Sources of Productivity Growth Dynamics: Is Japan Suffering From Baumol's Growth Disease?

This study examines the sources of labor productivity growth dynamics in Japan (1970–2010) and investigates the extent to which Japanese economic performance has been affected by Baumol's growth disease (BGD). We find that BGD silently undermines Japanese economic growth. However, the magnitude is miniscule, and consequently the aggregate labor productivity growth rate has not been decreasing monotonically. We also explore how BGD is arising and why it is small in the Japanese economy. BGD is weak because (1) the positive Baumol growth effect is also working in certain services sectors and (2) BGD is not a durable phenomenon: even if a sector begins to suffer from BGD, it is likely to recover quickly.     

LIQUIDITY AND THE INFORMATIONAL EFFICIENCY OF AFRICAN STOCK MARKETS

The hypothesis that a stock market price index follows a random walk is tested for 11 African stock markets, Botswana, Côte d'Ivoire, Egypt, Ghana, Kenya, Mauritius, Morocco, Nigeria, South Africa, Tunisia and Zimbabwe using joint variance ratio tests with finite-sample critical values, over the period beginning in January 2000 and ending in September 2006. The iid random walk hypothesis is rejected in all 11 markets. In four stock markets, Egypt, Nigeria, Tunisia and South Africa, weekly returns are a martingale difference sequence. Liquidity is an important factor which contributes to whether a stock market follows a random walk.     

Job satisfaction and gender: Why are women so happy at work?

By most objective standards, women's jobs are worse than men's, yet women report higher levels of job satisfaction than do men. This paper uses a recent large-scale British survey to document the extent of this gender differential for eight measures of job satisfaction and to evaluate the proposition that identical men and women in identical jobs should be equally satisfied. Neither the different jobs that men and women do, their different work values, nor sample selection account for the gender satisfaction differential. The paper's proposed explanation appeals to the notion of relative well-being, especially relative to workers' expectations. An identical man and woman with the same jobs and expectations would indeed report identical job satisfaction, but women's expectations are argued to be lower than men's. This hypothesis is supported by the finding that the gender satisfaction differential disappears for the young, the higher-educated, professionals and those in male-dominated workplaces, for all of whom there is less likely to be a gender difference in job expectations.     

矿产资源勘探与评价会计准则的国际趋同研究

在会计准则国际趋同方面，澳大利亚走在了最前面。国际会计准则理事会（IASB）和澳大利亚会计准则委员会（AASB）同时发布了国际财务报告准则IFRS6和与其对应的澳大利亚准则AASB6-《矿产资源的勘探与评价》。通过比较AASB6与IFRS6的制定背景、框架结构和内容的异同，发现AASB6体现了AASB对会计准则国际趋同制定的总体策略，而且在与国际会计准则趋同的同时，充分体现了澳大利亚国情，这对完善我国的《石油天然气开采准则》应该有所启示。     

General equilibrium models of monopolistic competition: A new approach

We analyze a class of ‘large group’ Chamberlinian monopolistic competition models by applying different concepts of functional separability to the same set of first-order conditions for utility maximization. We show that multiplicatively quasi-separable (MQS) functions yield ‘constant relative risk aversion’ (CRRA), and, therefore ‘constant elasticity of substitution’ (CES), functions, whereas additively quasi-separable (AQS) functions yield ‘constant absolute risk aversion’ (CARA) functions. We then show that the CARA specification sheds new light on: (i) pro-competitive effects, i.e., profit-maximizing prices are decreasing in the mass of competing firms; and (ii) a competitive limit, i.e., profit-maximizing prices converge to marginal costs when the mass of competing firms becomes arbitrarily large.     

Wage inequality, technology, and trade

The recent widening of wage inequality has been attributed by some to skill-biased-technical-change and by others to trade liberalization. This paper examines the two explanations within a unified model and also presents a new modeling of skill-biased-technical-change, where skilled workers replace unskilled ones. As a result technology adoption is endogenous and does not occur in all countries. Hence, wages for both types of workers, trade patterns and also factor productivities in all countries are endogenously determined. The model sheds light on the relationship between technology and trade, on the reasons for global productivity differences and on the causes for the recent rise in wage inequality.     

Gender differences in self‐employment

This paper examines the factors that influence transitions into self‐employment, paying particular attention to gender differences. We find that: (i) men are more responsive to the wage differential between wage/salaried employment and self‐employment; (ii) liquidity constraints are more important for men; and (iii) the link between father's self‐employment status and the probability of self‐employment is stronger for men. Taken together, these results suggest that, for women, self‐employment is a closer substitute for part‐time work and labour‐market inactivity than it is for men. We attribute such differences to the different labour market opportunities and occupational strategies of women.     

Politics and economics in weak and strong states

While much research in political economy points out the benefits of “limited government,” political scientists have long emphasized the problems created in many less-developed nations by “weak states,” which lack the power to tax and regulate the economy and to withstand the political and social challenges from non-state actors. I construct a model in which the state apparatus is controlled by a self-interested ruler, who tries to divert resources for his own consumption, but who can also invest in socially productive public goods. Both weak and strong states create distortions. When the state is excessively strong, the ruler imposes such high taxes that economic activity is stifled. When the state is excessively weak, the ruler anticipates that he will not be able to extract rents in the future and underinvests in public goods. I show that the same conclusion applies in the analysis of both the economic power of the state (i.e., its ability to raise taxes) and its political power (i.e., its ability to remain entrenched from the citizens). I also discuss how under certain circumstances a different type of equilibrium, which I refer to as “consensually strong state equilibrium,” can emerge whereby the state is politically weak but is allowed to impose high taxes as long as a sufficient fraction of the proceeds are invested in public goods. The consensually strong state might best correspond to the state in OECD countries where taxes are high despite significant control by the society over the government.     

Corruption, inequality, and fairness

Bigger governments raise the possibilities for corruption; more corruption may in turn raise the support for redistributive policies that intend to correct the inequality and injustice generated by corruption. We formalize these insights in a simple dynamic model. A positive feedback from past to current levels of taxation and corruption arises either when wealth originating in corruption and rent seeking is considered unfair, or when the ability to engage in corruption is unevenly distributed in the population. This feedback introduces persistence in the size of the government and the levels of corruption and inequality. Multiple steady states exist in some cases.     

Social networks in the global banking sector

We show that banks with shared social connections partner more often in the global syndicated loan market and that central banks in the network play dominant roles in various interbank transactions, indicating that social connections facilitate business connections. However, more centralized banks in the network also contribute significantly to the global systemic risk. Moreover, we find the soft information generated by social networks is particularly valuable when potential partners operate under different accounting and regulatory standards. Finally, we show that the recent banking crisis significantly limited the positive soft information effects of social networks in the global banking system.