Political regimes and foreign intervention

We present a theory of endogenous political regimes that emphasizes foreign direct investment as a motive for foreign governments to either induce regime transitions or promote regime consolidations. We characterize different forms of foreign intervention and identify the conditions under which they occur. We highlight new channels through which economic factors affect political regime choices. Foreign intervention is most likely to originate from countries where the government has a substantial pro-investor bias and to be directed at destinations where FDI is highly profitable and where income inequality is high. Foreign-sponsored coups d'état are more likely to be directed at democratic governments of poor countries. In destinations where FDI is highly profitable but the domestic elite is weak, foreign intervention tends to be aimed at stabilizing dictatorships. We relate the analysis to evidence on foreign intervention from around the world.     

Relevance in the Application of IFRS 16 for Financial Statements:Empirical Evidence the Impact of the Financial Method in SMEs

Leasing is confirmed among the preferred forms of financing by SMEs(Small and Medium Enterprises),even if its use grows both among large companies and private i...     

Elections and Capital Flows

This paper investigates the extent to which elections affect capital flows. I find little evidence of political capital flow cycles in advanced economies. In emerging and developing countries, however, presidential elections significantly lower preelection foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows but have no effect on other types of capital flows. Furthermore, I find evidence that these cycles are not caused by economic crises related to elections or preelection manipulation of policy variables. These results suggest that uncertainty about future government policies, which should have greater impact on more irreversible forms of capital flows like FDI, may be an important factor in generating this cycle.     

INCOME INEQUALITY AND POLITICAL POLARIZATION AND FRACTURALIZATION:AN EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION OF SOME EUROPEAN COUNTRIES

This paper investigates the relationship between economic inequality and the distribution of votes among political parties, namely political polarization and fracturalization. Economic inequality is captured by the Gini index, whereas new measures of political polarization and fracturalization are offered. This is the first paper to calculate political polarization and fracturalization indices by a methodology previously used for ethnic, religious and linguistic polarization and fracturalization. Empirical analysis uses data for 17 European countries and for three decades, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. It is shown that increased income inequality increases political party polarization and reduces fracturalization and that political party polarization decreases with increased GDP per capita.