Governance structures in the hotel industry

This study investigates alternative governance forms in the hotel industry. Agency theory maintains that the need for control over service quality, financial risk, and the market environment affect the choice of governance form. Prior agency research emphasizes alternative governance structures that principals employ, given local market conditions, agent incentives, and risk preferences. The study augments the established principal-agent perspective with a discussion of entrepreneurial motivations to join hotel alliances. The study analyzes the choice between independent ownership and affiliation with a voluntary chain as well as the choice between integration and franchising. Data analyses from 650 hotels indicate that the hotel size, amenities, population, and distance to headquarters influence governance.     

What to Expect After the Honeymoon: Testing a Lifecycle Theory of Franchise Relationships

This research examines the evolution of interorganizational relationships in a franchising context. Using U-curve theory, we develop three hypotheses and contrast them with traditional lifecycle theory. Three groups of constructs are affected by lifecycle: cooperation variables, dependence variables, and relationship variables. Four distinct stages emerge, with highest levels of variables in the honeymoon stage, lower levels in routine and crossroad stages, and increasing levels in the stabilization stage. Franchisors should strive for “stability on high levels” before operational realities influence the franchisees. Franchisees’ intermediate lifecycle phases are most critical for the system, since opportunistic behavior and switching are most likely.     

An Incomplete Contracting Model of Dual Distribution in Franchising

Dual distribution in franchising is addressed from an incomplete contracting perspective. We explicitly model cooperative (dual distribution) franchising as an organizational form, next to wholly-owned, wholly-franchised, and dual distribution franchise systems. Key conclusions of the model are: (1) dual distribution as an efficient governance mechanism does not depend on heterogeneous downstream outlets, and (2) whether dual distribution or some other organizational form is efficient depends on the size of the benefits to dual distribution relative to the parties’ costs of investing.     

Franchising Research Frontiers for the Twenty-First Century

About four decades ago, during the formative years of the franchising industry, visionary authors like Oxenfeldt and Kelly (1968) and Ozanne and Hunt (1971) proposed a rich slate of research agenda which still continues to guide some of the contemporary scholarship in the franchising domain. This article (1) explicates some of the unique features of the franchising context that presumably inspired these pioneering authors, (2) discusses four established elements of ontology unique to franchising and isolates the remaining research gaps therein, (3) specifies a new slate of more contemporary research agenda for future scholarship, and (4) concludes with a brief discussion of the ten articles featured in this Special Issue of the Journal of Retailing dedicated to the theme of Franchising and Retailing.     

A strategic groups approach to the franchising–performance relationship

Although franchising is a pervasive organizational form, little is known about its performance consequences. Prior studies have not found a direct performance effect, suggesting a need for alternative approaches. Drawing upon agency and resource scarcity theories, we develop the idea that strategic groups exist among franchisors and that performance differs among the groups. Using a sample of 65 restaurant chains, three strategic groups were found. The strategic group most influenced to franchise out of resource scarcity exhibited poorer performance than the other two groups. Results indicate that important, but nonlinear, relationships exist among franchising, its antecedents, and performance.     

Franchising and real estate brokerage

This paper examines the value of franchise affiliation to real estate brokerage firms. It uses a national sample to estimate models of brokerage firm sales and revenues. The results suggest that franchisees sell more properties than nonaffiliates, but that the average franchise sale results in less revenue. The net benefit of franchise affiliation is a 9.0 percent increase in net revenue to the average firm. We compare the initial cost of affiliation with the benefits and find that the up-front fees charged by franchisors are substantially lower than the present value of the stream of incremental profits generated by franchise affiliation.     

Proposing new variables for the identification of strategic groups in franchising

The identification of strategic groups in the Spanish franchising area is the main aim of this study. The authors have added some new strategic variables (not used before) to the study and have classified franchisors between sectors and distribution strategy. The results reveal the existence of four perfectly differentiated strategic groups (types of franchisors). One of the major implications of this study is that the variables that build a strategic group vary depending on the respective sector the network operates in and its distribution strategy. This fact indicates that including sector and distribution strategy is absolutely necessary to achieve good classifications of franchisor types.     

Valuing Exclusivity from Encroachment in Franchising

Conflict is created when business format franchisors penetrate existing markets with new outlets that increase system-wide sales, but negatively affect the sales and profits of existing franchisees. Territorial exclusivity contracts are used to manage channel conflict in such situations. We present a model to value territorial exclusivity from the perspective of both the franchisor and the franchisee. We show that under certain circumstances there is positive value to the franchisor by including the exclusivity clause in the contract and to the franchisee by purchasing this exclusivity. When this happens, the likelihood of franchisor-franchisee encroachment-related conflict is reduced.     

论商业特许经营中的知识产权法律保护

知识产权的运用是商业特许经营的核心特征,每一项特许经营都包括知识产权的集中许可和使用。但是由于知识产权所具有的无形财产权的性质,很容易被相关的利益方侵犯,发生知识产权侵权问题,因此为商业特许经营中的知识产权提供法律保护这一问题具有很强的理论意义和实践价值。本文认为,特许人应承担知识产权权源保证或瑕疵担保义务,被特许人也应负起保密等先合同之附随义务。在商业特许经营过程中,对注册商标、企业标志和专有技术提供规范的过程保护也至关重要。另外,本文还分析了当发生第三人从外部对商业特许经营中的知识产权进行时,如何在特许人与被特许人之间确定原告资格,以及另一方的协助诉讼义务。     

论特许经营中知识产权的保护

特许经营中的特许权,其实质是知识产权,它包括商标、商号、专利、专有技术、服务标记、商业秘密、经营模式等多种形式。与其他商业模式不同,特许经营的知识产权特别容易受到侵犯,因此,本文介绍了特许经营中知识产权的特点,我国法律的现有保护,重点讨论了如何对特许经营中的商标权和商业秘密进行保护。