The Non-Equity Entry Mode Choices of International Hotel Organizations in New Zealand

ABSTRACT

Research on the non-equity entry mode choices of service firms is relatively limited. We use transaction cost economics and organizational capability perspectives to examine the determinants of choosing between franchising and management contracts in the hotel industry. In our analysis of four international hotel organizations operating in New Zealand, we found that both asset specificity and imperfect imitability helped in explaining the choice between franchising and management contracts. Behavioral uncertainty and host country management capabilities explained the entry mode choice of some hotel organizations but were not applicable for others that entered New Zealand via international strategic alliances or used strata titles. Finally, environmental uncertainty and the development of New Zealand’s business environment had a limited effect on choosing between franchising and management contracts.     

The value of cash holdings in hotel firms

Extant research in finance suggests asymmetric information increases the cost of external financing substantially and creates underinvestment problems. While franchising might reduce underinvestment problems, it might exacerbate overinvestment problems in poorly-governed firms. Using combined postulations from both the pecking order theory and the free cash flow theory, this study examines the value of cash holdings in hotel firms and the extent to which franchising, financial constraints, and corporate governance affect this value. The findings suggest that cash can be a curse and a blessing; cash is more valuable for financially constrained firms than for unconstrained firms and less valuable for poorly-governed firms than for well-governed firms. Also, financial constraints have a greater effect on the value of cash holdings than weak corporate governance. Although franchising could solve underinvestment problems, it makes poorly-governed firms more vulnerable to overinvestment. Practical and theoretical implications are discussed within realms of corporate finance and franchising.     

Agency and institutional influences on franchising decisions

While the franchising literature has typically relied on agency theory, efficiency considerations may not fully explain decisions to expand through franchising or company ownership. In this study, I re-examine franchising decisions using insights from institutional theory. The key tenet of institutional theory is that decisions are influenced by isomorphic pressures arising from the environment. Economic rationales such as the achievement of efficiency are thought of as less pervasive concerns. I begin by investigating whether institutional theory explains variance in franchising decisions beyond what is explained by agency theory. Then, I explore the extent to which institutional considerations moderate the relationships between agency considerations and franchising decisions. Hypotheses are tested on a unique database of 132 French franchise chains. Empirical results suggest that successful competitors' use of franchising explains variance in the focal chain's use of franchising beyond what is explained by the importance of local managerial inputs and the threat of franchisee opportunism. In addition, the threat of franchise opportunism is less strongly related to the focal chain's use of franchising when successful competitors have a high proportion of franchised outlets. Overall, findings from this study suggest that researchers should supplement agency theory with institutional theory to adequately explain franchising decisions.     

Possible Applications of Survival Analysis in Franchising Research

Time is an important variable for retailers. The concepts of survival and duration, linked to this time variable, can be very interesting in franchising research. For instance, what are the determinants of the survival of a network or a store? Which elements decrease the period before franchising or internationalising a network? There is a well adapted but little-exploited methodology in this research area: survival analysis. Consequently, this methodological paper presents in detail survival analysis methodology before giving relevant examples of applications in the franchising field. Managerial implications of these kinds of research are given before the conclusion.     

Franchising and intellectual capital: A franchisee’s perspective

Various studies have focused on the reasons for franchising. Most studies have concentrated principally on the franchisors’ motivations for franchising, with only a few exploring franchising as a route to self-employment. This paper seeks to provide a conceptual framework which examines the value of franchising to franchisees, employing an intellectual capital perspective. It is suggested that the (perceived) value of the franchise system is unlikely to remain static over time, and that the perceived benefits of franchise systems will vary according to both system and franchisee attributes.

Monitoring Policy and Organizational Forms in Franchised Chains

Franchising is nowadays a prominent way to organize the distribution sector. While previous literature suggests that monitoring issues are a critical determinant of organizational choices, it is rather silent on the optimal monitoring strategy once the organization of the chain is set. In this article, we analyze the monitoring policy of chains with both franchised and company-owned units. We develop a model in which a chain monitors its outlets under asymmetric information on local demands and managers’ efforts. We show that partial monitoring (i.e., when the franchisor monitors only a subset of its outlets) represents an optimal monitoring policy. Second, we identify the units that should be monitored. Finally, we discuss the impact of information technologies and outlet location on monitoring policy and how it may affect the proportion of franchised and company-owned units within the mixed chains.     

Contractual Design as a Determinant of Performance: Evidence from Franchising

This empirical note deals with the contractual design of relationships between producers and retailers. It provides evidence on the links between the features of vertical contracts organizing franchising networks and the performances of these networks. An agency perspective is used to understand the structure of contracts. We focus on the relevance of vertical restraints by the upstream firm to prevent retailers from free‐riding in the distribution networks. From six frequent contractual provisions we distinguish two types of contracts according to the degree of constraint imposed on the franchisees. Econometric estimations carried out on this basis offer evidence consistent with the hypothesis that within franchising systems, more constrained contracts for retailers encourage better performance at the network level.     

Contractual Discrimination in Franchise Relationships

Franchisors often modify the contract terms offered to prospective (new) franchisees – to incentivize growth in the number of franchisees, to access capital, or to improve their financial performance. We argue that changes in contract terms offered to new franchisees (contractual discrimination across franchisees) can alter existing franchisees’ perceived equity in their relationship with the franchisor, and affect their freeriding. Specifically, we hypothesize, and show, that positive (negative) discrimination towards new franchisees reduces (maintains) existing franchisees’ perceived equity in their relationship with the franchisor, motivating existing franchisees to increase (eschew) freeriding – with impact on franchisors’ performance. To do so, we first take advantage of an exogenous event (the great recession of 2007-09) to study how 120 restaurant franchisors changed their contract terms to new franchisees and how that affected their post-recession net income (Study 1). We show that changes in contracts for new franchisees impact franchisors’ post-crisis performance, as a function of the number of existing franchisees. Second, with two experiments (Studies 2 and 3) with entrepreneurs and franchisees, we document that the observed changes in performance occur because contractual discrimination affects existing franchisees’ perceived equity and their intentions to free-ride. Thus, we contribute to the literature on equity in franchising relationships, on contract evolution in franchising, and its impact on financial performance.     

Why do entrepreneurs use franchising as a financial tool? An agency explanation

When and why one type of entrepreneur (franchisor) attracts to its ventures another type of entrepreneur (franchisees) instead of passive investors is a central concern in entrepreneurship literature. Based on the informativeness principle of the principal–agent model, we claim that franchisees are not such an expensive financial tool as has been argued in the literature because their compensation (return) is more efficiently designed: it directly depends on variables which are under franchisees' control. We therefore link agency and financial explanations for franchising. Most of our findings show that, once the agency argument is controlled for, the higher the cost of alternative funds for the franchisor (estimated through different variables), the more the franchisor will rely on expansion through franchising as opposed to company-ownership. We interpret this as a clue that franchising is also used as a financial capital source.     

A longitudinal study of franchisor failure according to Altman’s Z model

Purpose: The foremost objective of this study is to obtain segments/clusters of franchisors that are more likely to fail. A second aim is to evaluate the influence of the usual variables of the franchise contract on the solvency of franchises.

Design/methodology/approach: This study set up a database with information collected from several Spanish franchising yearbooks and franchisors’ websites to establish the census of Spanish franchisors. This article worked with a census of the franchises operating in Spain from 2001 to 2011. Latent class regression analysis is used.

Findings: This research found four segments or classes of franchisors with regard to their failure pattern. In addition, this article defined the most influential variables in the franchisors’ risk of failure. The relationships between the variables that define a franchise contract and the Z scores of Altman’s model have been extracted. The dependent variable has been the Altman’s Z model and the independent variables are those that define the franchise contract.

Research implications: This methodology offers potential franchisees a new criterion for assessing the franchise chains they are investigating, taking into account their risk of failure. This allows franchisees to better highlight those franchisors that have a lower crash risk and avoid the damage incurred by the closure of the chain. The information provided for franchisees should be accessible, usable, and suitable to help franchisees to choose the best franchise systems in which to invest. This methodology is of course very useful for franchisors, because they can comprehend their financial situation and how they could manage the franchising variables in order to improve their solvency.

Practical implications: All the segments are solvent, except Segment 3. The distinguishing feature of this segment is that over 64 percent of the firms are retailer chains. In addition, more than 20 percent of the franchises from our database are in financial danger, and this is the group where the number of service companies is lower.

Originality/value: This research is unique in two ways. First, this study presents a new methodology in this field that allows researchers to use the historical-financial data of franchisors, and the information of the franchise contract to predict franchisor failure. Second, this article helps franchisees to make their own decisions on the basis of the franchisors’ level of risk of failure. Third, this research offer a theoretical contribution about franchisor failure, this topic is scarcely treated by academic literature.