Retaliatory Equilibria in a Japanese Ascending Auction for Multiple Objects

We construct a family of retaliatory equilibria for the Japanese ascending auction for multiple objects and show that, while it is immune to many of the tacitly collusive equilibria studied in the literature, it is not entirely immune when some bidders are commonly known to be interested in a specific object.     

Ascending auctions for multiple objects: the case for the Japanese design

Summary. We consider two ascending auctions for multiple objects, namely, an English and a Japanese auction, and derive a perfect Bayesian equilibrium of the Japanese auction by exploiting its strategic equivalence with the survival auction, which consists of a finite sequence of sealed-bid auctions. Thus an equilibrium of a continuous time game is derived by means of backward induction in finitely many steps. We then show that all equilibria of the Japanese auction induce equilibria of the English auction, but that many collusive or signaling equilibria of the English auction do not have a counterpart in the Japanese auction.Received: 2 September 2004, Revised: 20 April 2005, JEL Classification Numbers: C72, D44.Fabrizio Germano: Correspondence toWe are indebted to Philippe Jehiel for useful discussions and to Nicolas Vieille for suggestions in the proof of Proposition 2; we also thank seminar audiences in Athens, Basel, Beer-Sheva, Berlin, Brussels, Cambridge, Edinburgh, Exeter, Lausanne, Lisbon, London, Louvain-la-Neuve, Namur and Tel Aviv. Germano acknowledges financial support from Euopean Commission, TMR Network Grant ERBFMRXCT0055, “Cooperation and Information” as well from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Technology, Grants SEC2001-0792, SEJ2004-06319, and in form of a Ramon y Cajal Fellowship. Lovo is member of GREGHEC, unité CNRS, FRE-2810. The support of the Economic and Social Research Council (ESRC) is also gratefully acknowledged. The work was part of the programme of the ESRC Research for Economic Learning and Social Evolution.     

第二代催化汽油选择性加氢技术的应用

介绍了第二代催化裂化汽油选择性加氢脱硫技术(RSDS-Ⅱ技术)在催化汽油选择性加氢装置中的应用。标定结果表明,以硫含量460～470μg/g、烯烃含量40%左右的催化裂化汽油为原料,采用RSDS-Ⅱ技术后,产品硫含量小于50μg/g,研究法辛烷值损失小于1.0。RSDS-Ⅱ技术具有非常好的脱硫选择性,是生产低硫清洁汽油的重要技术。