田野实验——现实世界中的经济学实验

随着经济学实验室实验的广泛应用和发展,田野实验这一更贴近现实世界的经济学实验也开始成为一种流行的实证研究方法。本文对田野实验的兴起、概念和分类作了具体介绍和叙述．并报告了我们已经开展的两个田野实验研究实例的研究思路、实验设计和实验结果。     

Sabotage in Corporate Contests – An Experimental Analysis

In corporate contests, employees compete for a prize. Ideally, contests induce employees to exert productive effort which increases their probability of winning. In many environments, however, employees can also improve their own ranking position by harming their colleagues. Such negative incentive effects of corporate contests are largely unexplored, which can partly be attributed to the fact that sabotaging behavior is almost unobservable in the field. In this study we analyze behavior in experimental contests with heterogeneous players who are able to mutually sabotage each other. We find that sabotaging behavior systematically varies with the composition of different types of contestants. Moreover, if the saboteur’s identity is revealed sabotage decreases while retaliation motives prevail. Our results promise to be valuable when designing corporate contests.     

Training strategic thinking: Experimental evidence

Strategic behavior is crucial for strong firm performance, especially in competitive environments. Thus, designing a good strategy is a key issue for firms. Designing a strategy requires a combination of strategic thinking—which involves analyzing a firm's strategic environment, defining a vision of its future, and devising new ideas to out-think competitors – and strategic planning – which implies using these ideas to formulate a business plan. Although many firms excel at strategic planning, few devote enough resources to strategic thinking, which results in strategic insanity (i.e., firms repeatedly applying the same strategies with the expectation of different outcomes). To foster a strategic environment within a firm, firm managers and other workers must show willingness for active involvement in a firm's strategic decisions. Nevertheless, not everybody has the skills to do so, as many firms lack work force training programs. This study shows, experimentally, how training affects firms' strategic behavior. The starting point is two groups of individuals with initially equal qualifications who play in a sequential game whose rules hinder the calculation of equilibria. The members of only one of the groups previously receive a treatment entailing a process of training and learning that aims at fostering strategic thinking. The results point to a significant increase in the number of strategic decisions in the treatment group in sharp contrast to the control group, confirming the initial hypothesis (i.e., the positive impact of training).     

Can willingness‐to‐pay values be manipulated? Evidence from an organic food experiment in China

Human behaviors are driven by implicit and explicit motives. Psychologists have developed two main tools, namely time pressure and cognitive load, to disentangle the two motives. This implies values of willingness to pay (WTP) may be sensitive to time pressure and cognitive load levels in practice. An experiment with 233 students was conducted in China to study the willingness to pay for organic food with consideration of different time pressures and cognitive load levels. Results show that (1) increasing cognitive load could significantly reduce consumers’ WTP for organic food; and (2) time pressure does not have a significant impact on WTP values. Such results suggest researchers should be particularly cautious about the cognitive load situations of respondents during a WTP survey.     

Fifty‐year overview of judgment and decision‐making research in accounting

As part of the celebration of the fiftieth anniversary of AFAANZ, we consider the breadth of judgment and decision‐making (JDM) experimental research in accounting over that 50‐year period. Our review is divided by decade and between auditing, financial accounting and management accounting. In four major journals, we found 5745 papers between 1970 and 2009, which we consider impressive and strong support for the opportunity to publish in this field. Our aim is to encourage more JDM research from Australians and New Zealanders, and to allow researchers in particular specialisations to get a better understanding of the JDM research in other specialisations.     

Experimental evidence on financial incentives, information and decision-making

This paper reports on a series of experiments aimed at exploring in greater detail previous work on the effects of financial incentives on information use and task performance in a principal-agent setting. The paper also develops some new statistical modelling in the area of experimental testing including incorporation into the modelling approach of data from post-experiment questionnaires. We find significant support for the finding that profit-related individual money rewards encourage increased accessing of valuable but costly past profit information by agents – and that this in turn enhances individual performance in earning profit for the agency.     

Playing the wrong game: An experimental analysis of relational complexity and strategic misrepresentation

It has been suggested that players often produce simplified and/or misspecified mental models of strategic decisions [Kreps, D., 1990. Game Theory and Economic Modeling. Oxford Univ. Press, Oxford]. We submit that the relational structure of players' preferences in a game is a source of cognitive complexity, and may be an important driver of such simplifications. We provide a classification of order structures in two-person games based on the properties of monotonicity and projectivity, and present experiments in which subjects construct representations of games of different relational complexity and subsequently play the games according to these representations. Experimental results suggest that relational complexity matters. More complex games are harder to represent, and this difficulty seems correlated with short term memory capacity. In addition, most erroneous representations are simpler than the correct ones. Finally, subjects who misrepresent the games behave consistently with such representations, suggesting that in many strategic settings individuals may act optimally on the ground of simplified and mistaken premises.     

Revealing the depth of reasoning in <Emphasis Type="Italic">p</Emphasis>-beauty contest games

The aim of this study is to evaluate the impact of information on levels of reasoning on individuals' choices in p-beauty contest games. In the baseline design, subjects received information only on the average and target values from the previous period. In the alternative design, the winner(s) explained in a short message (30 words maximum) what reasoning he/she applied in selecting the target value and then stopped playing. The winner's message, the winning number, the target and average values were then displayed on all computer screens. The results show that non-winning players imitate the level of rationality of winners, and a significant proportion of the population adopt strategies which are best responses to other imitators' behaviour rather than to the average level of rationality. Both the imitative strategies and the best responses to the imitative strategies stimulate a strong acceleration of the learning process. Electronic Supplementary Material Supplementary material is available in the online version of this article at . JEL Classification C72, C91, C92     

What motivates common pool resource users? Experimental evidence from the field

This paper develops and tests several models of pure Nash strategies of individuals who extract from a common pool resource when they are motivated by a combination of self-interest and preferences for altruism, reciprocity, inequity aversion, or conformity. Using data from experiments conducted in three regions of Colombia that depend critically on a local fishery, we test whether an econometric summary of the subjects’ pure Nash strategies is consistent with one or more of these models. We find that a model that balances self-interest with a strong preference for conformity best describes average strategies.