Misperceiving the value of information in predicting the performance of others

Economic models typically allow for “free disposal” or “reversibility” of information, which implies non-negative value. Building on previous research on the “curse of knowledge” we explore situations where this might not be so. In three experiments, we document situations in which participants place positive value on information in attempting to predict the performance of uninformed others, even when acquiring that information diminishes their earnings. In the first experiment, a majority of participants choose to hire informed—rather than uninformed—agents, leading to lower earnings. In the second experiment, a significant number of participants pay for information—the solution to a puzzle—that hurts their ability to predict how many others will solve the puzzle. In the third experiment, we find that the effect is reduced with experience and feedback on the actual performance to be predicted. We discuss implications of our results for the role of information and informed decision making in economic situations. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s10683-006-9128-y. JEL Classification C91, D83     

Elicitation using multiple price list formats

We examine the properties of a popular method for eliciting choices and values from experimental subjects, the multiple price list format. The main advantage of this format is that it is relatively transparent to subjects and provides simple incentives for truthful revelation. The main disadvantages are that it only elicits interval responses, and could be susceptible to framing effects. We consider extensions to address and evaluate these concerns. We conclude that although there are framing effects, they can be controlled for with a design that allows for them. We also find that the elicitation of risk attitudes is sensitive to procedures, subject pools, and the format of the multiple price list table, but that the qualitative findings that participants are generally risk averse is robust. The elicitation of discount rates appear less sensitive to details of the experimental design. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C9, D81, D91 An erratum to this article is available at .     

开放电工电子实验室的研究和实现

传统的电工电子实验室建设与管理模式下的实践教学在很大程度上达不到当今社会对人才培养的要求。实验室对学生开放是现代科技发展的需要,是高校实验教学现代化水平的重要标志,这不仅是一种理念和时尚,而且也为实验室建设创建一个传承和改革,创新与发展的平台和机遇。     

Banding together in a festival context: Examining effects of a joint-stakeholder external service recovery

Despite substantial growth in revenue and attendance numbers on a global and country level over the past decades, failure is still a fairly common phenomenon in the events/festival industry. Drawing on two scenario studies and data collected in the United States, this research investigated the impact on festival-goers’ evaluations and behavior of joint-stakeholder external service recoveries, in contrast to the prevalent focus on examining service recoveries by a single stakeholder that caused the failure. Findings revealed that festival-goers had different perceptions of and behavioral intentions towards the various stakeholders depending on their perception of fault for the failure. Yet, rather than a predicted joint effect with failure severity, we found a significant interaction effect of the locus of causality with service recovery measures, either via an internal or external recovery. Implications of study findings and directions for future research are discussed.     

重大社会环境事件与人口健康的实证分析和思考——“事件人口学”在我国的创建和完善发展

社会发展进程中,自然和社会环境的重大改变会对人口数量和结构产生近期和远期效果,其对人口健康的影响效应则有更多证据。对重大社会环境事件的定义、基于重大社会环境事件的人口与健康研究的主要发现和存在问题进行了系统的梳理分析,并概要介绍了相关的研究,发现重大社会环境事件作为一种外生冲击和自然实验,为开展人口与健康的因果关系和相关关系等都提供了独特的研究机会和范式,有效弥补了已有人口与健康研究方法学的不足,也使得我们可以更加理性看待重大社会环境事件对人口与健康影响的"双面效应"。在全球化视角下加强基于重大社会环境事件的人口与健康研究,将为制定促进人口健康与社会政策提供重要参考,并以此为线索,可进一步拓展重大社会环境事件与人口数量、结构、分布、变动等人口效应的影响,进而建立事件人口学的研究体系、方法和内容。     

Career concerns incentives: An experimental test

Holmström’s [Holmström, B., 1982/1999. Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective. Review of Economic Studies 66, 169–182. Originally published in: Essays in Economics and Management in Honour of Lars Wahlbeck, Helsinki] career concerns model has become a workhorse for analyzing agency issues in many fields. The underlying signal jamming argument requires players to use information in a Bayesian way, which is difficult to directly test with field data: typically little is known about the information that individuals base their decisions on. Our laboratory experiment provides prima facie evidence: (i) the signal jamming mechanism successfully creates incentives on the labor supply side; (ii) decision errors take time to decrease; (iii) while subjects’ average beliefs are remarkably consistent with play, a mild winner’s curse arises on the labor demand side.     

Letting third parties who suffer from petty corruption talk: Evidence from a collusive bribery experiment

Following a recommendation by Transparency International, we conduct a laboratory experiment to gauge the impact of a specific type of grassroots participation on petty corruption. Participants play a one-shot, three-person sequential bribery game that, depending on the treatment, either gives or does not give passive third parties suffering from corruption the opportunity to send a publicly visible message to potential bribers and bribees. We find that messaging opportunities deter bribe offers (i.e., the extensive margin of bribe), but affect neither the size of the offered bribe (i.e., the intensive margin) nor bribe acceptances. We conjecture that the different impact of the treatment on bribe-givers and bribe-takers may be due to the order of play.     

Dictator game giving: altruism or artefact?

Experimental dictator games have been used to explore unselfish behaviour. Evidence is presented here, however, that subjects’ generosity can be reversed by allowing them to take a partner’s money. Dictator game giving therefore does not reveal concern for consequences to others existing independently of the environment, as posited in rational choice theory. It may instead be an artefact of experimentation. Alternatively, evaluations of options depend on the composition of the choice set. Implications of these possibilities are explored for experimental methodology and charitable donations respectively. The data favour the artefact interpretation, suggesting that demand characteristics of experimental protocols merit investigation, and that economic analysis should not exclude context-specific social norms.

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Electronic Supplementary Material  The online version of this article () contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.      

Virtual world experimentation: An exploratory study

We explore the scientific potential of virtual worlds for experimental economics in terms of the subject pools and experimental platforms they present. Our results offer tentative, qualified support for virtual world experimentation. Overall, the behaviour of virtual subjects recruited, incentivised and observed within Second Life across a range of five standard experimental games was not found to differ significantly from established standard results. In addition, we identify certain methodological opportunities and challenges which confront virtual world experimenters.     

From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence

We consider a sequential two-party bargaining game with uncertain information transmission. When the first mover states her demand she does only know the probability with which the second mover will be informed about it. The informed second mover can either accept or reject the offer and payoffs are determined as in the ultimatum game. Otherwise the uninformed second mover states his own demand and payoffs are determined as in the Nash demand game. In the experiment we vary the commonly known probability of information transmission. Our main finding is that first movers’ and uninformed second movers’ demands adjust to this probability as qualitatively predicted, that is, first movers’ (uninformed second movers’) demands are lower (higher) the lower the probability of information transmission. JEL Classification C72 · C78 · C92