Timing,order and durability of new product advantages with imitation

This research examined the effects of timing, order and the durability of first mover advantages by analyzing the stock market reactions to new product introductions and imitations. The major findings are that both timing and order of moves are important and that rival reactions undermine the durability of first mover advantages. More specifically, (1) early and fast movers achieve greater gains than late and slow movers, and (2) first movers suffer at the time of new product imitations. Copyright © 2000 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.     

人寿保险行业市场结构及影响因素研究

准入退出壁垒、市场集中度、规模经济和范围经济以及产品差异化等是影响人寿保险业市场结构的主要因素。中国保险市场准入、退出的行政性政策壁垒较高,市场集中度较高,属于寡占 III 型市场结构;寿险业保费规模、保险密度、保险深度、保险资产总额占 GDP 的比重、保险资产总额占整个金融资产的比重较低;寿险产品同质化现象较严重。鉴此,应降低市场进入壁垒,建立市场退出机制,达到优化市场结构,提高资源配置效率目的。     

对中央银行非常规政策退出的几点思考

当前,随着全球经济复苏态势的不断显现,关于非常规货币政策的有序退出也逐步提上了各国央行的议事日程。该文对于非常规货币政策的概念、类别,以及金融危机以来美日欧等主要经济体所采取的非常规政策进行了梳理,在此基础上对于非常规货币政策的效果评价,及非常规货币政策的退出时机、节奏和顺序等战略决策进行了相关探讨和思考。     

The introduction of Entry Level Stewardship in England: Extension or dilution in agri-environment policy?

Agri-environment schemes were introduced in the mid-1980s. Their primary objectives have developed from initially aiming to hold back intensification towards stimulating environmental enhancement. The introduction of Entry Level Stewardship (ELS) in England represents a third stage in seeking to extend the coverage of schemes across the majority of agricultural land. This aims to influence land use along the whole of the intensive margin. The ELS offers a wide range of options for which farmers are awarded points. Selection of options equivalent to 30 points per ha in lowland areas entitles farmers to a payment of £30 per ha. By September 2007, 4.4 million ha had been entered into the scheme, equivalent to 47% of the agricultural area. From amongst the options on offer, 34% of points were for boundary options, 20% for intensive grass options, 16% for management plans and 13% for options taking arable land out of production. The choice of options varies across the country with a higher proportion of the agricultural area entered in the East. Entry into the scheme is associated with total agricultural area, cereals farming, larger farms, a lower proportion of area in Environmentally Sensitive Area and Countryside Stewardship schemes and grazing livestock numbers. While the ELS has introduced a large number of new entrants into agri-environment schemes, the extent of the environmental impact is uncertain. Given the large number of options available, it is likely that farmers will have chosen options that involve relatively little change and incur limited cost. At the same time, it would be surprising if the environmental gains were of the types most valued within local areas. The ELS approach implies that public goods provided from agricultural land should be paid for irrespective of what would have happened in the absence of the scheme. While this may be a fairer approach, it may also undermine the idea of land stewardship and imply that payments will continue to be required in the long term in order to sustain provision. The ELS does establish a framework within which incentives could be targeted to deliver specific benefits within particular contexts and suggestions are made as to how policy might be developed for this.     

Understanding the strategies of late-movers in International Manufacturing

This paper analyzes the internationalization of new multinationals from emerging countries. It also focuses on Production's role in firm internationalization, a subject seldom addressed because the discipline of International Manufacturing is still embryonic, while International Business tends to overlook production. The authors integrate International Business and International Manufacturing concepts and frameworks in order to analyze new multinationals from emerging countries, using the empirical evidence of a survey plus case studies of Brazilian multinationals for understanding late-movers’ strategies and competences, with emphasis on production.     

Entry mode choice in China's regional distribution markets: Institution vs. transaction costs perspectives

In this paper, we investigate the entry mode choice of a leading Taiwanese food company in setting up regional distributors in China's 312 sales districts. Our study shows that, in entry mode decisions, the institutional factors are more important than transaction cost considerations. Both formal and informal institutions are considered. Formal institutions refer to government prescribed institutions (laws and regulations), while informal institutions refer to rules prescribed by the industry and the society. Both institutions are shown to affect the entry mode choices but one important type of institution, professional norms, is conspicuously missing in China. Professional norms exert peer pressures on the practitioners in the same profession, forcing their behaviors to conform to a common pattern. In the absence of professional norms, the roles of network ties and mimetic behaviors are heightened and they become a proxy for professional norms. As a foreign enterprise operating in China's local markets, the Taiwanese food company attained legitimacy by forming alliances with local wholesalers and by following its predecessors in selecting organization forms.     

Antecedents of entry mode choice when diversifying

Corporate diversification is one of the broadest investigation topics in strategic management, but there are important gaps in the literature regarding entry mode choice. Few studies have examined the extent to which pre-entry conditions influence the choice of entry mode into new businesses. Past research has focused exclusively on internal development and acquisition as ways of entering new businesses, without considering the existence of hybrid forms, such as strategic alliances, that have experienced extensive growth during the last decade. Here we present an in-depth analysis of entry mode choice that uses an integrative perspective of corporate diversification and considers strategic alliances as an alternative to traditional approaches. A survey of 272 domestic diversifying entries by 155 Spanish firms allows us to characterize the use of cooperative agreements in diversification and to stress the role of inter-firm cooperation in acquiring the knowledge and capability required to grow into new businesses.     

Endogenous location leadership

We analyze a game of timing where Sellers, which have marginal production cost asymmetries, can delay entry and a commitment to a location in a Hotelling type setting. When cost differences are large enough the game becomes a war of attrition that yields Stackelberg behavior where the high cost firm will delay choosing a location until the low cost firm commits to its position. We find interaction effects between timing and the degree of product differentiation and compute timing/location and mixed strategy equilibria through a range of marginal cost differences. The firms maximally differentiate with moderate cost differences; with somewhat greater cost differences there is intermediate differentiation, and; with large cost differences there is a blockading monopoly. The low cost firm always commits to entry immediately whereas the high cost firm either enters immediately, shortly after the low cost leader, or never, depending on the cost differences. Finally, we find that in equilibrium the duopoly is sustained for a larger range of cost differentials and that differentiation is greater than the social optimum.     

科研项目评审与授项中委托代理问题分析

以科研项目评审与授项为研究对象,揭示了委托代理关系下的不确定性决策过程,通过改进传统委托代理情形下的不确定性决策模型,分析了委托人与代理人的方案选择过程。研究表明,在信息不对称和奖惩系数不合理的情况下,代理人和委托人的决策可能导致项目评审的不公平性,使得科研项目资金资助效率降低。最后,从信息集和奖惩机制方面提出了解决这一问题的对策。     

Stackelberg equilibrium with many leaders and followers. The case of zero fixed costs

I study a version of the Stackelberg game with many identical firms in which leaders and followers use a continuous cost function with no fixed cost. Using lattice theoretical methods I provide a set of conditions that guarantee that the game has an equilibrium in pure strategies. With convex costs the model shows the same properties as a quasi-competitive Cournot model. The same happens with concave costs, but only when the number of followers is small. When this number is large the leaders preempt entry. I study the comparative statics and the limit behavior of the equilibrium and I show how the main determinants of market structure interact. More competition between the leaders always displaces the followers. Instead, how a stronger threat of entry affects the equilibrium depends on the technology. With strictly convex costs it is the followers that eventually displace the leaders.