Phasing out the GSEs

We develop a new model of the mortgage market that emphasizes the role of the financial sector and the government. Risk tolerant savers act as intermediaries between risk averse depositors and impatient borrowers. Both borrowers and intermediaries can default. The government provides both mortgage guarantees and deposit insurance. Underpriced government mortgage guarantees lead to more and riskier mortgage originations and higher financial sector leverage. Mortgage crises occasionally turn into financial crises and government bailouts due to the fragility of the intermediaries’ balance sheets. Foreclosure crises beget fiscal uncertainty, further disrupting the optimal allocation of risk in the economy. Increasing the price of the mortgage guarantee “crowds in” the private sector, reduces financial fragility, leads to fewer but safer mortgages, lowers house prices, and raises mortgage and risk-free interest rates. Due to a more robust financial sector and less fiscal uncertainty, consumption smoothing improves and foreclosure rates fall. While borrowers are nearly indifferent to a world with or without mortgage guarantees, savers are substantially better off. While aggregate welfare increases, so does wealth inequality.     

Government as borrower of first resort

Optimal government bond supply is examined under asymmetric information and safe asset scarcity. Corporations issue junk debt when demand for safe debt is high since uninformed investors then migrate to risky overheated debt markets. Uninformed demand stimulates informed speculation, driving debt prices toward fundamentals, encouraging pooling at high leverage. As borrower of first resort, government can issue bonds, siphoning off uninformed demand for risky corporate debt, reducing wasteful informed speculation. Government bonds eliminate pooling at high leverage or improve risk sharing in such equilibria. Optimal government bond supply is increasing in demand for safe assets and non-monotonic in marginal Q.     

GOVERNMENT SIZE AND GROWTH: A SURVEY AND INTERPRETATION OF THE EVIDENCE

Abstract The literature on the relationship between the size of government and economic growth is full of seemingly contradictory findings. This conflict is largely explained by variations in definitions and the countries studied. An alternative approach – of limiting the focus to studies of the relationship in rich countries, measuring government size as total taxes or total expenditure relative to GDP and relying on panel data estimations with variation over time – reveals a more consistent picture. The most recent studies find a significant negative correlation: an increase in government size by 10 percentage points is associated with a 0.5% to 1% lower annual growth rate. We discuss efforts to make sense of this correlation, and note several pitfalls involved in giving it a causal interpretation. Against this background, we discuss two explanations of why several countries with high taxes seem able to enjoy above average growth. One hypothesis is that countries with higher social trust levels are able to develop larger government sectors without harming the economy. Another explanation is that countries with large governments compensate for high taxes and spending by implementing market‐friendly policies in other areas. Both explanations are supported by ongoing research.     

后税费时代的农村公共产品供给机制创新——基于政府、市场与村民自治组织的分工与合作

全面取消农业税后,农村的部分公共产品供给陷入了困境。农村公共产品缺乏的主要原因是供给机制的缺失,其中重要的因素是农村公共产品供给责任不清以及供给模式单一。本文从政府、市场与村民自治组织的分工与合作的角度阐述了如何清楚划分各级政府在农村公共产品供给中的职责和范围以及如何将私人部门和非营利性组织引入到农村公共产品供给中来,实现政府和市场的合作。     

转移支付与地方政府支出规模膨胀——基于中国预算制度的一个实证解释

自2000年以来,为了缩小地区间差距和促进基本公共服务均等化,我国的财政转移支付规模迅速扩大。本文利用1994-2015年省级年度数据发现,地方政府获得的一般性转移支付和专项转移支付每增加1元,年度一般预算财政支出将分别增加1.61元和2.12元,远远超过本地财政收入增加所产生的影响。这也意味着财政转移支付在我国产生了较大的“粘蝇纸效应”。在2010年提前下达固定数额转移支付指标改革后,一般性转移支付的“粘蝇纸效应”有所下降。使用分月数据的回归结果显示,“年底突击花钱”对专项转移支付“粘蝇纸效应”的贡献最大。本文的研究表明,转移支付引发的地方财政收入的不确定性、转移支付下拨时滞以及刚性的年度预算平衡制度是导致我国地方政府支出规模膨胀的重要原因。本文的研究结论意味着,中央应进一步规范转移支付制度、扩大提前下达转移支付指标的范围、加快转移支付的拨付进度、建立和完善跨年度预算平衡机制、积极防范转移支付的道德风险问题。地方各级政府应该加强预算执行管理,强化预算约束力。     

Anti-corruption,government subsidies,and investment efficiency

The problem of corruption in socio-economic development has long been a focus of academics and practitioners. To address this concern in China, the 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China instituted a new anti-corruption policy. In this paper, we examine the impact of this recently enacted anti-corruption policy on the investment efficiency of subsidized enterprises from the perspective of government subsidies. We conclude that government subsidies have a significant positive impact on the overinvestment behavior of enterprises and that the anti-corruption work done by the government has effectively restrained the excessive investment behavior of government-subsidized enterprises. Further, we find that the anti-corruption policy is more effective in restricting overinvestment in subsidized state-owned enterprises than in non-state-owned enterprises. We examine the impact of the anti-corruption policy on excessive investment caused by government subsidies and enrich the body of research related to investment efficiency. We also provide empirical support for further research on the anti-corruption policy at the macro-market and micro-enterprise levels. The findings highlight the need to establish new cooperation between government and enterprises, to rationalize the distribution of administrative resources, and to promote the sustained and healthy development of the national economy.     

后危机时代政府干预与银行信贷—基于国有经济视角

本文利用我国2007-2016年的省级面板数据,对后危机时代政府干预与银行信贷以 及不良贷款率进行了实证研究。本文发现：地方政府干预显著带来地区信贷增长以及不良贷款 率下降;地方政府通过对国有经济进行干预,可以显著带来地区信贷增长,但对降低地区不良 贷款率不显著。进一步研究发现：东部地区政府干预有助于提高地区信贷增长并降低不良贷款 率;西部地区政府通过干预国有经济能带来地区信贷增长;无论是东部、中部还是西部,政府 通过对国有经济的干预降低地区不良贷款率均不会产生太大效果。     

高校科研经费间接成本核算模型构建--基于政府会计制度背景

科研经费间接成本是对高校开展科研活动的成本补偿,随着《政府会计制度》的实施,高校在会计核算模式、财务报告编制方面都发生了重大的变化,新制度为高校成本核算提供了制度保障。本文阐述了科研经费间接成本的构成及研究现状,梳理了从资源归集、作业中心成本计算及科研项目成本分摊的整个核算流程。根据资源消耗的不同特点,运用作业成本法和权重比例法的理论和方法,科学地对科研经费间接成本进行分类和分摊,构建了比较完整地高校科研经费间接成本核算模型。同时提出了与模型运用相配套的建议:制定具体行业的间接成本核算规定,规范间接成本的核算;构建并完善高校成本管理系统并加强财务人员的培养;根据高校自身特点,制定科研经费间接成本核算体系。     

政府创新投入可以促进市场创新投入吗——基于我国内地63所教育部直属高校科技创新数据的实证研究

高校是我国重要的创新研发主体,高校经费主要来源于政府和市场,这两种异质性研发创新投入关系值得关注。选取2005-2018年我国内地63所教育部直属高校科技创新数据,采用面板VAR模型和个体固定效应模型,从动态和静态两个方面对高校科技创新投入中政府创新投入与市场创新投入的关系进行实证检验。结果发现,在高校科技创新活动中,政府创新投入对市场创新投入存在积极影响,这种促进作用存在两期左右的滞后期,且只在短期内显著;从长期看,政府投入对市场投入的促进作用不显著。     

政府公共工程招投标腐败举报研究

政府公共工程招投标领域内,参与投标人为达到自身的某种目的常常采取行贿等非法手段。这种腐败违法行为不仅严重败坏了社会风气,且给政府公共工程建设带来极大破坏。消除这种行为,除了需要相应的监管部门付出很多努力外,与招投标违法举报人的举报积极性密切相关,举报人提供的线索在查处腐败案件中起关键的作用。充分发挥举报人的积极性,是查处腐败案件的重要突破口,也是做好工程建设预防寻租腐败等发生的重点和难点。该文从政府公共工程招投标腐败举报问题出发。从举报人是否属于当事人的角度进行分类,研究了它们的异同点,并对举报人与被举报人之间利益进行博弈分析,在此基础上提出了完善政府公共工程招投标腐败举报制度的途径。得出结论是,提高举报人积极性的努力方向有两条：其一是降低举报人的举报风险;此外就是增加举报人在举报活动中的预期收益。