论国有企业改革中的管理层收购

管理层收购在本质上是一种杠杆收购行为,是20世纪70年代流行于欧美国家的一种企业收购方式。它在我国近年来的实践中有着多种模式,由于我国的特殊背景,在实施过程中,面临着法律和市场两个方面的障碍。本文主要讨论管理层收购的方案设计与模式,重点分析我国管理层收购中存在的问题,并提出相关建议,     

多元化战略、经济绩效与资本结构——关于上市公司股权融资偏好解释

我国上市公司存在十分强烈的股权融资偏好,学术界一般将其原因归结为股权融资成本偏低。笔者研究则表明,融资成本因素并不能全部解释上市公司股权融资偏好。本文从企业多元化经营战略角度来剖析股权融资偏好。研究发现:企业多元化程度越低负债率越低,企业经济绩效越好;企业有动力降低负债率,采用股权融资。研究还发现,企业多元化战略已经构成融资决策的有效约束,股权融资偏好是上市公司的理性选择。     

Knowledge transfer costs and dependence as determinants of financial reporting

Abstract This paper examines the circumstances in which financial reporting exists. Jensen and Meckling (1995 ) observe that where there are high knowledge transfer costs, then decentralisation is necessary; and that where decentralisation occurs there is a control problem, which can be addressed by providing a control system. I predict that where there are high knowledge transfer costs there will be a control system; if the control system uses financial reports, these will occur for activities with high knowledge transfer costs. The ability to decentralise is reduced where dependence makes it potentially costly to allow a subordinate to make decisions about the activity. The paper predicts that high dependence will be negatively associated with the existence of financial reports. The results confirm the predictions that financial reports are positively associated with knowledge transfer costs and negatively associated with dependence.     

German managers'' attitudes towards Anglo-American accounting: Results from an empirical study on global accounting harmonization

The starting-point of the present paper are systematic differences between the answers of German corporate managers and professors in an empirical study by C&L Deutsche Revision AG (1995) on accounting harmonization. In this study, managers expressed themselves in all questions more positively towards current German accounting and more negatively towards US accounting than professors. The fundamental assumption put forward in this paper is that these differences are due to differences in the economic interests of the two groups. To test this empirically, hypotheses are deduced with regard to the accounting-related interests of the executive managers. The idea behind the hypotheses is that managers' answers to questions in the C&L Industry Study can be explained by structural features of their respective companies. The hypotheses are tested using multiple regression analysis. The results of the tests show that managers' answers can, to some extent, be explained by the suggested multiple regression approach. However, the answers to the rather general and abstract question (the preferred balance between the true-and-fair-view and prudence accounting principles) are much better explained than the answers with regard to detailed US-GAAP regulations. We must assume that the managers' attitudes towards concrete US-GAAP, which are directly related to corporate accounting practice, are influenced by a multitude of firm-specific and personal factors.     

我国证券投资基金投资风格实证研究

本文利用我国公开披露的证券投资基金收益率数据,对关于投资风格分析的夏普模型在我国的适用性进行验证分析,得出该模型对我国证券投资基金进行投资风格分析是有效的,是观察、判断管理人投资风格及其变化的一个良好工具的结论,并概括出我国证券投资基金的投资风格特点。     

Do executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance?

Consistent with predictions of agency theory, we find direct evidence that executive stock option grants have value implications for firm performance. This inference is drawn from evaluation of various motivations for the use of such grants in executive compensation: value enhancement, risk taking, tax benefit, signaling and cash conservation. We find consistent evidence for the value enhancement motivation to reduce agency costs. As well, they signal for positive price sensitive information. Our results reject the tax benefit and cash conservation motivations. This finding is robust after controlling for the endogenous character of executive stock option grants and other equity-based grants. JEL Classification G32 • J33 • M52     

Management accounting and corporate governance: An institutional interpretation of the agency problem

Challenging the dominant economic agency theory of corporate governance with a new discourse drawn from institutional theory, the paper analyses how management accounting is implicated in corporate governance. The proposed institutional theory of agency links the micro-institutions of the organization that are informed by the practices of management accounting with external institutional players and stakeholders. The paper identifies emerging narratives in which the management accounting profession has recognised a distinctive, post-Enron set of sensibilities. Although techniques drawn from strategic management accounting can be adapted to embed better corporate governance practices, the institutional theory of agency identifies tensions between the heroic CEO narrative and the routinization of strategy implicit in strategic management accounting.     

英国的非公开权益资本和风险投资

英国是欧洲风险投资和非公开权益资本的发源地。在欧洲国家中,英国的风险投资和非公开权益资本起步最早,发展也最快。从1979年算起,英国风险资本投资额和非公开权益资本增长了100多倍。2005年,在欧洲的风险投资市场上,英国的风险资本总额占欧洲风险投资额的40￣50%,在欧洲是当仁不让的“大哥大”,在世界范围内仅次于美国。本篇文章主要介绍了风险投资(VentureCapital,VC)及非公开权益资本(PrivateEquity,PE)的最新概念和从属关系以及英国的风险投资及非公开权益资本的历史、结构、规模、投资趋势、投资阶段、投资领域、地理特征、知名风险企业、投资表现等,以此从数据和分析的角度使中国的风险投资领域及非公开权益资本领域的从业人员以借鉴、启迪的作用。     

The Informational Efficiency of the Equity Market As Compared to the Syndicated Bank Loan Market

The loan market is a hybrid between a public and a private market, comprised of financial institutions with access to private information about borrowing firms. We test whether this is reflected in informationally efficient price formation in the loan market vis-a-vis the equity markets, and reject this private information hypothesis. We also reject a liquidity hypothesis which suggests that equity markets always lead loan markets, despite bank lenders' access to private information, because of greater liquidity in equity markets. We further test, and reject, an asymmetric price reaction hypothesis that states that loan returns are more sensitive to negative information whereas equity returns respond symmetrically to both positive and negative information. We find evidence most consistent with an integrated markets hypothesis that suggests that both the equity and syndicated bank loan markets are highly integrated such that information flows freely across markets. This is particularly true when the equity market makers are also loan syndicate members.      

The consequences to analyst involvement in the IPO process: Evidence surrounding the JOBS Act

The JOBS Act allows certain analysts to be more involved in the IPO process, but does not relax restrictions on analyst compensation structure. We find that these analysts initiate coverage that is more optimistically biased, less accurate, and generates smaller stock market reactions. Investors purchasing shares following these initiations lose over 3% of their investment by the firm's subsequent earnings release. By contrast, issuers, analysts, and investment banks appear to benefit from this increased bias, as optimism is more positively associated with proxies for firm visibility and investment banking revenues when analysts are involved in the IPO process.