest rate appears to be a very important determinant of entry decision.     

企业国际化经营的市场进入方式选择

随着世界经济一体化进程的加快和我国成功地加入世贸组织,企业越来越普遍地从事国际化经营活动。正确选择市场进入方式是企业国际化经营成败的关键。本文着重分析了影响进入方式选择的主要因素,并基于这一领域的交易成本理论、组织行为理论、折衷理论等尝试构建了一个企业国际化经营的进入方式综合决策模型,以期对我国企业实施“走出去”战略提供有益的借鉴。     

Link16数据链导航功能实现与改进

基于同步的相对导航与精确定位技术是Link16数据链运行的关键。针对国内文献对该 技术介绍较少的情况,分析了相对导航的基本原理,研究了利用往返计时报文实现精确同步 的方法和步骤,建立了相对导航解算方程以及相对栅格与地理栅格坐标之间的数据转换模型 ,最后提出了一种用GPS/IMU数据融合和卡尔曼滤波方法提高导航精度的方案。应用结果表 明,该方案能显著提高数据链的导航精度。     

所得税申报中资产时间性差异的调整方法比较

在所得税申报中,资产时间性差异的纳税调整要涉及几个纳税年度,并且一个正常生产经营企业的资产往往处在动态过程中。每年有新增资产,也有出售、报废、到期的资产,要准确无误地对其进行纳税调整,是所得税申报中的一个常见问题也是难点问题。文章通过对所得税申报中资产时间性差异调整的两种方法的比较,确定一种较为简便可行的方法。     

The duration of new firms in banking: an application of Cox regression analysis

This paper studies the duration of two cohorts of entrants in the Italian financial intermediation industry. Using the Cox (1972) Proportional Hazards Model, it analyses the link between duration of each newborn firm and its start-up size, as well as a series of industry-specific characteristics. It emerges that not only did regulatory reform in 1990 result in a process of branch proliferation and industry concentration, but it also set in motion a pre-entry selection mechanism. Conversely, before completion of the regulatory reform, in 1989, entry was possible even for very small firms, and larger new entrants survived longer than their smaller counterparts, and this independently of the features of spatial and structural competition. First version received: Nov. 98/final version received: Oct. 99     

Uncertainty and entry deterrence

Summary. We study a model where capacity installation by an incumbent firm serves to deter others from entering the industry. We argue that uncertainty about demand or costs forces the incumbent to choose a higher capacity level than it would under certainty. This higher level diminishes the attractiveness of deterrence (Proposition 1) and, therefore, the range of parameter values for which deterrence occurs (Proposition 2). Received: July 10, 1997; revised version: November 21, 1997